Artificial Reproduction: The Right to Reproduce and the Right to Found a Family by Liu, Athena Nga Chee
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION:
THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE AND 
THE RIGHT TO FOUND A FAMILY
by
ATHENA NGA CHEE LIU
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE 
DEGREE OF P H .D IN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.
1 July, 1987.
@ ATHENA N. C. LIU
ProQuest Number: 10997368
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10997368
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
TO MY PARENTS,
STEWART,
MR. AND MRS. SIMPSON, 
AND SUKIE.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My thanks and gratitude to Sheila McLean whose 
indulgence in reading the manuscripts and whose 
observations and comments have proved to be most 
valuable. I would also like to thank Professor Alan 
Watson, Regius Professor of the Department of Forensic 
Medicine and Science for his generosity in allowing 
access to word processing facilities. I am also 
indebted to Eliz Doherty and Karen Stephens who 
speedly re-typed two missing chapters of this 
thesis. Particularly, my appreciation and thanks to 
Eliz who has patiently explained the various useful 
functions regarding word processing and printing 
facilities. Finally, my thanks to Professor Tom 
Campbell, Professor of the Department of
s
Jurisprudence, and Professor Robin Downie, Professor 
of the Department of Moral Philosophy, for their 
valuable comments to some of my earlier drafts.
Athena Liu, 1 July, 1987.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
(1) INFERTILITY AND ITS EXTENT
(2) CONVENTIONAL MEANS FOR ALLEVIATING 
INFERTILITY
(3) THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF INFERTILITY
(4) FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS
CHAPTER 2
V
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE METHODS
(1) INTRODUCTION 15
(2) ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 16
Types of Artificial Insemination 19
(a) Artificial Insemination Using
Husband 1s Semen 19
(b) Artificial Insemination by Donor 21
(c) Artificial Insemination Using 
Combined Semen of a Husband and
Donor 24
Current Status of Artificial Insemination 25
(3) IN VITRO FERTILISATION, EMBRYO REPLACEMENT
AND EMBRYOS TRANSFER 25
Success Rate of IVF 29
Current Status of IVF 32
(4) SURROGACY 3 5
Current Status of Surrogacy 41
(5) CONCLUSION 43
CHAPTER 3 
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE METHODS:
THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE AND 
THE RIGHT TO FOUND A FAMILY
(1) INTRODUCTION 45
(2) JUSTIFICATIONS OF USING RIGHTS-LANGUAGE 46
(3) THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE 51
American Judicial Recognition of the Right 
to Reproduce 53
British Judicial Attitude 59
(4) THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE AND ARTIFICIAL 
REPRODUCTIVE METHODS 67
(5) THE RIGHT OF THE INFERTILE TO REPRODUCE 71
(6) ARTICLE 12 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO FOUND A FAMILY 78
Minimum Guarantee 80
The Right of the Unmarried to Found a 
Family 81
Minimum State Assistance 83
(7) CONCLUSION: THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE, THE RIGHT 
TO FOUND A FAMILY AND ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE 
METHODS 85
CHAPTER 4 
MORAL AND SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF 
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES
(1) INTRODUCTION 89
(2) OBJECTIONS TO ARTIFICIAL TECHNIQUES:
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND IN VITRO 
FERTILISATION 91
Unnatural 91
Natural Procreation 93
(3) OBJECTIONS TO IVF 96
(4) OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF DONATED GAMETES 103
The Couple 103
Third Party Intervention 104
The Individual 107
Harm to an AID Child 108
(5) CONCLUSION 117
CHAPTER 5 
LEGAL ISSUES IN FOUNDING A FAMILY
BY ARTIFICIAL TECHNIQUES
1. INTRODUCTION 119
2. LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO FOUNDING A FAMILY BY 
ARTIFICIAL TECHNIQUES 123
Artificial Reproductive Techniques and
Their Effects on Marriage 123
(a) Consummation of Marriage 123
(b) Approbation of Marriage 125
(c) Adultery 129
Parenthood and Artificial Reproductive 
Techniques: AI & IVF 133
(a) Semen Donation and Fatherhood 136
(b) The Unmarried 140
(c) Ovum Donation and Motherhood 144
(d) Embryo Donation 145
(e) Summary 146
Registration of Birth 149
(3) CONCLUSION 152
CHAPTER 6 
MORAL AND SOCIAL
ACCEPTABILITY OF SURROGACY
(1) INTRODUCTION 155
(2) SURROGACY IN PRINCIPLE 161
Surrogacy as an Unnatural Practice 163
Harm to Surrogates and Surrogate-born 
Children 165
(3) SURROGACY WITH MONEY PAYMENT > 171
Surrogacy with Reasonable Compensation 172
Surrogacy For a Fee 174
(a) Inconsistent With Human Dignity 175
(i ) Slavery 17 7
(ii) Gestation for a Fee 179
(iii) Treating Anothers as a 
Means to an End and 
Exploitation 181
(b) Baby-Selling 188
(i) Surrogacy and Adoption 198
(ii) Role of the Courts in 
Performed Surrogacy 
Arrangements 202
(4) CONCLUSION 204
213
215
215
221
226
231
232
236
238
239
242
243
243
245
249
252
255
CHAPTER 7
LEGAL ISSUES IN SURROGACY 
INTRODUCTION
VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF A SURROGACY 
ARRANGEMENT
The 'Transfer Term'
The 'Carrying Term'
The 'Pre-natal Care Term'
PARENTHOOD AND SURROGACY 
Fatherhood 
Motherhood
Summary: Parenthood in Surrogacy 
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 8
STATE FUNDING OF ARTIFICIAL TECHNIQUES
INTRODUCTION 
ARGUMENT FROM RIGHTS
Right to Reproduce as a Positive Claim 
Right
Right to Found a Family as a Positive Claim 
Right
UTILITARIAN ARGUMENTS 
CONSISTENT HUMANITARIANISM 
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION 260
APPENDIX 1 269
APPENDIX 2 271
BIBLIOGRAPHY 277
ABBREVIATIONS
ALL. E R (All England Report)
Can. Bar Rev. (Canadian Bar Review)
D & R (Decisions and Reports of the European 
Commission of Human Rights)
DLR (Dominion Law Report)
Dec. Adm. Com. A p . (Decision of the European 
Commission of Human Rights as to the Admissibility of 
Application)
Fam. Law (Family Law)
M.L.R. (Modern Law Review)
N.L.J. (New Law Journal)
Op. Com. (Opinion of the European Commission of Human 
Rights)
P (Probate)
SC (Session Cases)
SLT (Scottish Law Times)
SUMMARY
In Britain, approximately 10% of all married 
couples are infertile. Infertility is a significant 
human problem which can generate distress and 
suffering. The use of artificial reproductive 
methods (artificial insemination, _in vitro 
fertilisation, and surrogacy) has been the subject of 
concern in this country, especially in the last few 
years. Discussions on the subject have usually been 
conducted with no reference to specific concepts.
This thesis endeavours to fill this theoretical gap.
It examines what rights, if any, people have in the 
areas of reproduction and founding of a family which 
may support the claim of the infertile to found a 
family (whether through reproduction or not) by using 
artificial reproductive methods. If certain rights 
are apparent, is there any compelling moral, social or 
legal justification for defeating or hindering their 
exercise? The moral and social acceptability of 
artificial reproductive methods and some of the 
complex and fundamental legal issues they engender 
will be examined. Assessments will be made as to 
whether compelling interests and legal difficulties 
can be satisfactorily resolved, thus removing them as 
serious obstacles to the exercise of rights. Lastly, 
the question of the type of access to artificial 
reproductive methods will be considered in the light 
of the nature and scope of the rights which have been 
identi fied.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
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(1) INFERTILITY AND ITS EXTENT
The problem of human infertility is as old as
humanity. For instance, it was recorded in Genesis
16 that Sarah, Abraham's wife, could not have children
and she asked her maid to bear him a child. Today,
it is estimated that approximately some 10%'*' of
British married couples are infertile for one reason 
2
or another; and that the husband's infertility is
3responsible m  about one-third of these couples.
This indicates an incidence of 16,000 marriages a year
4which will be infertile because of the husband.
In other words, the total number of infertile 
marriages per annum in the UK is about 48,000.
1. See The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology, London, HMSO,- 
Cmnd. 9314, 1984, para. 2.1, (hereinafter cited 
as the Warnock Report). The basis on which this 
figure is arrived at is not mentioned. It was 
said that 75% of couples engaging in normal 
sexual intercourse without using contraceptive 
devices achieve pregnancy within 12 months.
Where this is not the case, a couple may be 
potentially infertile. See Pepperill, R. J . , 
Hudson, B., Wood, C., The Infertile Couple, 
Edinburgh, Churchill Livingston, 1980, p.l.
2. For the various causes of infertility, see 
infra., chapter 2.
3. Snowden, R., & Mitchell, G.D., The Artificial
Family, London, Allen & Unwin, 1981, p. 14.
4. Snowden, R., & Mitchell, G.D., op. cit. p.14.
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(2) CONVENTIONAL MEANS FOR ALLEVIATING INFERTILITY
An obvious means whereby infertile couples can
have children is by adoption. Up to 100,000 British
couples at any one time would like to adopt 
5babies. However, the number of babies available
6for adoption has been declining since the 1970s.
7
As the Warnock Report noted, there are at least 
four reasons for this: (1) the widespread use of
contraceptive devices, (2) the increase in the number 
of abortions, (3) changing attitudes to, and state 
support for, single parents, and (4) the freer 
availability of sterilisation. As a result, there
g
are fewer babies available for adoption. In 1983, 
there were only 9,029 adoptions in England and 
Wales. Over half of these were 'step-parent 
adoptions' (that is, where one of the adoptive parents 
was already the child's biological parent). Fewer 
than 2,000 of the remaining adoptees were under one 
year old. The most sought after group of healthy 
white babies were adopted at a rate of about 1,200 a
5. See “Is Buying Babies Bad?", The Economist, 12 
Jan., 1985, p . 12.
6. "Is Buying Babies Bad?", loc. cit.
7. The Warnock Report, para. 2.1.
8. However, there are some 20,000 'special needs'
children in the care of British local 
authorities. For the work of adoption agencies
in finding homes for these children, see Ingram, 
Miranda, “Adopting the Unadoptable", New Society, 
9 August, 1985, pp. 206-7.
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year. The demand for them, therefore, is in no way
9
reflected by the supply. Consequently, only a 
relatively small number of couples can succeed in 
adopting a baby.
(3) THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF INFERTILITY
Whether the desire for a child emanates from an
innate biological drive, or relates to social
pressures, or a combination of these factors, is not
the issue h e r e . ^  The reality is that a large
number of infertile couples desperately want either
children of their own (that is, they wish to
procreate), or other children, in order that they may
establish a family. ^
This is borne out by the fact that a large
number of infertile couples seek medical advice and
12
assistance on how to achieve pregnancy. Some
couples are even willing to go through often very 
complicated fertility diagnostic procedures, in some
9. See "Is Buying Babies Bad?", The Economist, 12 
Jan., 1985, p. 12. The demand and supply ratio 
in the UK is 80:1.
10. For a discussion regarding the tenability of the 
procreational instinct theory, see Ruut, 
Veenhoven, "Is There an Innate Need for 
Children?", (1975) 4 European Journal of Social 
Psychology, pp. 495-501.
11. See infra, chapter 3, pp. 71-77, for the 
distinction between procreation and founding of a 
family.
12. See Menning, B.E., "The Infertile Couple: a Plea
for Advocacy", (1975) 54 Child Welfare, 454.
- 4 -
cases to the extent of exhausting the last personal, 
emotional and medical possibility, in an attempt to 
have a child.
The diagnostic procedure for infertility is 
13often complicated. It involves the use of basal
temperature chart, blood and urine studies for various 
hormonal levels, semen analysis, biopsies of tissue, 
x-ray examination of the reproductive tract or even 
direct visualisation, by surgical means, of internal 
organs. Depending on the diagnosis, treatment may 
consist of the provision of hormones or steroids, 
which may be hazardous or have unpleasant side 
effects. Surgically, an individual may require 
resection or repair of organs or a delicate operation 
in an attempt to open passage ways.
The final verdict of infertility is always 
traumatic. The initial shock of it gives way to a 
protracted period of human suffering, with an eventual
resolution of feelings and, hopefully, recovery.
14Nijs & Rouffa reported a sequence of four stages 
which embrace a feeling of confusion for one week; 
puzzlement, rebellion and doubting for 2 or 3 weeks; 
sexual dysfunction for 2 or 3 months and a depressive 
reaction which may last 6 months. According to
13. Menning, B.E., loc. cit.
14. Nijs, P., Rouffa, L . , "AID Couples: Psychological 
and Psychopathological Evaluation", (1975) 7 
Andrologia 187.
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them, this sequence is reminiscent of the changes 
which follow bereavement. The initial sense of shock 
is accompanied by feelings of confusion and numbness, 
often with an associated sense of isolation and 
loneliness. They reported that the individual may 
experience anger at the sense of losing control of his 
or her body. Lowered self-esteem may lead to 
feelings of despair, and quilt feelings may be 
evoked. Grief is felt not only over the loss of the 
body's fertility function but also over the implicit 
loss of a natural child (potential, anonymous and 
ideali sed).
Furthermore, infertility may have serious
social and psychological consequences in both men and
women. In a survey of patients in an in vitro
fertilisation programme, some of the important reasons
given for wanting children are that one has a strong
desire to have a child, life is incomplete without a
child, or the feeling of uselessness without a 
15child. An infertile woman, thus, may feel that
her life is incomplete, unfulfilled and that she is 
not quite a 'woman' because she is unable to have a 
child, or to undertake the role of parenting.
15. Singer, P. & Wells, D, The Reproduction
Revolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1984, p. 237.
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If a man is infertile, he is somehow seen to be
lacking manhood and inadequate. This, perhaps,
explains partly why AID (that is, artificial
insemination using semen from a donor) is almost
16invariably kept secret. A wife who has received
AID writes,
"...I personally would prefer to adopt a 
child but my husband was absolutely 
against it. Ke was scared by the 
thought that people should know he was no 
good...
Infertility may also put great strain on 
marriages. One infertile woman describes her feeling in 
this way:
"I gave myself to the end of this year to 
become pregnant (having tried to have a 
baby for the past five years), and I 
decided that if I wasn't, then I had best 
leave my husband and let him look for a 
younger, more productive lady to have a 
baby with. This will be a very sad 
thing, as Martin and I have everything 
going for us, but children.1
Infertility, therefore, is a genuine and
sometimes destructive human problem. Its
circumvention has considerable importance both for the
happiness of individuals, and for the future of the
species. Yet, decisions taken in this respect have
16. See infra, chapter 4, pp. 108-116.
17. Snowden, R. & Mitchell, G. D., op. cit. p. 40. 
See also Snowden, R. & Mitchell, G. D., 
Artificial Reproduction: a Social Investigation,
Allen & Unwin, London, 1984.
18. See Singer, P. Sc Wells, D., op. cit. p. 54.
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both moral and legal implications which must be 
considered in tandem with social consequences. It is 
not sufficient, therefore, merely to state that there 
is a problem causing human suffering and demanding 
attention. If already limited resources are to be 
channelled into this area, a consistent ideology is 
needed to explain the commitment to infertility 
circumvention, and delineate the extent to which 
services can, or should, be made available. If such 
a rationale can be found and adequately explained, 
then there are implications for society, for medicine 
and for the law.
It is clear that there is a sizeable proportion
of the population for whom the inability to procreate
and/or to found a family can cause considerable
suffering. Since the conventional means for the
circumvention of infertility eg. adoption are
inadequate to meet all these needs, and since
alternative artificial reproductive methods
19(artificial insemination, bn vitro 
2 0fertilisation and surrogacy) have been developed 
which can circumvent various causes of infertility, 
the contention is often that these methods should be 
available to enable people to found a family
19. Hereinafter referred to as A I .
20. Hereinafter referred to as IVF.
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21(whether through reproduction or not), and that 
they should also be part of state funded infertility 
treatments. This thesis examines the strength of 
this contention.
(4) FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS
Before embarking on an appraisal of the 
strength of this contention, chapter 2 will explain 
the nature, usefulness and current status of the 
artificial reproductive methods which will be 
considered in this thesis.
The use of artificial reproductive methods for 
the founding of a family (whether through reproduction 
or not) has been the subject of concern both in 
British and in many other affluent societies.
Although debates today are mainly centred on the 
acceptability of surrogacy, rather than AI & IVF, an 
examination and appraisal of the debates regarding the 
latter, and not simply the former, can and will 
furnish a wider picture concerning the claim of the 
infertile to have access to artificial reproductive 
methods.
21. Eg. a wife, with a sterile husband, undertaking 
artificial insemination using semen of a donor 
will be founding a family through reproduction, 
whereas the husband may be said to be founding a 
family without reproduction, see infra, chapter 
3 ,pp. 71-77f for a fuller exposition of the
distinction between the concepts of reproduction 
and founding of a family.
- 9 -
In considering this, one is clearly dealing
with moral and social issues as well as legal ones.
Although the law is not the exact mirror of morality,
the reaction and the role of the law regarding
artificial reproductive methods must and should be
anchored on conclusions reached after rational
22discussion of the issues involved.
Debates regarding the acceptability of 
artificial reproductive methods have often been 
conducted in a vacuum in which no specific conceptual 
position is adopted or referred to. This is so even 
in relation to AI & IVF which have largely been 
accepted by the British society at large as viable 
alternative methods of enabling the founding of a 
family (whether through reproduction or not). The 
relative absence of a theoretical perspective is 
especially striking, and significant, in debates 
regarding the acceptability of surrogacy.
In this thesis, endeavours will, thus, be made 
to fill this theoretical gap in the current debates. 
The discussion, therefore, will concentrate on viewing 
the problems of infertility and their circumvention 
from a rights-based perspective. This type of 
discourse is increasingly used to validate claims
22. This is particularly vital in the context of 
surrogacy where emotion and sentiment can run 
high.
- 10 -
which individuals feel to be particularly 
significant. It may, therefore, prove to be fruitful 
to consider analytically the value of such discourse 
in relation to those whose condition militates against 
the satisfaction of a need, which is strongly felt to 
be both legitimate and desirable.
To that end, endeavours will be made, in
chapter 3, to examine what rights, if any, people have
in the areas of reproduction and founding of a family
both by analysing Anglo-American judicial attitudes,
and the philosophy behind Article 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights which talks about the
23"right to marry and to found a family".
In this chapter, the two concepts - 
reproduction and founding of a family - will be 
discussed in detail in order to assess whether or not 
they are essentially aspects of the same right, or 
whether they can be meaningfully perceived as separate 
individual rights.
Chapter 3, in effect, sets out the thematic 
approach of the whole thesis. If individuals have 
certain rights in the areas of reproduction and 
founding of a family, some social and legal 
implications can be drawn from this regarding the use
23. See generally, Jacobs, F.G., The European
Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1975, p. 162.
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of artificial reproductive methods. Moreover, the 
nature of any identificable rights may significantly 
affect the expectations which may legitimately attach 
to the behaviour of a given state. These issues will 
be the subjects of consideration in the rest of the 
thesi s .
Having examined what rights people have in the 
areas of reproduction and founding of a family, the 
question is:- is the use of artificial reproductive 
methods in order to exercise these rights 
acceptable? In other words, are there compelling 
moral, social or legal reasons which may hinder or 
defeat the exercise of rights? Chapters 4 and 6, 
therefore, deal with the moral and social 
acceptability of artificial techniques (AI, IVF, and 
the use of donated gametes), and surrogacy, 
respectively, in founding a family (whether through 
reproduction or not).
These two chapters essentially involve analysis 
of the validity, compellingness and superability of 
certain arguments - whether personal, social or moral 
in nature - against the use of artificial reproductive 
methods. This is consistent with the theme, 
established in chapter 3, that the burden of proof in 
arguments seeking to deny access to use artificial 
reproductive methods for the founding of a family 
(whether through reproduction or not) is on those who 
maintain such a view.
- 12 -
It will be argued, in both chapters 4 & 6, that 
artificial reproductive methods, as means of founding 
a family (whether through reproduction or not) should 
not be outlawed. Regulation may furnish a bedrock 
for these methods, and a proper legal foundation for 
their use, which is also important, can be shaped.
Consequently, in chapters 5 & 7, certain vital 
legal issues involved in founding a family through 
artificial reproductive methods will be examined.
One legal issue, engendered by the use of
artificial reproductive methods, is the definition of
parenthood. The law and society are obviously
24interested m  this question, since all children 
have legally defined parents unless they are unknown 
(e.g. in cases of babies abandoned at birth, or where 
fathers are unknown). Furthermore, since current 
English and Scottish law use the concept of parenthood 
as the device for according parental duties regarding 
children born as a result of natural reproduction, it 
seems logical to analyse, in relation to children born 
as a result of artificial reproductive methods where 
the question of parenthood is not totally certain at 
the moment, who ought to, or should, have parental
24. See eg. attempts to amend Clause 1 of the Family 
Law Reform Bill 1987 by Lord Denning and Lord 
Kilbracken, to include definitions of 'mother' 
and 'father'. See Weekly Hansard, Vol. 484, No. 
1352, Col. 552-527, See Appendix 1.
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duties in their respect. Resolution of this issue 
may further facilitate questions relating to, for 
example, registration of births.
Surrogacy as a means of founding a family, 
however, can generate additional legal issues, 
including questions of enforceability and the means of 
securing a legally recognised relationship between the 
commissioning parties and a surrogate-born child.
These issues will be examined in chapters 6 & 7.
In conclusion, therefore, it will be contended
that certain rights are apparent in matters relating
to human reproduction in general, and in artificial
reproductive methods in particular. Such rights can
be the cornerstone' of an argument in favour of access
to artificial reproductive methods - an argument which
\
could be defeated only where the individual concerned 
is deemed not to have such rights, or where the 
methods themselves are perceived as morally or 
socially unacceptable i_n se.
In chapter 8, however, consideration will be 
given to the implications of accepting such methods, 
and will explore specifically the issue as to whether 
or not identification and exposition of these rights 
necessarily implies a certain type of access - that 
is, given that artificial reproductive methods are not 
inherently unacceptable morally and socially, and that 
fundamental legal difficulties are not insurmountable, 
does this demand state provision of these methods?
- 14 -
The use of artificial reproductive methods for
the founding of a family can raise many social and 
25legal issues. This thesis, therefore, is only an
inceptive attempt to examine the question, and to 
analyse some of the fundamental legal issues which are 
consequential on medical advance. It is hoped that 
the thesis will generate, and contribute to, debate 
both in respect of the issues discussed, and on a 
wider range of important issues in the field of 
artificial reproduction.
25. For a discussion of the issue of eligibility, see 
eg. the Warnock Report, paras. 2.5-2.12; Higgs 
Roger, "Lesbian Couples: Should Help Extend to 
AID", (1978) 4 Journal of Medical Ethics, p. 91; 
Hanscombe, Gillian, "The Right to Lesbian 
Parenthood", (1983) 9 Journal of Medical Ethics, 
i p. 133. For a discussion of the possible legal 
issues engendered by the use of artificial 
reproductive methods, see eg. Cusine, D. J., 
"Artificial Insemination", in McLean, S.A.M.
(ed), Legal Issues in Medicine, Aldershot, Gower, 
1981, p. 163; Wright Gerald, "The Legal 
Implications of IVF", in Test-Tube Babies, a 
Christian View, London, Unity Press, Becket 
Publications, 1984, pp. 39-44.
CHAPTER 2
v  —  ■ ■ ' 1
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE METHODS
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(1) INTRODUCTION
This chapter will seek to provide a brief
exposition of both the nature and the estimated
efficacy of artificial reproductive methods in the
circumvention of infertility (whether through
reproduction or not).
Throughout this thesis, certain terminology is
used to differentiate and distinguish the matter under
consideration. Thus, the term artificial
reproductive 'techniques' is used to refer to
26artificial insemination and m  vitro
. . . 27 .fertilisation, including their variations where
donated gametes are used. Surrogacy, therefore, is
not taken to be an artificial reproductive technique
as such, but is rather one of the artificial
reproductive 'methods', when it is being implemented
by artificial techniques. Thus, the term artificial
reproductive 'methods' will be used in this thesis to
include AI, IVF and surrogacy (as implemented by
artificial techniques), whereas, artificial
'techniques' refers only to A I , IVF and the use of
donated gametes. Since the thesis concerns
artificial reproduction, surrogacy as implemented by
2 8natural means will not be discussed.
26. Hereinafter referred to as A I .
27. Hereinafter referred to as IVF.
28. That is, no consideration will be given to 
pregnancies achieved by means of sexual 
intercourse even when they are specifically
achieved with the aim that the subsequent child
should be handed over to the social mother.
- 16 -
In this chapter, three main artificial 
reproductive methods, as options for the infertile who 
seek to found a family (whether through reproduction 
or not), will be considered.
(2) ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (AI)
AI is a technique whereby semen of a man is
mechanically introduced into a woman's vagina with the
intention that conception will take place.
The first recorded human artificial
insemination was in 1790 when a British doctor, John
Hunter, succeeded in inseminating the wife of a linen
draper in London with the seed of her husband who was
suffering from a disability which made normal
intercourse impossible. It was reported that normal
29pregnancy and delivery ensued.
The first recorded successful human 
insemination by donor (AID) was not performed until 
1884 in the U.S.A.. This was revealed when, in 1909, 
Addison Davis Hard published in a letter in an 
American journal - Medical World - in which he claimed 
that the first human donor insemination had been 
performed at Jefferson Medical College in America in 
1884. The operation was performed when it was found
29. Finegold, Wilfred J., Artificial Insemination, 
Springfield, Illinois, Charles C. Thomas, 1964, 
pp. 5-9.
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30that a patient's husband was azoospermic. The
surgeon discussed the case in the medical school with
a group of students/ one of whom was Hard. They
suggested that semen should be collected from the
'best looking member of the class' and used to
inseminate the wife. According to Hard/ the operation
was performed under anaesthetic and neither the wife
nor the husband was informed. The wife became
pregnant and a son was born. The secret was kept
until the son was 25 when Hard published information
concerning the experiment.
In the U.K./ the issue of artificial
insemination was discussed seriously in the 
311930s. In 1945/ the general public, the press
32and parliament became involved. The then
Archbishop of Canterbury set up a commission to 
enquire into the development of A I . The Commission's 
report, published in 1948, strongly criticised AID and
recommended that the practice should be made a
. . 33criminal offence. In I960, the Feversham
Committee Report concluded that AID was
30. That is, the husband's semen contained no livng
sperm cells, and thus, he was sterile.
31. See Snowden, R. & Mitchell, G.D., The Artificial
Family, London, Allen & Unwin, 198T^ pi 15”.
32. See Snowden, R., & Mitchell, G.D., op. cit., p.
15.
33. See the Report of the Commission, Human 
Artificial Insemination, published in 1948, 
reprinted in 1952 by S.P.C.K..
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34undesirable. Nonetheless, AID continued to be
practised on a small scale. By 1970, public opinion
had changed considerably regarding AID, and a Panel of
inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir John Peel
35reported more favourably on AID. In 1979, the
practice had become so widespread that the Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG)
provided the following written information to
prospective recipients:
"Artificial insemination has been 
practised in this country for many 
years. Each year several hundred 
children are born following this 
procedure, bringing a great deal of 
happiness to parents...The treatment is 
straight-forward and painless. It will 
be carridd out by a doctor or nurse who 
will insert a single instrument into the 
vagina to place the sperm in the mucus at 
the neck of the womb."36
The actual number of human artificial
inseminations performed from nation to nation is
unknown. This is due partly to the secrecy
surrounding artificial insemination, and partly to the
fact that the introduction of regulation and control
34. Departmental Committee on Human Artificial 
Insemination, London, HMSO, Cmnd. 1105, 1960, 
para. 239, (hereinafter cited as the Feversham 
Report).
35. Peel Committee, "Report of the Panel on Human 
Artificial Insemination", (1973) 2 British 
Medical Journal, Suppl., Appendix V, p. 3, para. 
12.
36. RCGG, Artificial Insemination, explanatory 
information booklet for patients, London, 1979.
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37is a recent phenonmenon m  many countries.
Recent estimates are that about 1,700 children a year
3 8are born as a result of AID in the UK, and there 
are a number of medical centres in the UK performing 
AI either as private service or as part of the NHS. 
Developments in the last few decades clearly show that 
AI has gradually become an acceptable method of 
circumventing certain causes of infertility.
Types of Artificial Insemination 
There are three kinds of artificial 
insemination which may be used to enable the founding
of a family (whether through procreation or
4. \ 39 n o t ) .
(a ) Artificial Insemination Using Husband's
Semen
This form of artificial insemination uses semen 
from a husband to inseminate his wife (AIH), and is
37. Thus, in December 1972, at the CIBA Foundation 
symposium on Law and Ethics of AID & ET held in 
London, it was said that no nation kept a 
register recording details of AID, see Law & 
Ethics of AID and Embryo Transfer, London, 
Associated Scientific Publishers, 1973, p. 4.
38. See Legislation on Human Infertility Services and 
Embryo Research - A Consultation Paper, HMSO, 
London, Cm. 46, 1986, (hereinafter cited as the
Consultation paper).
39. For a further discussion of these techniques, see 
Cusine, D. J. , Modern Reproductive Techniques, 
Aldershot, Gower, (Forthcoming 1988).
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sometimes referred to as homologous insemination.
This is not frequently used, because there are very
few situations where it is of value. However, it is
40appropriate m  the following situations:
(i) Where there are factors, for example,
physical difficulties, on the part of either a husband
or wife (or both) preventing achievement of
intercourse, but when the fertility of both parties is
otherwise adequate. Male physical difficulties
41include retrograde ejaculation, physical 
impotence, penile deformity and obesity. Female 
physical difficulties may include obesity, vaginal
scarring or tumours, abnormal uterine position,
42 . . 43vaginismus and cervical hostility.
(ii) Where a husband is subfertile because of 
defective spermatozoa, the chances of conception may 
be improved if one can separate the fertile part of 
the semen from the less fertile. Since semen can be 
preserved, several specimens of a husband's semen can 
be collected to form one single insemination. A I ,
40. See generally, the Feversham Report, paras. 62-70.
41. Patients suffering from this condition have the 
sensation of ejaculation but semen is deflected 
into the bladder instead of being discharged 
externally. Sperm can be salvaged for AIH.
42. This entails painful spasm of the vagina 
associated with aversion from intercourse.
43. This is where sperm are killed or rendered 
inactive by cervical mucus.
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therefore, may be more effective than natural 
intercourse. AIH can also be used where a husband's 
subfertility is caused by poor motility of sperm cells.
(iii) If a man is about to undergo vasectomy, 
he may wish to obtain a store of his semen so that he 
can have children if he wishes in the future.
The advantages of AIH are that a husband and 
wife can found a family through reproduction. 
Consequently, a husband will not feel left out of the 
reproductive process. Furthermore, there is no
difficulty or ambiguity with a resulting child's legal
44status, and the question of parenthood is not
45raised. AIH is, thus, the least controversial of
the available artificial techniques, morally, socially 
and legally.^
(b) Artificial Insemination by Donor 
Artificial insemination by donor is sometimes 
called heterologous insemination. This involves the 
insemination of a woman (usually a married woman) with 
the semen of a donor, and may be the answer to certain 
causes of infertility. There are three situations 
where AID can be used:
(i) AID is mainly used where a husband's semen 
is defective for one reason or another, causing
44. Compare this with an AID child, see infra,
chapter 5, pp. 119-121.
45. See infra, chapter 5, pp. 133-144.
46. See infra, chapters 4 & 5.
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sterility or gross subfertility. This may be due to
the following conditions. For instance, his semen
may contain no living sperm cells (azoospermia), or it
may have no sperm cells at all (aspermia). Both of
these conditions result in absolute male sterility.
Other conditions may be where the husband's semen
contains too few spermatozoa (oligospermia), or very
47few motile sperm cells (oligozoospermia).
(ii) AID may be used where a husband suffers 
from hereditary diseases, for example, Huntington's 
Chorea, haemophilia, hereditary blindness or certain 
types of muscular dystrophy, which are likely to be 
transmitted to his children. AID can sometimes be 
used in cases of rhesus incompatibility, or where the 
wife has a history of spontaneous abortion which may 
be due to abnormality in her husband's sperm.
The advantages of AID in the above situations 
are obvious. It gives certain infertile couples an 
opportunity to have a child of whom the wife is the 
biological mother. Furthermore, AID does not
47. In a normal man, there may be a hundred million 
or more spermatozoa per cubic centimetre of 
semen. Sixty million may be regarded as below 
normal but not low enough for AID to be 
considered. However, it is not possible to say 
that a man with less than a certain number of 
sperm cells is completely sterile. The number 
of sperm cells per cubic centimetre varies from 
one week to another. Therefore, a husband's 
semen is usually examined on several occasions 
before a practitioner decides whether AID is 
necessary. This is a precaution taken to avoid 
a situation where after the birth of an AID 
child, the husband is found to be capable of 
fathering a child.
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necessarily entail public admission of male sterility/ 
and a wife can experience pregnancy, which may be very 
important to some women.
(iii) The third possible use of AID is where a 
single woman wants a child but is unwilling to 
conceive by conventional means for one reason or 
another.
At present, semen in AID is mainly collected
from medical students and husbands of obstetric
48 .patients. General criteria for selection of
semen donors are as follows: the donor should be of
reasonable intelligence and should understand the
nature of the donation, he should have a good medical
v
background, with no former record of mental disease or
other transmittable hereditary diseases. In
addition, a donor with matching physical
characteristics to that of the husband is often
preferred. The donors 1s identity is kept
anonymous. Thus, neither the donor nor the couple
49know each other. The success rate of AID depends
on the selection of the participants, but it may be as
48. Joyce, D.N., "Recruitment, Selection and Matching 
of Donors", in Brudenell, M., et al. (eds.), 
Artificial Insemination, Proceedings of the 
Fourth Study Group of the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, RCOG, 1976, pp. 
60-69, (hereinafter cited as Arti f icial 
Insemination, RCOG, 1976).
49. See Snowden, R. & Mitchell, G.D., op. cit., pp. 
62-72.
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50high as 75%. On average, it takes 3 or 4 cycles
for conception to occur and, sometimes, it can take 
much longer.
(c ) Artificial Insemination Using Combined
Semen of a husband and donor
This technique is otherwise known as CAI or
confused artificial insemination, and is sometimes
used where a husband is not completely sterile but has
only a few motile sperm cells (oligozoospermia). A
child conceived as a result of the use of this method
of conception may still be the biological child of the
husband. There is no way to determine whether this
52is so without paternity testing. However,
majority opinion in medical circles is against CAI on
the ground that it diminishes the effectiveness of 
53AID. Moreover, it confuses the status of
resulting children.
50. See Kerr, M.G. & Rogers, C. , "Donor 
Insemination", (1975) 1 Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 30, 31. See also Artificial 
Insemination, RCOG, 197 6.
51. See Artificial Insemination, RCOG, 1976.
52. See Maidment Susan, "DNA Fingerprinting", (1986) 
136/1 N.L.J. 326.
53. See Human Procreation, Ethical Aspects of the New 
Techniques, Report of a Working Party Council for 
Science and Society, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1984, p. 40, (hereinafter cited as Human 
Procreation, CSS, 1984). Neither the Warnock 
Report nor the Consultation paper mentioned this 
particular type of artificial insemination.
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Current Status of AI
The provision of AI seems to be relatively 
54uncomplicated. Whether AIH or AID, the technique
is relatively simple and in terms of its use, AI is 
now a well-established technique. Current debates 
have tended to centre on certain social and legal 
problems which are consequential to the technique 
itself, for example, the status of AID children, the
issue of fatherhood, registration and recording of AID
55 . .births, rather than on the acceptability or
56legality of the technique itself.
(3) IN VITRO FERTILISATION (IVF), EMBRYO REPLACEMENT 
AND EMBRYO TRANSFER
Whereas artificial insemination essentially 
dominated artificial reproductive technology until 
fairly recently, additional techniques are now 
available which may be useful in cases of infertility 
where AI is of little or no assistance.
Whilst AI functioned mainly when the 
infertility was that of the male partner, female 
difficulties in conception may now also be overcome in
54. See Artificial Insemination, RCOG, 197 6.
55. See infra, chapter 5, pp.133-151.
56. See generally, Snowden, R., & Mitchell, G.D., op.
cit. and Snowden, R., & Mitchell, G.D.,
Artificial Reproduction: a Social Investigation, 
London, Allen & Unwin, 1983.
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some cases. Perhaps the commonest, and best known, 
of these techniques is that of In vitro fertilisation 
(IVF).
The publicity surrounding the development and 
use of this technique has rendered the phrase 
'test-tube baby' a part of everyday language. In 
fact, this is something of a misnomer, since 1 in 
vitro1, is Latin for 'in glass', and therefore IVF 
simply means fertilisation of a female ovum by male
■u n  57sperm m  a shallow saucer.
The technique of IVF was developed in order to
facilitate conception by bypassing damaged or blocked
fallopian tubes whose functions were inadequate to
5 8produce pregnancies. Unsuccessful tubal surgery
is the major reason for turning to IVF.
57. See Human Proceation, CSS, 1984, pp. 13-27.
58. The functions of fallopian tubes include the 
collection of oocytes, transportation of sperm 
from the uterus to the outer end of the fallopian 
tube, nutrition and transportation of an early 
embryo down the fallopian tube to the uterine 
cavity. Inadequacies in any of these functions 
would make pregnancies difficult or impossible. 
The major kind of tubal pathology which causes 
infertility is adhesions; inflammation of the 
lining of the uterus to which the fallopian tubes 
connect directly on either side, by way of a 
structure known as the horn of the uterus. Such 
inflammation can be caused by intra-uterine 
devices (IUD's), pelvic inflammatory disease, or 
gonorrhoea.
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IVF in humans is a recent development. Most
of the early technical advances were made in England
59by Edwards and Steptoe. These included
collection of occytes by laparoscopy,^
fertilisation of occytes matured _in vitro, in vitro
61development of embryos to the blastocyst stage.
62In 197 6, they reported a tubal ectopic pregnancy
63resulting from IVF. The first successful
replacement of an embryo to a uterus was made by them
in 1978 in the treatment of Mrs. Lesley Brown,
64resulting m  the birth of the first IVF baby.
It has been said that IVF may be useful for
about 5% of women who have damaged or diseased
65fallopian tubes. It will be useful, for example,
where a woman's fertility cannot be alleviated by 
tubal surgery because of the severity of the blockage 
or disease, or where the tube has been removed 
altogether. Where a woman is not ovulating, IVF of a 
donated ovum may be achieved. IVF may also be used
59. See Edwards, R.G. & Steptoe, P., A Matter of
Li fe, London, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1980; Hann, 
Judith, The Perfect Baby, London, George 
W'eidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., 1982, Chapter 7.
60. Laparoscopy is an operation performed under local 
anaesthesia whereby a telescope is passed into 
the abdominal cavities enabling the inspection of 
internal organs and the collection of ova from 
the ovaries.
61. Han, Judith, op. cit.
62. Foetus growing in the fallopian tube instead of 
the womb.
63. Flan, Judith, op. cit.
64. Edwards, R.G. & Steptoe, P., op. cit.
65. See the Warnock Report, para. 5.1.
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in cases where a husband's semen contains an
insufficient number of spermatozoa (oligospermia).
In such cases, fertilisation may take place under
laboratory conditions rather than after sexual
intercourse. Additionally, IVF may be useful to
66couples who suffer from unexplained sterility.
In other words, IVF can be useful to some
infertile people for the founding of a family (whether
through reproduction or not). Thus, where a couple's
infertilty is due, for instance, to the female
partner's blocked fallopian tubes, IVF allows the
couple both to reproduce and to found a family. The
technique is completed by the reimplantation of the
\
fertilised ovum - otherwise known as embryo 
replacement (hereinafter referred to as ER). Thus,
the woman who provides the ovum, may have it 
fertilised outside of her womb and reimplanted.
Where reimplantation is successful, she is both the 
biological and the bearing mother.
The same technique can also be applied in 
situations where the woman is sterile, but is able to 
carry a child. In this case, fertilisation is 
undertaken of a donated ovum, and the resulting embryo 
is then implanted in the womb of the bearing, but not 
biological mother. This technique is referred to as 
embyro transfer (hereinafter referred to as E T ).
66. See the Warnock Report, para. 5.1.
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Additionally, donated semen can be used in
IVF., For instance, where a male partner is sterile,
and the female partner has blocked fallopian tubes,
fertilisation of the female's ovum can be achieved in
vitro using donated semen.
Although the permutations of IVF are varied,
and the social and legal implications may differ, IVF
remains simply a fertilisation technique in it purest
G7form, and need not be associated with surrogacy.
Thus, in the situations described above, surrogacy is 
not involved, and the arguments which may be used 
against surrogacy cannot be taken to apply
68automatically or fully to these uses of IVF.
Success Rate of IVF
It is difficult to give a uniform assessment of
the 'success rate' of IVF because scientists use the
term in different ways. However, one way of
assessing the issue is to consider the number of
pregnancies per laparoscopy.
In England, the figures given by Edwards &
Steptoe in 1983 were 967 laparoscopies and 192
pregnancies. That is, a pregnancy rate of between 
6919-20%.
67. For a discussion on surrogacy, see infra, pp. 
35-42.
68. For a full discussion of the arguments for or 
against surrogacy, see infra, chapter 6.
69. See the iwarnock Report, para. 5.13.
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Another way of looking at the success rate of
IVF is to ask how many embryos created actually result
in pregnancies. One trial in Melbourne resulted in a
pregnancy rate of 12-18% when only one embryo was put
70back into the uterus.
This, however, does not indicate the survival
rate of all embryos created, which depends on the
practice of particular IVF centres. For instance,
the practice of Carl Wood's team in Melbourne is to
collect as many oocytes as possible in one single
laparoscopy, fertilise them all and select the best
71for implantation. Thus, some embryos may be
found to be unsuitable for implantation whilst others
are 'spare' embryos and are frozen. Since the
survival rate for frozen embryos is very low, they are
counted amongst those that do not survive. With this
practice, one achieves a higher birth rate per
laparoscopy but a lower rate of birth per embryos
created. According to the figures supplied by Dr.
Alan Trounson, between 1980-1982, Wo o d 's team obtained
876 oocytes and succeeded in fertilising 633 of them
for 272 patients. Out of these 633, there were 45
live births. That is, for every 14 embryos created,
72one finally became a baby. In England, the
70. See Singer, P., & Wells, D., op. cit., p. 25.
71. Singer, P., & Wells, D., op. cit. p. 25.
72. Singer, P., & Wells, D., p. 25.
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practice is similar/ except that where embryos are not
implanted, they are thrown away or used for research
73and experiments. Some may be frozen.
These practices have met with some moral
74 . . .objections. As a result, m  Norfolk, Virginia,
the practice is to fertilise only as many oocytes as a
woman is willing to have transferred to her
V. 75womb.
Up until now, there have been two reported
abnormalities following IVF pregnancies. One was the
76spontaneous abortion of a triploid foetus, and the
other was the birth of a child with transposition of
77 . .the major vessels of the heart. The limited
v
data, thus, does not suggest an increased frequency of 
congenital abnormalities among IVF conceptuses. In 
experienced IVF clinics, the frequency of spontaneous 
abortions also does not seem to be in excess of that
73. See Guardian, October, 8, 1982.
74. For the debates on the moral status of embryos,
see Jonstcn, Brian, "The boral Status of the 
Embryo: Two Viewpoints", in Test-Tube Babies: a 
Guide to Moral Questions, Present Techniques and 
Future Possibilities, in Walters, W.A.W. &
Singer, P. (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1984, p. 49.
75. Singer, P. & Wells, D., op. cit., p. 25.
76. A triploid has 69 chromosomes rather than 46.
See Steptoe, Edwards & Purdy, "Clinical Aspects 
of Pregnancies Established with Cleaving Embryos 
Growth In Vitro", (1980) 87 British Journal of 
Obstetric and Gynaecology.
77. Wood, Trounson, Leeton etc., "Research Features 
of Eight Pregnancies Resulting from IVF & E T ", 
(1982) 38 Fertility Sterility 22.
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78anticipated in natural conception (12-18%),
Finally, several tubal pregnancies have been reported
following IVF, but these are not unexpected since most
of the women in question had remnants of severely
damaged fallopian tubes, which might predispose them
79towards ectopic pregnancies.
Current Status of IVF
IVF, in comparison with A I , is a much newer 
artificial reproductive technique. It has generated
a number of wider issues which have moral, social and
8 0legal implications. Nonetheless, as an
artificial reproductive technique which aims at 
circumventing certain causes of infertility in order 
to enable some infertile people to found a family, it 
is now widely accepted.
For instance, the British Medical Association's 
working group on In Vitro Fertilisation and Embryo 
Replacement and Transfer (1982) took the view that IVF
was an acceptable means to circumvent certain forms of
81infertility. The barncck Report took the same
78. Trounson & Conti, "Research in Human IVF & E T ",
(1982) 285 British Medical Journal 244.
79. Steptoe & Edwards, "Reimplantation of a Human 
Embryo with Subsequent Tubal Pregnancy", (1975) 
Lancet 880.
80. See infra, chapter 5.
81. See "Interim Report on Human In Vitro 
Fertilisation and Embryo Replacement and 
Transfer", (1983) 286 British Medical Journal, 
1594.
view, and recommended that IVF "should continue to be
82
available within the N H S . "
Consistent with the acceptance of the use of
donated semen in A I , the BMA considers the use of a
male partner's sperm and a donated ovum for IVF & ET
8 3to a female partner not unethical. The same view
was also reached by the Warnock Report, which endorsed
the use of donated embryos by infertile couples where
a female partner is capable of carrying a child to 
84term.
In 1984, there were some hundreds of babies
8 5born throughout the world as a result of IVF, and 
some 36 medical teams offering IVF in Eritain, 
Australia, the USA and most of Western Europe.^
The government Consultation paper published in 1986
stated that about 1,000 births in total in the UK were
8 7thought to have involved IVF.
It can be seen, therefore, that - whatever 
objections there may be to this practice - it is now 
widely used and relatively uncontentious. Of course, 
this explains only its use, and says nothing about its
82. See para. 5.10.
83. See "Interim Report on Human In Vitro
Fertilisation and Embryo Replacement and 
Transfer", (1983) 286 British Medical Journal, 
1594.
84. See The Warncck Report, paras. 6.6 and 7.4.
85. See the Warnock Report, para. 5.5.
86. See Singer & Wells, "IVF: the Major Issues",
(1983) 9 Journal of Medical Ethics 192.
87. par a . 8.
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S 8social and moral acceptability. However, the
apparently general accex^tance of IVP' does say 
something about its value as a technique in 
circumventing infertility.
88. See infra. Chapter 4.
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(4 ) SURROGACY
A third artificial method to which the 
infertile may have access in order to found a family
(whether through reproduction or not) is surrogacy.
89Surrogacy, as has been said, is not a distinct 
artificial reproductive technique. Rather it is a 
particular situation in which these techniques are 
applied.
Essentially, surrogacy involves a woman (the
surrogate) agreeing to bear a child, and subsequently
to surrender that child to be brought up by a person
or persons other than herself. The terms
commissioning mother and father (or parties) are
generally used to denote the persons who intend to
90'bring up a surrcgate-born child.
Surrogacy may be useful where a woman is unable
to bear a child. This may be because she suffers
severe pelvic disease or has had a hysterectomy, or
because she has a medical condition (eg. heart or
kidney disease) and pregnancy may seriously threathen
91her life or health.
89. See supra, p. 15.
90. See SI (6) of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 
1985. It has been argued that the correct 
definition of a surrogate is a woman who is a 
substitute mother. The contention is that a 
surrogate is in fact the mother, and the 
commissioning mother is the surrogate. See K.L. 
Vol. 473, Cel. 17 2. This is not how the term is 
used in this thesis.
91. See the Warnock Report, para. 8.2.
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Surrogacy is not a novel, but rather an
ancient, method for the circumvention of
infertility. For instance, it was recorded in the
Bible that Abraham's wife, Sarah, could not bear him a
child. Sarah gave Abraham her slave girl so that she
92could bear him a child. Another example of
ancient surrogacy was the story of Jacob and his
93barren wife Rachel. In these cases, the
surrogates conceived by natural means and thus they 
were also the biological mothers.
One of the novel aspects of surrogacy today is 
the capacity to implement it by use of artificial 
techniques. These techniques replace conception by 
natural means, and a surrogate-born child may have a 
number of possible genetic links. He or she may be 
genetically connected with two of the following 
people: the surrogate, the commissioning parties and 
the donors of gametes.
One may classify surrogacy according to whether 
a surrogate has any biological link with the child.
Where a surrogate has a biological link with 
the child, this can be achieved by artificial 
techniques in the following ways. First, the most 
common form of surrogacy is where a couple arrange for 
a surrogate to undertake artificial insemination using
92. Genesis 16.
93. Genesis 13.
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the semen of the commissioning male partner. This
94will hereinafter be called partial surrogacy.
Alternatively, a surrogate may have a biological link
with the child she bears by virtue of the fact that
fertilisation was achieved by means of the technique
9 5of IVF followed by embryo replacement. This is
certainly a rare form of surrogacy and will 
hereinafter be referred to as IVF & ER surrogacy.
Conversely, a surrogate-born child may have no 
genetic link with the surrogate at all. In other 
words, the surrogate is merely offering her 
gestational function to an embryo. The embryo may be 
genetically linked to the commissioning parties.
This is possible because of the availability of IVF 
followed by embryo transfer. Such a case will 
hereinafter be referred to as full surrogacy. A more 
unlikely possibility, where the surrogate has no 
genetic link with the child, is where the
94. See Singer & bells, op. cit. pp. 110-111. See a 
different usage of the terms by Wright Moira, in 
"Surrogacy and Adoption: Problems and 
Possibilities", (1986) 16 Fam. Law 109, p. 109. 
"In partial surrogacy the surrogate mother is 
implanted with an embryo which is genetically 
that of the commissioning mother and father. In 
full surrogacy the surrogate mother's egg is 
fertilised _in vivo by AID and replaced in her 
uterus." This terminology is not used here, 
since surely, in the latter case, no replacement 
of anything is necessary.
95. For instance, where a surrogate has blocked 
fallopian tubes but has no ovulation problems.
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commissioning parties have also no genetic link with 
the child, for instance, where an embryo is donated by 
anonymous gamete donors. This will be referred to as 
donated embryo surrogacy.
Surrogacy can also be classified according to 
whether or not money is involved. It is important to 
bear this aspect in mind, since the nature of the 
arguments both for and against surrogacy may change 
significantly according to the circumstances under 
which it is entered into. Moreover, the response of 
society to the parties involved, and to the 
acceptability of a surrogacy arrangement, may also be 
coloured or influenced by the presence or absence of 
money payment.
Thus the media often calls surrogacy 
96'baby-selling1. However, money is not
necessarily an inevitable part of surrogacy which may
be purely an altruistic act. For instance, a sister
may bear a child for her infertile sister, and the
whole transaction may involve no payment of money or 
97other rewards. This v/ill be called surrogacy in
principle.
96. See infra., chapter 6, pp. 188-198, for the 
baby-selling argument.
97. Although the British Medical Association have 
recently advised doctors not to participate in 
any surrogacy arrangement, even that which is 
undertaken for no reward by sisters, for 
sisters. See the Guardian, May 8, 1987, p. 3.
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Where money payment is involved, depending on 
the sort of payment and to whom it is made, one can 
envisage at least three different possibilities.
(1) One possible situation arises where a woman 
agrees to be a surrogate providing that the 
commissioning parties will compensate her for all 
expenses she is likely to incur, for instance, medical 
expenses for the conception and birth of the child, 
and any loss of earnings by the surrogate during the 
period of confinement. This will be called surrogacy 
with reasonable compensation.
(2) A surrogate may receive payment besides 
that which represents a reasonable compensation.
This will be called surrogacy for a fee.
The distinction between surrogacy with
reasonable compensation and surrogacy for a fee may
not, however, always, be easily drawn. Surrogacy
arrangements, for example, in the United States may
involve payment to the surrogate of about $10,000 -
$12,000, but it will often be unclear whether such
payment is a genuine costing of out-of-pocket
expenditure, or whether it represents compensation
plus a fee, and if the latter, which proportion
relates to which aspect of the transaction.
Approximately the same amount (that is, about £6,500)
98was paid m  the Baby Cotton case and the Adoption
98. Re A Baby, The Times, 15 Jan., 1985, p. 8.
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99Application: Surrogacy case. The judge m  the
latter case, in fact, said that the £5,000 paid was
insufficient to compensate the surrogate's loss of
100earnings and expenses.
The distinction between surrogacy with 
reasonable compensation and surrogacy for a fee must 
depend on individual circumstances of each case, and 
no fixed line can be drawn which divides the two 
categories. Thus, a large amount paid to a surrogate 
who has to give up a highly paid job may be reasonable 
compensation to that particular surrogate. Yet, when 
that same amount is paid to a surrogate with a low 
income, it may be a case of surrogacy for a fee. As 
will be seen later, a rough distinction is
important for subsequent discussions on the 
permissibility of surrogacy with money payment, but a 
precise distinction between the two categories is not 
vital.
(3) Money payment in surrogacy may be made to a 
party other than the surrogate. An agency may 
operate on a commercial basis, arranging surrogacy and 
charging both surrogates and commissioning parties for 
linking the two parties together and for the provision
99. The Times, 12 March, 1SS7, p.27.
100. ibid.
101. See infra, chapter 6.
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of counselling services. These will be called
. , . 102 commercial surrogacies.
Current Status of Surrogacy
Since it was first reported that an American
103 , ,lawyer had set up a commercial agency, surrogacy
104has been a very controversial issue. Because of
its potential moral, social and legal implications,
105the debate about surrogacy continues, and the 
British Parliament is still considering its approach 
to surrogacy. In the UK, Section 2 of the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985 has criminalised the activities 
of commercial surrogacies. The Act has also made it 
a criminal offence to advertise in respect of or for
102. Section 2 of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 
has criminalised the activities of commercial 
surrogacies in the UK.
103. See Keane, Neel & Breo D. L . , The Surrogate 
Mothers, New York, Everest House, 1981.
104. The issue has been considered by various reports, 
see the Warnock Report; Human Procreation, CSS, 
1984; Surrogate Motherhood, Report of the Board 
of Science and Education, BMA, 1987. Reports in 
other jurisdictions include, Report on the 
Disposition of Embryos produced by IVF, the 
Committee to consider the social, ethical an 
legal issues arising from IVF, chaired by 
Professor Louis Nailer, Victoria, Australia,
1984, (hereinafter cited as the Waller Report); 
Report on Human Artifcial Reproduction and 
Related Matters, 2 Vols., Ministry of the 
Attorney General, Toronto, 1985, (hereinafter 
cited as the Ontario Report).
105. For the debates generated by the Baby M case, see 
"Judges Press For Guidelines", The Times, 2 
April, 1987, p. 8; "The Future of Baby M", The 
Daily Telegraphy, 3 April, 1987, p. 15.
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106 . , . surrogacy. Surrogacy itself, however, is not
107
illegal or unlawful. Nonetheless, the general
attitude towards surrogacy seems to be one of
disapproval and rejection, and doctors have been
advised by the BMA not to participate in such
arrangements."^^ Indeed, the Warnock Report by a
majority of 16:14 rejected all forms of 
109surrogacy.
106. Section 3.
107. See infra, chapter 7.
108. See the Guardian, 8 May, 1987, p. 3.
109. The Warnock Report, Chapter 8.
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(5) CONCLUSION
This somewhat brief description of the three 
main types of artificial methods currently available 
has been undertaken to provide some information as to 
the situations in which they are relevant. It also 
serves to illustrate that their use may vary according 
to the nature of the infertility problem. A 
distinction has also been highlighted between those 
methods which are generally used to circumvent 
infertility by involving both of the partners in the 
actual reproduction, and those which do not. This 
distinction and its significance for the rights to 
which the infertile may lay claim on will be 
considered in context later.
It is not, however, considered necessary to 
describe the practicalities of these artificial 
methods in more depth, since they have been 
extensively reviewed elsewhere.111 Their 
significance for the purposes of this thesis lies 
essentially in the extent to which they facilitate 
reproduction and founding of a family, or merely 
permit the founding of a family. Whilst these two 
concepts itiay tend to be thought of as inseparable, it 
may be that distinctions can be drawn which, whilst 
not suggesting that they never coincide, may
110. See infra, chapter 3, pp. 71-77.
111. Per example, see Singer, P. & Wells, D., op. 
cit., pp. 1-69; Artificial Insemination, RCOG, 
!979.
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nonetheless serve to highlight what it is about the 
rights (it any) of an individual, and particularly, 
the infertile, that is truly significant, especially 
in view of the possibility of artificial 
reproduction. Analysis of the value of 
conceptualising procreation and founding a family 
separately, and of the significance of using the 
language of rights, is therefore undertaken in the 
following chapter in order to provide a sound 
conceptual basis from which moral deductions can be 
drawn, and which may serve to stimulate and inform 
relevant social and legal change.
CHAPTER 3
v “
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE METHODS: 
THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE AND
THE RIGHT TO FOUND A FAMILY
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(1) INTRODUCTION
As has been seen, the 
in founding a family (whether 
not). The hypothesis to be 
whether individuals also have 
reproduction and founding of 
support the claim to have 
reproductive methods. This 
examine what rights, if any, 
reproduction and founding of 
support this claim.
infertile have interests 
through reproduction or 
tested in this chapter is 
certain rights regarding 
family which may 
to artificial 
chapter, therefore, will 
people have, in 
a family, which may
a
access
v
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(2 ) JUSTIFICATIONS OF USING RIGHTS-LANUGAGE
The justifications for using rights-language
are both general and specific. Generally,
rights-talk has been an extremely useful tool in the
struggle for human liberty, freedom and respect. A
classic example of this can be seen in the moral
discourse of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
in which rights were frequently used to assert what
were the minimum socio-political arrangements
necessary to, and compatible with, human 
112existence. To that extent, and as will be seen
later, the concept of rights, denoting liberty and
freedom, can be very useful in the areas of
reproduction and foundig of a family.
More specifically, rights-talk in relation to
procreation and founding of a family has been
113prevalent especially in American literature.
During the last few decades, the concept of rights has 
set the scene for debates in women's struggles for
112. For the importance and values of the concept of 
rights, see Fineburg, Joel, "The Nature and 
Values of Rights", in Fineburg, Joel (ed.), 
Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, 
Guildford, Princeton-Hall, 1980, p. 148.
113. Coleman, Phyllis, "Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis 
of the Problems and Suggestions for Solution",
(1982) 50 Tennessee Law Review, 71; Rushevsky, 
Cynthina, "Legal Recognition of Surrogacy 
Gestation," (1982) 7 Women's Rights Law Reporter, 
107 .
- A I ­
W A  .reproductive control and freedom, and m  issues
115relating to population control. It can also be
valuable as a means of analysing contemporary 
issues. Advances in medical technology and knowledge 
have expanded the parameters of reproductive choice 
and freedom (and thus their importance) on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, have created conflicting 
interests which have hitherto not been encountered.
For instance, individuals may have interests in using 
medical technology to control certain aspects of 
reproduction (such as the sex of children). Yet, 
this may conflict with interests of the community as a 
whole. One of the ways of analysing and balancing 
these conflicting interests is in terms of rights.
To that extent, conflicts of interests regarding the 
use of artificial reproductive methods may be so 
analysed.
The terminology of rights, however, is mainly 
employed by American jurists and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It is rarely used in the 
British context. What underlies the British legal 
system and social thinking, in general, is that 
anything that is not specifically prohibited is
114. See Gordon Linda, Woman's Body, Woman's Right, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1977.
115. See Bayles M.D., "Limits to a Right to 
Reproduce", in O'Neil, Onora and Ruddick, William 
(eds.), Having Children: Philosophical and Legal
Re fleet ions on Parenthood, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1979, p. 13.
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116 .permissible. But as will be seen later, m  the 
areas of reproduction and founding of a family, the 
British judicial and social approach of according 
considerable freedom to individuals is very similar to 
that of American judicial thinking, and the legal 
philosophy of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. To that extent, the language of rights can 
be the short-hand for denoting a set of common values 
in the West in the areas of reproduction and founding 
of a family.
Nonetheless, specifics rights are not the 
starting premise of this chapter. Rather, endeavours 
will be made to demonstrate that fundamental values 
are involved justifying the claim that certain rights 
do exist and should be vindicated in the areas of 
reproduction and founding of a family.
Clearly, any discussion of freedom and choice
in reproduction and founding of a family is bound to
have global implications, and issues such as
overpopulation, poverty and starvation will therefore
arise. These issues, however, are beyond the ambit
of this thesis, but have been thoroughly discussed 
117elsewhere .
116. See infra, pp. 59-66.
117. See eg. Hardin, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the 
Commons", in Bayles, M.D. (ed.), Ethics and 
Populat ion, Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman, 1976; 
Bayles, M.D., "Limits to a Right to Reproduce", 
and O'Neil, Onora, "Begetting, Bearing and 
Rearing", in Having Children, op. cit., pp. 13 & 
25.
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This thesis is concerned with an examination of 
the claim of the infertile to use artificial 
reproductive methods to found a family (whether
through reproduction or not). Currently, this is
only an issue in affluent societies which have the 
resources and techniques for artificial reproductive 
methods. Nonetheless, what is argued here will have
equal applications when artificial reproductive
techniques are available in other countries in the 
future.
It may be well to mention here that
classification of rights is an issue which has been
extensively debated by philosophers and 
118 '
jurists. Since the purpose of this thesis is to
analyse what rights, if any, an individual has in the 
areas of reproduction and founding of a family, a 
streamlined picture of the kinds of rights which are 
commonly used suffices.
One classification of rights is to use the term 
‘claim rights' to denote a right-holder having control 
over others' duties. The term 'liberty rights' 
denotes a right-holder having control over his or her 
own acts through freedom from imposed duties, and
118. See eg. Hart, K.L.A., "Bentham on Legal Rights", 
in Simpson, A.W.B. (ed.), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1973, p. 170; MacCormick, D.N., "Rights in 
Legislation", in Hacker, P.M.S. & Raz, J., Law, 
Morality and Society, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1977, p. 139.
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'power rights’ refers to powers of a right-holder
119exercisable at his or her discretion.
120As will be seen, the concept of claim
rights is significant in this thesis, thus it is worth 
noting the two possible aspects of this concept. A 
positive claim right entails a right-holder having 
control over others' duties to do someting; whereas a 
negative claim right involves controlling others' 
duties not to do something. For instance, if X has a 
positive claim right to education, others' have the 
obligations to provide it. If X has a negative claim 
right to education, the obligations of others would be 
not to interfere with X's educational pursuits.
119. MacCormick, Neil, K.L.A. Hart, Hondon, Edward 
Arnold (Publishers") L t d . , 1981, chapter 7, p. 
88.
120. See infra, pp. 51-88.
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(3 ) THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE
One major difficulty with this topic is: what
does one mean by the right to reproduce? Writers of
existing literature on the subject are relatively
unmindful of the importance of a working definition,
even though it will affect one's view as to whether or
not there is such a right, and if so, what is its
nature and scope. As Suzanne Uniackes said:
"...hardly anyone would agree that the 
right to have children means that 
infertile people have a right to be 
supplied with children to adopt, or that 
someone has a right to participation of 
another, non-consenting person as a 
co-parent, or that a couple has a right 
intentionally to reproduce without 
incurring any subsequent responsibility 
for their offspring."121
What emerges from this quotation is that there 
may be confusion regarding the meaning of the right to 
reproduce, in the sense that it may denote three 
different concepts. First, it may mean the right to 
bring one's biological children into the world 
(whether by natural or artificial means). Second, it 
may refer to the right to parenting, that is, the 
bringing up of children. Finally, it may refer to a 
combination of these two aspects rights.
The right to reproduce, including the right to 
parenting, is the broadest concept of the three.
121. "IVF and The Right to Reproduce", (1987) 1 
Bioethics. (Forthcoming).
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Consequently, considerations which may be relevant in
defining the nature and scope of this right may be 
122extensive. Conversely, the right to reproduce
(as referring to simply reproduction) or the right to
parenting, are both narrower concepts.
However, the combination of these two rights
makes up the fullest explanation of the right an
individual may have in the areas of reproduction and
founding of a family. Still, each of these rights
may be said to be separate and distinct entity. For
example, a woman may reproduce (that is have a baby)
but be deemed in certain circumstances not to have the
123right to be a parent. Conversely, appeal to the
right to reproduce (which is generally taken to
124include the converse - that is, not reproducing) 
may be used as a means to validate a choice not to be 
a parent.
In this chapter, and throughout this thesis, 
the term the 'right to reproduce1 is used to denote 
the bringing of one's biological children into the 
world or not. To that extent, one is clearly 
distinguishing the concepts of reproduction and 
founding of a family, the latter of which is concerned
122. See O'Keil, Onora, "Begetting, Bearing and 
Rearing", in Having Children, op. cit., p. 25.
123. See Re D (a Minor), The Times, 5 Dec., 1986, p. 
15, a case which will be discussed latter, see 
infra., pp. 227-228.
124. McLean S.A.M., "The Right to Reproduce", in 
Campbell, T.D., et a l . (eds.), H uman Rights: From 
Rhetoric to Reality, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
198 6, p. 80.
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with the right to parenting. Nonetheless, this in no 
way implies that the two concepts, reproduction and 
founding of a family, are inevitably totally 
unconnected.
From the literature on the subject of the right
to reproduce, there seems to be a consensus that it is
primarily perceived as a negative claim right
demanding that an individual's procreative activity
should net be unwarrantedly interfered with. Indeed,
this interpretation is supported by the American and
British judiciaries. And, as will be seen 
125latei, one can also infer that such a right 
exists in Article 12 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
American Judicial Recognition of The Right to 
Reproduce
In the USA, the right to reproduce has only
relatively recently been given judicial support. It
was fiist promulgated in the landmark decision of
127Skinner v. Oklahoma where there were suggestions 
that procreation was a fundamental individual right.
In this case, an Oklahoma statute provided for
125. See infra., p. 82.
120. "Ken and women of marriageable age have the right 
to marry and to found a family, according to the 
national laws governing the exercise of this 
right."
127. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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the sterilisation of persons who had been convicted 
for larcency three times. However, the statute 
specifically exempted persons convicted of 
embezzlement, although the crime was often the same in 
nature and attracted the same punishment. The 
Supreme Court struck down the statute on the ground 
that it violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, the statute 
was held to be unconstitutional because differential 
treatments of different classes of people were based 
on criteria wholly unrelated to the objectives of that 
statute.
The Court, nonetheless, recognised the
significant nature of sterilisation operations which
generally deprived people their reproductive
capacities. Mr. Chief Justice Stone, utilising the
bread concept of liberty, talked of compulsory
sterilisation as "an invasion of personal 
128liberty". More importantly, Mr. Justice Douglas
spoke of the statute as one which "touches a sensitive 
and important area of human rights. Oklahoma 
deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic 
to the perpetuation of a race - the right to have
r jr • , , 1 2 9offspring.
128. ibid., 544.
129. ibid., 536. (emphasis mine)
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The clear implication of this statement is that 
there is a right not to have one's procreative 
capacities interfered with. The judge, thus, 
perceived the fundamental value of freedom in relation 
to procreation and the personal decision as to whether 
to procreate or not. A statute which compulsorily 
deprived an individual of the opportunity of 
exercising this right would need to be stringently 
justified. This judgment marked a distinct move in 
American judicial attitude, since, in a number of 
eariler cases, the right to reproduce received little 
or no attention or credibility. As a result, 
Skinner has often been considered the milestone in 
claims that it was appropriate to discuss procreation 
in terms of human rights.
This attitude has continued to pervade
subsequent American decisions, and has formed a
significant part of debates relating to many aspects
of reproductive choice. Procreation is offered
protection as a penumbra right to the wider
constitutional rights of liberty and privacy. Thus
131
1n Griswold v . Connecticut, a state statute which 
made the use of contraceptives a criminal offence was
130. See eg. the American judicial attitude towards 
the right to reproduce in the case of Buck v.
Bell 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See generally Meyers, 
B.W., The Human Body & the Law, Chicago, Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1970, chapter 2.
131. 281 U.S. 479 (1965).
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held to be unconstitutional on the ground that it
violated the right of marital privacy. Mr. Justice
White (concurring) said:
"...the liberty entitled to protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
the right 'to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children'...there is a 'realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter' 
without substantial justification."132
Although Griswold was decided on the ground of
marital privacy, the right to make one's own choice as
to whether to procreate (or whether to use
contraceptive devices) is not restricted to married
couples. It is the right of an individual, the
deprivation of which requires the existence of a
compelling state ^interest.
Thus, it was said that "Skinner...did not
guarantee the individual a procreative opportunity; it
merely safeguarded his procreative potential from
13 3state infringement." In other words, the right
to reproduce was significant even where it attached to
a single person who had no opportunity to exercise
it. This view was restated in the judgment of
134Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the Supreme Court 
held a Massachusetts statute, banning the distribution 
of contraceptives to unmarried persons,
132. ibid. 502.
133. Poe et. a l . v. Gerstein et. a l . 517 F. 2d, 787, 
795 (1975).
134. 405 O.S. 438 (1972).
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unconstitutional. The Court held that the statute
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by providing dissimilar treatment for
married and unmarried persons who were in similar
situations. Mr. Justice Brennan, delivering the
opinion of the Court, said:
"If the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as to the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child..."135
. . 136The decision of Roe v. Wade extended the
individual's right to privacy in procreation a step
further. In this case, the majority of the Court
took the view that the right of privacy encompassed a
woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy during the first trimester. Mr.
Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court,
said:
"...the right [of personal privacy] has 
some extension to activities relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships and child rearing 
and education ... [Vv]here certain 
'fundamental rights' are involved, the 
Court has held that regulation limiting 
these rights may be justified only by a 
'compelling state interest ' . ..and that 
legislative enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate 
state interests at s t a k e .  "^ -3/
135. ibid., 453.
136. 410 U.S. 113 (1973 ) .
137. ibid. 152-155.
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138The series of cases from Skinner to
Roe^*^, therefore, demonstrate two essential
points. First, the essence of the right to reproduce
is based on the constitutionally protected concepts of
liberty and privacy. The application of these
concepts to procreation protects an individual's
freedom to choose, free from unwarranted governmental 
140interference. The right to reproduce,
141therefore, is a negative claim-right.
Moreover, the right to reproduce applies to
individuals, irrespective of marital status. In
other words, if liberty to choose in relation to
procreation is valued, such freedom has the same value
142regardless of one's marital status.
The appeal to constitutional freedoms, couched 
in terms of human rights, has, therefore, 
significantly clarified the extent and nature of the
138. supra cit.
139. supra cit.
140. But there is no right to federal funding of 
abortion, see Harris v. McRae, 488 U.S. 297 
(1980), see generally, Petersen, K.A., "Public 
Funding of Abortion Services: Comparative 
Developments in the United States and Australia", 
(1984) 33 International Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 158.
141. For an argument that the right to reproduce may 
be a positive claim right that demands £:>ublic 
funding to assist one to reproduce, see infra, 
chapter 8, pp. 243-245.
14-2. A woman's right to abortion as established in Roe
is irrespective of marital status. See Planned
Parenthood Association v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 _ _ _ _ _
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right to reproduce in the United States. The freedom
to make reproductive choices is the basis against
which derogation is tested, and courts have
subsequently been obliged to justify in strong terms
143any denial of this right.
British Judicial Attitude
Although there are no British cases which
analyse in detail the concept of the right to 
144reproduce, the attitude of English judges, from
what evidence is available, seems to incline towards
according considerable freedom to individuals in
relation to procreation.
There is no British law directly prohibiting or
interfering with the free choice of individuals,
whether married or not, in relation to procreation.
However, some restriction is applied in situations
where competing values are taken to have priority.
145For example, unlike the situation m  Roe v. Wade, 
no absolute rights are given to women in terminating 
pregnancies under the Abortion Act 1967, at any stage'
143. See Re Eve (19S6) 31 BLR (4th) 1.
144. The concept of the right to reproduce has been
briefly considered in two English cases, Re D 
(Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation), [1976] 1 All
E.R. 3 26; Re B (a Minor) (Sterilisation), The 
Times, March 17, 1987, p. 35 (Court of Appeal) &
The Times, May 1, 1987, p. 37 (House of Lords), 
see infra, pp. 62-66, for a fuller discussion of 
the case. See also the recent case of T. v. T.,
The Times, July 11, 1987, p. 36.
145. supra cit.
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146m  the pregnancy. Indeed, this Act was not
framed in terms of rights at all, but was based,
rather partly on a more pragmatic concern to ensure
that, where terminations were carried out, they were
done so safely and competently, thus reducing the toll
147m  terms of human life. Other restrictions,
such as provisions which stipulate the age at which 
women may laefully consent to sexual intercourse and 
the prohibition of incestuous relationships, strike at 
the sexual act rather than at the right to 
reproduce.
whether the general assertion that an 
individual is free to make various choices in relation 
to procreation is further qualified by the recent
House of Lords decision in Re B (a Minor)
148 149(Sterilisation) will be considered below.
Leaving the case aside for the moment, in general an
individual may choose to have one child, many or no
children. The decision not to procreate is no longer
confined to the deliberate choice of celibacy or
abstinence. The spacing and timing of procreation
can, in most cases, be controlled according to one's
146. For a discussion of another aspect of the 
Abortion Act 1967, see infra., chapter 8, pp. 221-6.
147. H.C., Vol. 732, Col. 1067-1077.
148. Re B (a Minor) (Sterilisation), The Times, March 
17, 1987, p. 35 (Court of Appeal) & The Times,
May 1, 1987, p. 37 (House of Lords).
149. tee infra., pp. 64-66.
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preferences, and by the use of various contraceptive
devices, voluntary sterilisation and abortion (within
150the ambit of the law). What is, therefore,
taken to be central to rights in reproduction is an
individual's freedom to decide whether, when, and how
often one should reproduce. The freedom to choose
regarding reproduction is accentuated by Peter Pain,
J. in Thake v. kaurice, where he said,
"The policy of the state, as I see it, is 
to provide the widest freedom of 
choice;. It makes available to the 
public the means of planning their 
families or planning to have no family.
If plans go awry, it provides for the 
possibility of abortion. But there is 
no pressure on couple either to have 
children or not to have children or to 
have only a limited number of children.
Even the one-parent families, whether 
that exists though choice or misfortune, 
is given substantial assistance.
A further example demonstrating this attention
to freedom of choice, being derivative from, and
descriptive of, the right of an individual to make
autonomous choices, can be seen in the recent growth
in, and recognition of, wrongful conception 
152claims. This type of claim accepts that there
150. For further discussion, see Skegg, P.D.G., Law, 
Ethics and Medicine, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1984, chapter 1.
151. [1984] 2 ALL E.R. 513, 526. (emphasis mine)
Other aspects of the case were considered in the 
Court of Appeal, see [1986] 2 ALL. E. R. 497.
152. See eg. Sciuriaga v. Powell (1980, unreported), 
CA transcript 597; Emeh v. Kensington, Chelsea & 
Fulham Area Health Authority [1984] 3 A L L . E.R. 
1044; Udale v. Bloomsbury Area Health Authority
[1983] 2 ALL.E.R. 522; Thake v. Maurice [1986] 2 
ALL. L. R. 497.
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is a wrong to parents where, as a result of a
defendant's (usually a physician's) negligence, they
are not given an opportunity to consider all possible
options regarding procreation or non-procreation.
Compensation is thus given for the wrong done to the 
153parents.
In sum, although the British courts have never 
attempted to elaborate on the concept of the right to 
reproduce (as exhaustively as the American judicary 
have done), the underlying assumption is that 
individuals should be given the widest possible choice 
regarding procreation, and that invasion of what may 
be called one's right to self-determination or
autonomy requires careful considerations and
. . . 154considerable justification.
A decision that may be cited as reinforcing the
point is the case of Re D (Minor) (Wardship:
15 5
Sterilisation).
153. See generally, Hilliard Lexa, "'Wrongful Birth': 
Some Growing Pains", (1985) 48 M.L.R. 224; Taylor 
Ann Spowart, "Compensation for Unwanted 
Children", (1S85) 5 Fam. Law 147; Brahmas Diana, 
"Damages for Unplanned Babies - A Trend to be 
Discouraged?", (1983) 133/1 N.L.J. 643.
154. See Lord Hailsham in Re B (a Minor)
(Sterilisation), where he stressed that this case 
is not to be taken as a precedent in all cases 
relating to the mentally handicapped, The Times, 
May 1, 1987, p. 37.
155. [1976] 1 ALL E.R. 326.
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In this case, an 11-year-old minor suffered
156from a rare condition known as Sotos syndrome.
Her I.Q. was about 80. She had the capacity to marry
and could possibly have a reasonable family life. A
proposal to sterilise her to avoid an unwanted
pregnancy was successfully challenged. Heilbron, J.
in the Queen's Bench Division said that the operation
involved the deprivation of a basic human right (that
157is, the right of a woman to reproduce). The
judge also mentioned the girl's prospect of marriage
and having children. Because the judge's reference
to the right to reproduce was interchanged with the
concept of the right to marry and founding a 
15 8 vfamily, it is difficult to identify whether the
decision was a vindication of the girl's right to
reproduce or right to found a family or both. In
other words, the court made no serious distinction of
the concepts of reproduction and founding of a family,
159which as will be seen later, can be very
important in the context of the infertile.
156. This involved, amongst other symptons, epileptic 
seizures, clumsiness, dull intelligence, 
precocious growth and personality problems.
157. [1976j 1 ALL E.R. 326, at p. 332 .
158. See Article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights 
which says:- "lien and women of marriageable age 
have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the 
exercise of this right."
159. See infra., pp. 72-75.
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Re D was distinquished in the recent House of 
Lords decision in Re B (a Minor) (Sterilisation) 
where the Court exercised its wardship jurisdiction
and ordered a 17-year-old mentally retarded girl, with
. . 161 a mental age of 5, to be sterilised.
It may be argued that this decision is getting
dangerously close to suggesting that a particular
group of people do not have the right to
162 ■ reproduce, and consequently, that it is a
towards narrowing the application of the cone
However, as the Lords stressed, the decision
no general principle of public policy, and wa
concerned solely with what was in the best in
of the ward.
160. The Times, May 1, 1987, p.37.
161. The Law Lords unanimously came to the decision 
after considering that the evidence in the case 
had demonstrated that there was an unacceptable 
risk of pregnancy which could only be obviated by 
sterilisation in order to prevent childbirth in 
circumstances of uncomprehending fear and pain 
and risk of physical injury.
162. “But Lthe right to reproduce] was only such when 
reproduction was the result of informed choice of 
which the ward in the present case was 
incapable... To talk of the 'basic right1 to 
reproduce of an individual who was not capable of 
knowing the causal connection between intercourse 
and childbirth, the nature of pregnancy, what was 
involved in delivery, unable to form any materal 
instincts or to care for a child, appeared to his 
Lordship wholly to part company with reality." 
per Lord Hailsham, L-C., the Times, May 1, 1987, 
p.37. Again, in the Court of Appeal, Justice 
Dillon said that the minor would remain incapable 
of giving informed consent to sterilisation, 
abortion or marriage, and she would not be 
capable of looking after a baby. If she became 
pregnant, the pregnancy would have to be 
terminated. In effect, she has no right to
step 
ept.
involved
s
terests
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Since the right to reproduce of the mentally
163handicapped involves complicated issues,
consideration of the merit of this decision is outside
the ambit of this thesis which is rather concerned
with rights of individuals, particularly the
infertile, to use artificial reproductive methods to
found a family (whether through reproduction or not).
In any event, the decision does not affect the
conclusion drawn so far regarding the right to
reproduce, since British judges and society clearly
recognise the fundamental importance of freedom to
procreate. For this reason, there was considerable
164anxiety concerning the implications of Re B . In
165other words, the whole episode of Re B can 
buttress the conclusion arrived at earlier that the 
right to reproduce means that one's reproductive 
capacity should not be unwarrantedly interfered with
unless compelling interests dictate.
. . . 166Moreover, even were the decision m  Re B
to be taken as having wider implications in respect of 
the right to reproduce, it must be borne in mind that,
reproduce (and/or to found a family). See the 
Times, March 17, 1987, p. 35.
163. Cf . the Canadian approach in the case of Re Eve 
(1986) 31 DLR (4th) 1, where the court concluded 
that sterilisation should never be performed for 
non-therapeutic purposes under the parens patriae 
jurisdiction.
164. The Times, May 1, 1987, p. 37.
165. supra, cit.
166. supra, cit.
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in reality, even the most fundamental of human rights
may be subject to exceptions. Thus, the right to
life may be denied, eg. after due process of 
167law. Equally, the court has declared that a
decision to sterilise a mentally handicapped girl can 
be taken only after consideration by the appropriate 
court. The fact that the right to reproduce may
not be extended to all individuals in every situation, 
is not fatal to the claim that the right exists, nor 
to the assertion of its fundamental significance.
167. Article 2(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights says, "Everyone's right to life shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court following his conviction of a 
crime for which his penalty is provided by 
law." See generally Jacobs, F.G., The European 
Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 197 5.
168. See Re B, supra, cit.
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(4) THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE AND ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE 
METHODS
So far, the right to reproduce in the
Anglo-American legal context has been analysed. It
may be said that the right to reproduce, as a negative
claim right, denotes freedom of choice relating to
whether and when to procreate only. Consequently, it
will have no implication or bearing on the use of
artificial rex^roauctive methods, since those matters
169relate essentially to how to procreate.
Nonetheless, if the right to procreate raises a 
strong presumption against interference unless it is 
proved to be warranted, this presumption applies 
equally in respect of people's freedom to choose to 
use artificial reproductive methods. In other words, 
the right to reproduce does not have to be justified, 
or argued for, whenever a new situation arises. The 
burden of proof is for those who argue against freedom 
and choice. Two points follow on from this 
premise. One concerns the use of artificial 
reproductive methods in general, not specifically 
relating simply to the infertile. The other concerns 
the use of artificial reproductive methods, in 
particular, by the infertile.
169. Coleman Phyllis, "Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis 
of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions", 
(1982) 50 Tennessee Law Review, 71.
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The possibility of using artificial
reproductive methods to procreate can increase the
range of choices available to those whose fertility is
not in question. For instance, a couple may prefer
artificial, as oppose to natural, reproduction for
reasons such as pure fascination with artificial
techniques. If freedom to choose is the essential
aspect of the right to reproduce, interference with
people's options can only be justified by a compelling
state interest.
This libertarian philosophy underlies what the
17 0judge had m  mind m  the Baby M case. He
considered the Supreme Court cases on procreation and
privacy, and said that, although those decisions do
not address non-coital procreation,
"it must be reasoned that if one has a 
right to procreate coitally, then one has 
a right to reproduce non-coitally. If
it is the reproduction that is protected, 
then the means of reproduction are also 
to be protected...This court holds that 
the protected means extends to the use of 
surrogates."171
In other words, from the perspective of an 
individual, he or she should have the choice to resort 
to artificial reproductive methods for procreation. 
From the point of view of a surrogate, for example,
17 0. See Hcrnblower, Margot, "Judge Awards 'Baby M' to 
Her Biological Father", The Washington Post,
April 1, 1987.
171. ibid.
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the concepts of liberty and privacy, as exemplified by 
172Roe v. Wade, would be wide enough to encompass a
woman's choice to be a surrogate even although that
may entail merely the use of her gestation 
173function.
To put the matter in another way, if an
individual has the right to reproduce, then the
services of those who may facilitate the exercise of
that right must be inextricably linked with that
right. Thus, even in situations where the surrogate
makes no genetic contribution to the embryo, it could
be argued that to prohibit surrogacy interferes with
the right to reproduce of the other individual(s ).
Where the surrogate is genetically linked to the
child, then the freedom to reproduce of both the
surrogate and that of the other individual would
equally be restricted were surrogacy to be 
17 4outlawed. In other words, the right to
reproduce, would include the right to choose how to 
procreate. Consequently, only if other, and 
compelling, values compete, would restrictions on 
artificial reproductive methods be consistent with
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973 ) .
173. See Carey v. Population Services International, 
431 US 678 (1977), where the Court spoke of 
"individual autonomy in matter of child-bearing" 
and said that "the teaching of Griswold is that 
the Constitution protects individuals' decision 
in matters of child-bearing from unjustified 
intrusion of the state." ibid., 687.
174. See chapter 6 for further discussions on the 
acceptability of surrogacy.
- 70 -
validation of the right to reproduce as described 
here.
For present purposes, however, it is essential
to establish in greater depth what relevance, if any,
the existence of this right to reproduce has to the
infertile.
The fact that those whose procreative
capacities which are unimpaired can validly demand
their protection (with the limited exclusions noted 
175above) may not necessarily seem directly
relevant to the position of those who have no such
capacity or those whose capacity is impaired for one
176reason or another. The significance of the
177 .judgment m  the Baby M case is that it seemed to 
extend the right to reproduce beyond the mere capacity 
to procreate. It contemplated the right as including 
access to artificial assistance. The question 
remains, however, as to the extent to which capacity 
is a pre-requisite for the exercise of the right.
175. See supra., pp. 63-66.
176. see supra., chapter 2.
177. Hornblower, Margot, "Judge Awards 'Baby M' to Her 
Biological Father", The Washington Post, April 1, 
1987 .
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(5) THE RIGHT OF THE INFERTILE TO REPRODUCE
The initial hypothesis of this chapter was that
once the nature and scope of the right to reproduce
was explored and unravelled, the concept may provide a
satisfactory justification for the claim of the
infertile to use artificial reproductive methods.
This is correct only up to one level of enquiry. If
178the view taken m  the Baby M case is adopted,
then the right to reproduce may be taken to imply an
incorporation not simply of the right to decide
whether or not to procreate, but also of the right to
choose how to procreate. As with all other human
rights, a compelling justification would be needed if
the exercise of the right is to be interfered with.
This formulation of the right to reproduce,
however, is inadequate in respect of the infertile in
two aspects. First, it fails to accommodate the
claim of some infertile people. Second, the right to
reproduce, as a negative claim right, will clearly not
advance any claim of the infertile to state funding of
artificial reproductive techniques, without which the '
right may be meaningless. This latter claim can only
be understood by reference to the notion of a positive
claim right to reproduce. Questions of state
responsibility will be considered in more depth 
179later. For the moment, however, the situation
178. See supra, cit.
179. See infra, chapter 8.
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of the infertile people will be considered.
In the case of a sterile individual, any claim 
that there is a right to use artificial reproductive 
methods to have a child so that he or she can found a 
family would obviously not be covered by the concept 
of the right to reproduce. The individual's interest 
here is not in reproduction, but rather in founding a 
family.
However, the inability to reproduce may relate 
to circumstances other than the lack of capacity of a 
given individual. This is of particular importance, 
since references to 'infertility' often encapsulate 
the infertile couple, even although one of the parties 
may have unimpaired procreative capacity. Such a 
person within that relationship lacks the natural 
opportunity to vindicate his or her right to 
reproduce. Nonetheless, the right to reproduce, as 
explicated here, provides protection for the 
individual's freedom to choose not only whether or not 
to exercise that capacity, but also how to exercise 
i t .
Indeed, if the right to rejjroduce did not 
include the right to have access to artificial 
reproductive methods, the right to reproduce of 
individuals who are in the situation described above, 
would be rendered nugatory. This is so because the 
choice confronting them is either not to
73 -
prccreate, or to engage in sexual relations, 
outside the relationship, with a fertile partner.
This latter option, whilst it would allow the exercise
of the right to reproduce, may be regarded as immoral
or unacceptable in itself. Indeed, much of the 
debate concerning artificial reproduction has centred
on similar questions as to the morality of the
+. -u ■ 1 8 1techniques.
If the right to reproduce is of value, then it 
would be strange indeed were its vindication to depend 
on an individual being forced to indulge in activities 
which could be regarded as immoral.
In other words, unless artificial reproductive 
methods are themselves sufficiently immoral so as to 
amount to a compelling justification to limit their 
accessibility in order to vindicate the right to 
reproduce, it would seem that where a husband is 
sterile, his wife's right to reproduce includes the 
right to choose to employ AID, without unwarranted 
governmental interference. Similarly, in a case 
where a wife is sterile and wombless, the husband has- 
a right to choose partial surrogacy in order to 
procreate, without unwarranted interference.
180. As the state is not obliged to provide a sexual 
partner, nor presumably to provide a fertile 
sexual partner, see Poe et. al. v. Gerstein e t . 
a l ., supra, cit. at p. 795.
181. See infra, chapter 4.
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Yet, to describe these couple's interests in 
artificial reproductive methods purely in terms of an 
individual right to reproduce - even technically 
correct and impeccable - may not reflect all, or may 
only reflect a fragment, of the interests involved.
The claim to use artificial reproductive methods in 
those cases may not be related entirely to the wife's 
01 the husband's claim to exercise an individual’s 
right to reproduce. It may additionally, and as 
importantly, reflect the interests of these couples in 
founding a family. Indeed, the interest of a couple 
in founding a family (rather than in procreation) may 
be fundamental in some cases. For instance, in a 
case of a couple both of whom are sterile, their claim 
to use donated embryo surrogacy can hardly be a claim 
to reproduce by the couple. Rather, it is a claim 
reflecting their interests in founding a family.
Implicit in this analysis is that individuals
who do not have the capacity to reproduce (because of
sterility) cannot be in a position meaningfully to
182claim a right to reproduce.
Having said that an individual's right to 
reproduce may be too narrow a concept to encapsulate 
one crucial element of the interests of some infertile
182. Unless the concept of the right to reproduce
includes the right to be rendered fertile. This 
is clearly incompatible with the notion of a 
negative claim right. See infra, chapter 8 for 
a discussion on the positive claim right to found 
a family.
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couples in founding a family, it does not necessarily 
follow that an individual's right to reproduce is 
totally inapplicable and inappropriate when one is 
dealing with an infertile couple. Thus, both the 
right to reproduce and the interest in founding a 
family co-exist in a case where a couple is childless 
because the female partner has blocked fallopian 
tubes. Here, both partner can seek to vindicate both 
their individual right to reproduce, and their 
interest (as a couple) in founding a family. In 
other words, functional incapacity which is not 
irremediable is not a bar to the application of the 
right to reproduce.
Obviously, an individual, as well as a couple, 
may have interests in founding a family. Thus, in 
the case of a single person, he or she may claim an 
individual right to reproduce. Additionally, he or 
she may claim an interest in founding a family.
The above discussion, therefore, demonstrates 
that reproduction and founding of a family can be seen 
as distinct concepts, albeit that they are often 
inextricably connected. For instance, although an 
individual who has the right to reproduce may also 
claim an interest in founding a family, not all those 
who can claim the latter may be in a position 
meaningfully to claim the right to reproduce, which 
depends on capacity. The distinctiveness of the two
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concepts is reinforced by the fact that families can 
be founded by means other than through biological 
procreation/ for instance/ by adoption and
T O O
step-parenting. The necessary corollary being
that reproduction may not always be followed by 
founding of a family.
There are two points which emerge from this 
discussion and which can be recapitulated here.
First, that the right to reproduce extends to an 
individual who has capacity to reproduce/ but is 
unable to exercise that capacity because of the 
infertility of his or her partner. In practical 
terms, the use of the language of rights in such a 
case may seem to point to the desirability of allowing 
access to artificial reproductive methods in order 
that the person having the right may vindicate it.
Second, it has also been noted that the claim 
of the infertile to have access to artificial 
reproductive methods is not always based solely on the 
right to reproduce. In some cases, it may be based 
also on the interest in founding a family, which will' 
be the sole claim of a couple both of whom are
183. Eg. the Commission on Human Rights noted that, 
"...adoption of a child and its integration into 
a family with a couple might, at least in some 
circumstances, be said to constitute the 
foundation of a family by that couple. It is 
quite conceivable that a 'family' might be 
'found' in such a way." Dec. Adm. Com. Ap. 
7229/75, 12 Dec 1977. D & R 12 p.32 (34-35).
184. See eg. where children are given up for adoption.
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sterile. It is important, therefore, when discussing 
the rights of the infertile in respect of the use of 
artificial reproductive methods, to consider in more 
depth what is the strength of this interest, and its 
place and consequences in the catalogue of rights.
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(6) ARTICLE 12 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO FOUED A FAMILY
As has been noted, the claim of some infertile
people to use artificial reproductive methods may be 
based on the interest in founding a family, an 
interest that is identified in, and elevated to the 
position of a right by, the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In this section, the nature and scope 
of the right and, the values it protects will be 
analysed.
Since procreation is generally so closely 
linked with founding of a family - and the state has
only a limited power to negate a parent's claim to
' 185bring up his or her child - one may deduce that,
given that there is a negative claim right to
reproduce, there is also a negative claim right to
found a family. In other words, western societies
not only value non-interference in reproduction, but
also what is usually consequential upon the exercise
of the right to reproduce. In fact, this has been
accepted by the Anglo-American cases discussed earlier
on the right to reproduce. For instance, the
American cases talked of personal privacy extending to
activities of marriage, procreation, family
relationships and child rearing.'*'^ And the
185. See Re D (a Minor), The Times, 5 Dec., 1986, p. 
15.
ib0. See Eg. Mr. Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade 410 
U.S. 113, 152-5 (1973), loc. citl
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British cases talked of freedom of choice regarding
10 7
founding of a family. In this section, the
meaning of Article 12 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which guarantees the right to found a 
family will be compared with the Anglo-American 
concept.
The importance of family units to society has
been recognised in a number of international
agreements. For instance, Article 16(3) of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) states
that the "family is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society and is entitled to protection by
1 88
society and the State...". Article 12 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms says:
"Men and women of marriageable age have 
the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing 
the exercise of this right."1S9
187. See Eg. Peter Pain J. in Thake v. Maurice [1984]
2 All. E.R. 513, 526, loc. cit.
188. See also similar provisions in Article 10(1) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, and Article 23(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.
189. Similarly, Article 16(1) of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (1948) says, "Men and 
women of full age...have the right to marry and 
found a family...". A similar article appears 
in Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.
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Minimum Guarantee
Article 12 is subject to limitations "according
to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right". This does not mean that national laws
governing the exercise of the right to marry and to
found a family cannot amount to a breach of Article
12/ otherwise, the very purpose of the Convention,
which was to guarantee certain minimum rights
irrespective of national lav/s, would be 
190defeated. Limitations regarding Article 12,
therefore, must relate to legitimate purposes, such as
191prevention of polygamy or incest. In other
words, the protection of Article 12 could extend to
\
situations even where there was a breach of national 
laws.
190. In relation to the right to marry, it was said 
that "...although the right to marry is thus to a 
large extent subjected by A12 itself to the 
domestic legislation,... this reference to the 
domestic law cannot authorise States completely 
to deprive a person or category of persons of the 
right to marry." Op. Com., 1 March 197 9, Van 
Oosterwijck Case, Publ. Court B, Vol. 36 pp.
27. See Jacobs, F.G., The European Convention 
on Human Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975,
p . 16 2.
191. Lord Kilbrandon, for example, suggests that "it 
might well be...that the European Court would not 
condemn 'national laws governing the exercise of' 
the right to found a family if these laws were 
designed to prohibit the wilful transmitting of 
genetic defects. Such laws would stand on 
exactly the same footing as these which, for 
genetic reasons, forbid marriage and punish 
sexual intercourse between persons of particular 
degrees of consanguinity." in "The Comparative 
Law of Genetic Counselling", in Hilton, B., et 
al. (eds.) E thical Issues in Human Genetics, New 
York, Plenum, 1973, p. 254.
- 81 -
The Right of the Unmarried to Found a Family
Regarding the content of Article 12, the Court
of Human Rights said in one case that,
"...although marriage and the family are
in fact associated in the Convention and
in domestic legal systems, there is 
nothing to support the conclusion that 
the capacity to procreate is an essential 
condition of marriage or even that 
procreation is an essential purpose of 
marriage."192
Therefore, it could be argued that Article 12 contains
two separate rights: namely, the right to marry and
the right to found a family.
Nevertheless, the two rights appear to be
extremely closely linked. In one case, for example,
the Commission an Human Rights expressed its opinion
that "the right to found a family...attaches
193indissolubly to the right to marry." In another
case, it was said that "the provision does not
guarantee the right to have children born out of
wedlock. Article 12, in fact, foresees the right to
marry and to found a family as one simple 
194right." It appears, therefore, from these
statements that Article 12, in itself, does not 
confer the right to found a family on the unmarried.
192. The Van Oosterwijck Case, supra, cit., at p. 28.
193. The Van Oosterwijck Case, supra, cit., p. 28.
194. Dec. Adrru Corfu Apu 6482/74, 10 July 1975 . D & R 7
p. 55(77).
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Notwithstanding this, a state cannot prohibit,
or unwarrantly interfere with, the procreational
activity of the unmarried without incurring
195 •responsibility under the Convention. This is so
because Article 8 of the Convention protects the
"private and family life" of an individual from
unwarranted interference of public authorities. In
effect, it has been held that Article 8 protects a
woman's decision as to whether to terminate a
pregnancy (that is, whether to procreate and whether
196to found a family) within certain legal limits.
Thus, even if the interpretation of Article 12 
needs to be confined to the provision of the right to 
found a family only following a valid marriage, the 
provisions of Article 8 apparently recognise the right 
of a woman to make reproductive choices (whether or 
not to reproduce and/or to use her gestational 
function). Implicit in this, and in the terminology 
of this Article which refers to 'private and family 
life' is the right of the individual (whether married 
or not) to found a family. This right has its roots’ 
in the concepts of privacy and liberty, expressing the
195. There is only one case on sterilisation that has 
been considered by the Commission. It was in 
the context of Articles 2 & 3, which concern 
deprivation of life and inhuman and degrading 
treatment respectively, see Application 1287/61.
196. Op. Com., 12 July 1977, Case of Bruggemann and 
Scheuten, D & R 10 p. 100 (116-7).
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same values as that recognised by the Anglo-American 
judges.
M inimum State Assistance
Sc far it has been established that there is a 
right to found a family recognised by the European 
Convention on Human Rights even if the recognition may 
seem somewhat oblique. It applies to both the 
married and the unmarried, and it essentially protects 
an individual against unwarranted interference by the 
state, that is, it is essentially a negative claim 
right. The state, therefore, is not obliged to 
assist people in the exercise of this right, except to 
the extent of doing what is the minimum necessary - 
for example, by providing a minimum framework and 
facilities (register of marriages and births) whereby 
peo£jle can establish a legally recognised family 
relationship.
197Thus, m  one case, the Commission on Human
Rights found that the right to found a family, 
guaranteed by Article 12, did not include a right to' 
found a family in a particular way which was not
recognised by the national laws, eg. foreign
- .. 198aaoption.
197. Dec. Adm. Com. A p . 7229/75, 12 Dec 1977. D & R 12 
p.32 (34-35).
198. There is no right to adopt guaranteed by Article 
12 or by the Convention. See Dec. Adm. Ap.
6482/74, 10 July 1975. D & R 7 p. 75(77).
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Conversely/ a state is obliged to provide 
minimal state assistance to facilitate access to the 
right to found a family. This is supported by cases
interpreting the right to marry in Article 12. Thus,
it has been held that the right of prisoners to marry
can require state assistance to the extent of making
ft
the necessary administrative arrangements enabling a
prisoner to marry, where this causes only minimun
inconvenience and there is no substantial conflict
199with the public interest.
In other words. Article 12 does not oblige a 
state positively to assist people's endeavours in 
founding a family. It will not, for example, oblige 
a state to fund the operation of marriage agencies to 
pair up single people so that they can found a 
family. Nor will it obligate a state to fund people 
to have children. The right to found a family, as 
guaranteed by Article 12, like the right to reproduce, 
is a negative claim right protecting the liberty of 
individuals, married or otherwise, to found a family
■t: I , r 2 0 0free from unwarranted interference.
199. See the Hamer Case, D & R 24 p. 5(14-16).
200. See infra, chapter 8 for an argument that there 
is, in fact, a positive claim right to found a
family.
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(7) CONCLUSION; THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE, THE RIGHT TO 
FOUND A FAMILY AND ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE METHODS
In this chapter, the rights which people have 
regarding reproduction and founding of a family have 
been examined and analysed in the Anglo-American legal 
context, and in the context of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. It has been claimed that the right 
to reproduce can be separated from the right to found 
a family, and that there is no evidence that either of 
these rights need to be confined to those who are 
married. In fact, authority points clearly to the 
conclusion that marital status is not relevant to the 
protection of these rights.
Equally, it has been argued that both the right 
to reproduce and the right to found a family are 
negative claim rights. They are the penumbra rights 
of liberty and privacy. These rights essentially 
give individuals the widest possible freedom of choice 
in reproduction and founding of a family - including, 
it has been suggested, the choice to employ artificial 
reproductive methods, and a woman's decision to become 
a surrogate. In these terms, any unwarranted 
interference with the use of artificial reproductive 
methods will be an infringement of an individual's 
rights since it will have the effect of limiting 
people's choice.
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But for those who are infertile, who may have 
either the right to reproduce, or the right to found a 
family, or both, limitations on the use of artificial 
reproductive methods can have more significant 
effects.
It may render the rights of some infertile
people valueless and nugatory. For instance,
prohibition of surrogacy will amount to an abrogation
and a nullification of the right to reproduce of a
woman who has had a hysterectomy, but is capable of 
201ovulating. Prohibition of IVF and AI will have
the same effect respectively on a woman who has 
irremediably blocked fallopian tubes, and a man who, 
for example, suffers retrograde ejaculation. In any 
of the above situations, the infertile's right to 
found a family will also be severely restricted.
Given that the value of both these rights is 
accepted, consideration must also, however, be made of 
their relative status, and of the weight which can be 
attached to arguments which would deny the infertile a 
legitimate appeal to human rights in claiming access 
to artificial reproductive methods.
It should be clear that of the two rights 
discussed here, the wider is the right to reproduce. 
Although both rights may be in the same family of
201. That is, who is capable of providing the
wherewithal for procreation, but is not capable 
of carrying a child.
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rights - that is, they are both negative claim rights 
- the right to reproduce seems to be less vulnerable 
to attack. The circumstances in which a state will 
consent to defeat the right to reproduce, for example, 
by authorising compulsory sterilisation are 
increasingly rare and narrowly defined. However, the 
circumstances in which the right to found a family may 
be interfered with seem to be wider. For instance, a 
state may deprive an individual of the right to 
parenting on the ground that one is not 'fit' to be a
parent - a decision based on the balance of
202probabilities and substantially subjective.
Although the right to found a family is
narrower in scope than the right to reproduce, this
does not invalidate the importance it has in this
discussion, and in court decisions. Just as
reproduction is regarded as value, sc too is the
family unit, and the freedom of citizens to establish
203 ,
such a unit. As the court noted m  He D , the
denial of rights which was being contemplated was not
only of the right to reproduce, but was also the 
important right to found a family - a right on which 
the court placed apparently equal value.
The distinction drawn in this chapter between 
the right to repr oduce and the right to found a family
202. See eg. Re D (a Minor), The Times, 5 Dec., 1986, 
p . 15, see infra., p p . 227-8.
2 03. The Times, Ray 1, 1987, p>. 37.
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is of crucial importance in any consideration of the 
rights of the infertile, and the extent to which they 
may validly seek access to artificial reproductive 
methods. Vvhilst it is acknowleged that some 
infertile people cannot reasonably be in a position to 
claim the right to reproduce, it is submitted that it 
can and does make sense to talk of them having a right 
to found a family.
The implications of this are legion. Most 
notably, it is logical to claim that, unless there is 
something inherently immoral in artificial 
reproductive methods themselves, which would provide a 
compelling reason for denying access to them, then the 
right to found a family (whether through reproduction 
or not) should not be unnecessarily limited. It is
to this question that discussion now turns.
CHAPTER 4
MORAL AND SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY OF
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES
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(1) INTRODUCTION
In chapter 2, reference was made to three 
possible artificial reproductive methods (AI, IVF and 
surrogacy) to which the infertile may have resort in 
order to found a family (whether through reproduction 
or not). The nature and use of these methods have 
been the subject of concern and have generated varying 
degrees of debate. Concern is understandable, 
because these are not purely medical techniques, as 
applied to reproduction and founding of a family, 
which exist in a vacuum without moral, social and 
legal implications.
In this chapter, the question addressed is
whether artificial reproductive techniques (AI, IVF
and the use of donated gametes) which enable the
infertile to found a family (whether through
reproduction or not) are inherently objectionable,
thus justifying certain types of interference, or
prohibition, which would in effect abrogate the right
to reproduce of some infertile people, and limit the
205right to found a family of the infertile.
204. See generally, Human Procreation, Ethical Aspects 
of the New Techniques, Report of a Working Party 
Council for Science and Society, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1984, (hereinafter cited as 
Human Procreation, CSS, 1984).
205. The question of the use of these techniques in 
surrogacy arrangements poses additional 
problems. This question is, therefore, 
considered separately, see infra., chapter 6.
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Analysis of some of the fundamental objections 
against AI & IVF indicates that they are profferred on 
the basis of commom and deep-rooted beliefs, which may 
be marshalled and appraised under the same headings.
It is to these common features that the first section 
of this chapter will be directed. Following this, 
analysis of the arguments applicable uniquely to IVF 
will be considered. The acceptability of the use of 
donated gametes will be considered in the last section 
of this chapter.
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(2) OBJECTIONS TO ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES: 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION & IN VITRO FERTILISATION
T T  4 -  1  206Unnatural
It has been argued that artificial reproductive 
techniques (that is, AI & IVF) are unacceptable 
because they are 'unnatural'. There are two ways of 
comprehending this argument.
First, artificial reproductive techniques may 
be considered by some to be 'unnatural' in the sense 
that the 'sacred process' of life is the prerogative 
of God and should not be interfered with.
This argument would suggest that the infertile
should accept their condition rather than attempting
to procreate against God's 'will' by using artificial
207reproductive techniques. This line of argument
is certainly vague. Would taking drugs to destroy a 
life-threatening bacterium be an interference with the 
'sacred process' of life, and an usurption of God's 
prerogative? Further, the belief that procreation 
should be dictated by God's prerogative is clearly a 
belief not adhered to rigidly by those who are 
prepared to use artificial techniques to procreate, 
and there is no serious suggestion that these people's
206. See generally Singer, P., & Wells, D., The 
Reproduction Revolution, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1984.
207. See the Vatican's disapproval of artificial 
reproductive techniques, The Times, March 11, 
1987, p.3.
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view should be converted.
A second interpretation of the term 'unnatural'
is based on the belief that these techniques
contravene the 'natural law'. One theory of natural
law is that the laws of nature can be discovered by
208reference to the ends of natural things. That
is, all things and all human beings have certain ends
which constitute their flourishing and human acts have
certain ends (or purposes) which define the
appropriate way in which they should be performed.
The argument that AI & IVF are 'unnatural' goes
like this: since the only natural and legitimate end
of sex is procreation, modes of procreation, such as
AI & IVF which sever such a link,
209natural law. Notwithstanding
208. A theory which owed much to Aristotle and the 
Stoics. See Singer, P., Sc Wells, D. , op. cit. 
pp. 39-41.
209. See Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology, London, HMSO, Cmnd. 
9314, 1984, paras. 4.3 Sc 5.6. (hereinafter cited
as the Warnock Report). See also the Vatican's 
rulings on the impropriety of artificial 
reproductive techniques, The Guardian, 11 March, 
1987.
are contrary to the 
the unpopularity
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of this procreational model of sex and the lack of
Ti n
credibility of its original basis, it is unclear
what useful purpose this argument serves regarding the
acceptability of artificial reproductive techniques.
211As Singer & Wells have said, even if procreation 
is the essential legitimation for sexual intercourse, 
it would not necessarily be wrong to achieve 
procreation in some other way when infertility 
prevents the achievement of this essential goal 
through sexual intercourse. This leads to the next 
objection to AI & IVF.
Natural Procreation
To some people, AI & IVF are wrong because 
'true' procreation is achieved solely by a man-woman 
relationship. This argument turns the procreational 
model of sex on its head. In other words, instead of 
arguing that sex is for procreation, the contention 
here is that procreation should only be achieved 
naturally, that is, as a result of sexual
210. See Blustein Jeffery, Parents and Children: The 
Ethics of the Family, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1982, pp. 233-6; Cohen, Carl, "Sex, Birth 
Control, and Human Life", in Baker, Robert and 
Elliston, Frederick (eds.), Philosophy and Sex, 
New York, Prometheus Books, 1975, p. 150; Pope 
Paul VI, "Humane Vitae", in Philosophy and Sex, 
o p . cit., p. 131.
211. Singer, P., & Wells, D., op. cit., at pp. 40-41.
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intercourse. Thus, it has been argued that:
The true character of procreation is 
secured by its belonging to the man-woman 
relationship...The procreative and 
relational aspects of marriage strengthen 
one another, and that each is threatened 
by the loss of the other. This is a 
knot tied by God, which men should not 
untie. It is clear that any attempt to 
convert begetting into making constitutes 
a lossening of that knot..."212
According to this view, AI & IVF are not 'true'
procreation. Yet, defining one mode of procreation
as 'true' or 'false' is rather extraneous to the main
issue. Why is artificial procreation unacceptable?
The author seems to suggest that AI & IVF which
separate the relational and procreational aspects of
213marriage, threaten the former. However, there
is no concrete or substantive evidence to support this 
assertion. Indeed, it may equally be argued that 
couples who resort to AI & IVF in order to have 
children demonstrate their love and commitment to each 
other, possibly even to a greater extent than some 
fertile couples.
212. See O'Donovan, Oliver, Begotten Or Made, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 17-8.
213. Nor is it true that it is necessarily less 
meaningful. " [Fertilisation achieved outside 
the bodies of the couple remains by this very 
fact deprived of the meanings and the values 
which are expressed in the language of the body", 
see Vatican's ruling against artificial 
reproductive techniques, The Times, March 11, 
1987, p. 3.
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To sum up, the 'unnatural' argument, and the
argument that natural procreation should be the only
mode of procreation, are based on fundamental personal
beliefs and values. Consequently, individuals who
ascribe to those view may legitimately eschew
artificial reproductive techniques. These arguments,
however, are not sufficient to establish by themselves
that others, who do not share the same beliefs, should
be prohibited from having the choice to use them in
the exercise of their right to reproduce and to found
214a family. Consistent with Mill's classic 
explanation of the justification for interference with 
others, these beliefs would be enforceable on others 
only if they represent harm to the general good.
214. See Mill, John Stuart, "On Liberty", in Feinburg, 
Joel & Cress, Hyman (eds.), Philosophy & Law, 
California, Wadsworth Publishing C o ., (2nd E d .),
1980, p. 180.
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es) OBJECTIONS TO IVF
In the preceding section, fundamental 
objections common to both artificial reproductive 
techniques have been discussed. The conclusion is 
that they are not morally and socially unacceptable, 
and that these arguments cannot justify interference 
with their use on those grounds alone. However, some 
unique features of IVF may modify this conclusion in 
its respect.
Whereas certain objections may be common to 
both AI and IVF, the nature of the latter may provide 
a further source of debate for those who would 
advocate its use. The crucial distinquishing 
characteristic of IVF is that it involves more than 
simply the facilitation of a process which takes place 
naturally. Rather, it entails the extra-corporeal 
creation of a human embryo. The arguments already 
discussed may be applied to this extra-corporeal 
fertilisation, but they do not serve to render it 
universally immoral by themselves. The more subtle 
arguments raised in respect of IVF have, in fact, 
tended to concentrate on the way in which it is 
practised, and its potential to generate future (and 
admittedly speculative) harm.
Thus, even those who take the position that an 
embryo, from the moment of conception, ought to be 
treated with the respect accorded to a human being may 
accept that as long as it is given the chance to
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fulfill its potential, IVF is not unacceptable.^"^
Consequently, debates on IVF usually centre on
its practical use, and the many scientific
possibilities it opens up, such as experiments on
human embryos, freezing embryos, genetic studies and 
216
so on, rather than on the acceptability of IVF
P er se. For instance, responding to moral concern
regarding wastage of embryos during the selection and
reimplantation process, the IVF centre in Norfolk,
Virginia, has adopted the practice of fertilising eggs
only if a woman wishes them to be transferred to her 
217
womb. In Britain, the Unborn Children
2iD
(Protection) Bill 1985 which generated much 
passionate debate on the moral status of embryos was 
essentially an attempt to ensure that embryos were
215. See Johnstone, Brain, "The Moral Status of the 
Embryo: Two Viewpoints", in Singer, Peter & 
Walters, William (eds.), Test-Tube Babies, A 
Guide to Moral Questions, Present Techniques and 
Future Possibilities, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1984, pp. 49-56.
216. See generally the Warnock Report and Harris,
John, "In Vitro Fertilisation: the Ethical 
Issue", (1983) 33 Philosophical Quarterly, 217.
For a brief survey of the debates on embryo 
experimentation, see the Warnock Report; Mary 
Warnock, "Absolutely Wrong", The Times, 30 May 
1985; "Why Warnock is Wrong", The Times, 6 June, 
1985; Editorial, The Times, 13 Feb. 1985; "The 
Birthright That Science Deserves To Lose 1, The 
Guardian, 6 June 1985; The Guardian, 16 Oct. 1985.
217. See supra, pp. 31.
218. The Unborn Children (Protection) Bill, Session 
1984-5, H.C. Bill No. 23, and the Unborn Children 
(Protection) (No. 2) Bill, Session 1985-6, H.C. 
Bill No. 220.
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created in vitro only for the purpose of enabling a
219woman to have a child. In other words, IVF as a
technique is not automatically regarded as
unacceptable. Rather, anxieties are directed
primarily to the way in which it is carried out.
Moreover, some may contend that, although IVF
is not an unacceptable technique in itself, it becomes
unacceptable in view of the possible consequences to
which it may lead. This is called the slippery slope 
220argument.
For instance, it may be argued that, if IVF is 
allowed, it may be a step on the road to the Brave New 
World; a society in which genetic engineering enables 
human beings to be produced with certain 
characteristics in a state controlled laboratory for 
the benefit of the state. IVF, therefore, is 
unacceptable because its potential danger outweighs 
its possible benefits.
Opponents to IVF, therefore, argue that "if 
medicine turns to doctoring desires instead of medical
219. Clause 1(1) states, "Except with the 
authorisation of the Secretary of State under 
this Act, no person shall... procure the 
fertilisation of a human ovum in vitro...".
Clause 1(2) says that authorisation is allowed 
only for an IVF procedure to be carried our for 
the purposes of enabling a specific woman to bear 
a child.
220. See Govier, Trudy, "What's Wrong with Slippery 
Slope Arguments?", (1982) 12 Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 303.
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conditions... is there any reason for doctors to be 
reluctant to accede to parents' desires to have a girl 
rather than a boy, blonde hair rather than brown, a
op I
genius rather than a Clout...".
Although the slippery slope argument (a type of 
consequentialist argument) can often sound persuasive, 
it may also be inherently illogical. The thrust of 
the argument, in relation to IVF, runs like this: IVF 
is used to satisfy the desire of the infertile to have 
their own children and, if this is accepted, the 
principle of consistency will require the acceptance 
of other technical extensions, such as genetic 
engineering, to create, for example, a genius, if this 
is what parents desire. This will eventually lead us 
to the Brave New World.
Nonetheless, accepting IVF does not necessarily 
force acceptance of other technological extensions.
The two situations mentioned above may be equated in 
the sense that both are concerned with satisfying 
people's desires, and thus, if these desires are 
accorded the same weight consistency will require 
acceptance of the latter situation if the former is 
permitted. Yet the two situations may not be 
identical, since one relates to a situation where 
people desire to have their own children, the other is 
where parents desire to have particular kinds of
221. Ramsey, Paul, "Shall We Reproduce?", "Rejoinder
and Future Forecast", (1972) 220 JAMA 1480, 1481.
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children. The reasons for these different desires 
may not be equally acceptable, and hence, the two 
cases need not be treated as identical. Accepting 
the former does not necessarily oblige one, on the 
ground of consistency, to accept the latter.
Moreover, the desire to have children is validated by
acceptance of the right to reproduce and to found a
222
family. No such equivalent rights adhere to the
wish for a particular kind of children.
In any event, technological advances alone will 
not lead to Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. This is 
because Huxley's society is one where not only has the 
state mastered genetic engineering and artificial 
human reproduction, but it is a society with a rigid 
caste system, intense brainwashing and human 
enslavement. Transformation of present society to 
that of the Brave New World could only be achieved if 
all these elements exist. Successes in genetic 
engineering alone are insufficient to achieve this.
Nonetheless, fear of potential abuse of genetic 
engineering techniques is not entirely 
unjustifiable. Even if the above scenario is 
unlikely, other more plausible consequences may follow 
from IVF techniques which may be equally 
unacceptable. A review of these possibilities led 
the Warnock Report to recommend the creation of a
22 2. See supra, chapter 3.
- 101 -
statutory licensing authority/ but not to recommend
the outright banning of IVF and some of its
22 3consequential practices. In the absence of
legislative backing for this recommendation a 
voluntary licensing authority was set up in 1985 to 
monitor the activities of those who wish to carry out
research involving human embryos and/or the treatment
* T,rri 224 of IVF.
In other words, objections regarding the
practice of IVF, and the slippery slope argument are
not persuasive grounds for the prohibition of all
IVF. However, they do present a powerful case for
the need to regulate the practice and its scientific
extension.
In sum, IVF, like A I , is not _in £>e an
unacceptable technique. As the Warnock Report
concluded, IVF is an acceptable means of treating
infertility, and it should continue to be available
225subject to licencing. Thus, it is accepted that
the infertile should be allowed to resort to 
artificial reproductive techniques for reproduction 
and founding of a family, given that the problems 
identified here merely call for regulation of the
223. See the Warnock Report, para. 13.3.
224. See Voluntary Licensing Authority for Human In 
Vitro Fertilisation and Embryology, First Report, 
London, Medical Research Council/Royal College of 
Obstetrician and Gynaecologists, 1986.
225. See para. 5.10.
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practice of IVF and do not render it morally
reprehensible. Indeed, the current position is that
a number of centres in various countries are offering
these techniques as part of their infertility 
226
services. One may, therefore, conclude that the
right of the infertile to reproduce and to found a 
family prevail, and have indeed been tacitly 
recognised by virtue of the fact that no prohibition 
of these techniques has been seen appropriate despite 
strong condemnation from some sections of the 
community. The balance of morality, therefore, may 
be said to favour the vindication of human rights over 
practical, but avoidable, problems which can arise in 
the attempts to facilitate access to these rights.
However, it must be noted that the arguments 
described above have been deliberately confined to the 
relatively straightforward situation where a couple 
are artificially assisted to reproduce and to found a 
family by the use of their own genetic gametes.
Whilst the same arguments may be levelled against the 
use of donated ova and sperm, their characteristics 
may change. Equally, additional arguments may arise 
in this situation.
226. Singer, P., & Wells, D., op. cit., p. 13.
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(4) OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF DONATED GAMETES
If AI & IVF are not unacceptable _in se: as means 
of reproduction and founding of a family, is the use 
of donated gametes which will enable the founding of a 
family (whether through reproduction or not) equally 
acceptable?
227The Couple
It has been argued that the use of donated 
gametes (whether sperm or ova) is unacceptable because 
it amounts to a third party intervention into a 
marriage relationship which is a covenant-relationship
between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all
228 vothers. If this argument stands, it will rule
out the use by married couples of donated gametes. 
Another argument against the use of donated gametes is 
the possible harm to a child when he or she comes to 
know about the circumstances of his or her 
conception. The effects of both of these arguments 
on the rights of individuals to found a family 
(whether through reproduction or not) will be examined 
in turn.
Since these arguments are normally raised in 
respect of the use of donated semen in AI (AID), the
227. Note that the Warnock Report use this term to 
refer to all stable relationships except when 
discussing status of children, see para. 2.6.
228. See the Warnock Report, para. 4.10.
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following discussion will refer to AID. However, 
what is said is equally applicable to the use of 
donated gametes in artificial reproductive techniques 
in general.
Third Party Intervention
The essence of this contention against AID is
that, since donated semen of a person not party to a
marriage is used for procreation, it amounts to a
third party intervention into a marriage. It is
comparable to an extra-marital relationship, and is
229therefore objectionable.
AID has sometimes been equated with 
230adultery. However, such a comparison can hardly
be justified. The nature, motive and elements of the
229. See, for example, in 1949, Pope Pius XII 
condemned AI as immoral. "...Artificial 
insemination in marriage, but produced by the 
active element of a third party, is equally 
immoral... The husband and the wife have alone 
reciprocal right over their bodies in order to 
engender new life..." See Finegold, Wilfred J., 
Artificial Insemination, Springfeild, Illinois, 
Charles C. Thomas, 1964, p. 78.
230. In 1945, a commission set up by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury to consider the practice of human 
artificial insemination concluded by majority 
that "...the act both of a married donor, and a 
married recipient constitute adultery."
According to the Commission, adultery involved 
the surrender of either reproductive powers or 
organs of generation whether capable of actual 
generation or not. (The Report was published in 
1948, and reprinted in 1952 by S.P.C.K. under the 
title Artificial Human Insemination, p.37). See 
infra, chapter 5, pp. 129-132.
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O  "5 1
acts are totally different. An adulterous
relationship involves sexual intercourse between two 
people, often with emotional involvement; AID does 
not. The motives of the two acts, again, are not 
parallel. AID is used in the hope that conception
T O O
will occur so that a couple can have a family.
This is not generally the case in an adulterous
relationship which usually aims at the pleasure it
233will give, whereas AID is a means to an end.
The legal position seems settled. In Scots law, AID
is not adultery even if it is undertaken without a
2 34husband's consent. This is almost certainly the
English position, although no English courts have
' . 235considered the point.
However, other arguments must also be
considered. It has been suggested that the
introduction of a third party into a marital
relationship is undesirable because of the possible
harmful consequences it may have; in that a husband
will be reminded of his infertility by the existence
of an AID child. Nonetheless, this is clearly
something that a couple will have to assess for
231. See the Warnock Report, para. 4.10.
232. See supra, chapter 2, pp. 21-24.
233. ibid.
234. MacLennan v. MacLennan, (1958) S.C. 105., See
infra, chapter 5, p. 130.
235. See infra, chapter 5, pp. 129-132.
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236
themselves. Furthermore, the fact that some
couples will be affected adversely by AID is not 
sufficient to exclude its use by others. In fact, 
this may merely serve to indicate the need for
2 3 7counselling for those contemplating using AID.
In terms of a married couple, then, there may 
be some strength to the argument that AID is an 
intrusion into the marital relationship, since - at a 
practical level - there is the need for a donor. It 
is not clear, however, that intrusion which is 
designed to develop the relationship and which is 
effective in vindicating basic rights, need be viewed 
as a bad thing. In other words, it is not morally 
imperative that intervention in a marriage is in 
itself wrong, particularly where the aim and likely 
outcome of the intervention is to cement a 
relationship rather than to disrupt it. In some 
cases, the use of donated gametes will provide the 
only method by which individuals and couples may 
exploit their rights to reproduce and to found a 
family.
236. See supra, chapter 3, pp.55-56, on marital 
privacy.
237. See Legislation on Human Infertility Services and 
Embryo Research — A Consultation Paper, HMSO, 
London, Cm. 46, 1986, para. 25 (hereinafter cited 
as the Consultation paper).
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The Individual
The arguments used in respect of a married 
couple, do not, of course, automatically apply to 
single individuals, who - it has been asserted - may
also claim the right to reproduce and to found a
* ■ -| 238 0 . . . . .family. Since no marriage exists, intrusion
into a marriage cannot be used as an argument in an
attempt to limit access to these techniques.
However, arguments can be adduced which relate
specifically to the single individual, and which may
seem to suggest that such techniques should not be
made available to them. Most notably, it may be
argued that - even accepting the practice of using
donated gametes in some circumstances - the deliberate
creation of a single parent family is sufficiently
unacceptable to merit a restriction of access. Were
such an argument to have priority, then it would
seriously hinder the assertion that the single
infertile also have rights to reproduce and to found a
family.
In fact, courts in recent cases have been
noticeably disinclined to disvalue the one-parent
239 ■family, and society seems less inclined to regard
it as necessarily a bad thing. The general view,
238. See supra, chapter 3.
239. See Thake v. Maurice, [1984] 2 All E.R. 513, at 
p. 516, per Peter Pain J., loc. cit.
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therefore, may be less hostile towards single-parent
4= ■ i • 240families.
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the 
strongest arugment against exercising the right to 
reproduce and to found a family through the use of 
AID, may be found in consideration of the subsequent 
child. The rights of individuals and couples may be 
affected by competing rights of children.
Harm to an AID Child
One of the strongest objections to the use of
AID is that an AID child may experience confusions of
personal identity due to the circumstances of his or
her conception.
At the moment, the practice in AID appears to
be that some practitioners advise couples not to
disclose to the child his or her circumstances of
conception, whilst others apparently leave the
decision as to whether to tell to them to the
recipients:
"...unless you decide to tell the child 
there is no reason for him (or her) even 
to know that he (or she) was conceived by 
AID. Whether or not you do so is 
entirely up to you."241
240. Compare this with the Departmental Committee on 
Human Artificial Insemination, London, HMSO, 
Cmnd. 1105, 1960, para. 112, where the committee 
vehemently opposed the idea of AID to single 
women.
241. Artificial Insemination, Explanatory information 
booklet to parents, London, RCOG, 1979.
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A study lias found that most AID couples
intended never to reveal the circumstances of their
conception to AID children. These children therefore
may never know of their AID conception nor be informed
of the donors identities. Some, therefore, argue
^9 -^irist AID on the ground that it is wrong to deceive
a child regarding the circumstances of his or her 
243conception.
Despite the secrecy regarding AID in general,
some AID children do discover the circumstances of
their conception, either in the divorce proceedings of
their 'parents', or indirectly from family
conversation. The undesirable consequences of
accidential disclosure have strengthened the case for
openness with AID children regarding the circumstances
of their conception.
The argument for openness and the debates
relating to the extent of disclosure, implicitly
accept the use of AID, and considerations relate to
what measures will best meet the needs of AID children
taking into account interests of those who use and 
245donate semen.
Nonetheless, some may contend that possible 
harm to a child when he or she is told about his or
242. See Snowden, R.S. & Mitchell, G.D., The 
Artificial Family, London, Unwin Paperbacks, 
1981, pp. 82-5.
243. See Human Procreation, CSS, 1984, p. 47.
244. See infra, pp. 112-116.
245. See the Consultation paper, paras. 29-30.
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her circumstances of conception is an important 
consideration against AID itself, and not merely a 
consequential issue. Those in favour of AID may seek 
to counter this argument by pointing out that the 
discovery by a child that his or her 'father' is in 
fact not genetically linked to him or her, does not 
necessarily entail greater distress than the discovery 
that one has been adopted. However, there are 
distinctions between the two situations which make 
this counter-argument of only limited value.
Although adoption is a situation where the 
child may suffer when he or she is told about his or 
her true origin, it is nonetheless often the best 
option for a child who has already been born. 
Consequently, adoption cannot be used as an example on 
all fours with the deliberate creation of a child, who 
may suffer as a result of his or her particular 
circumstances of conception.
Notwithstanding this, it is, however, difficult 
to contend with any strong conviction that such a 
child would have been better off not being born in the 
first place (which he or she would not have been but 
for the use of AID), and that, conversely, people have 
no right to use AID to found a family (whether through
O /L C
reproduction or not). In fact, courts have been
246. See generally, Liu, A.N.C., "Wrongful Life: Some
of the Problems", (1987) 13 Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 69.
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notably loath to accept that non-existence could ever 
be preferable to existence even with handicap.24^
In sum, people s rights to found a family 
(whether through reproduction or not) prevail, despite 
the personal belief of some that third party 
intervention into a marriage is wrong, and that an AID 
child may suffer due to his or her particular 
circumstances of conception.
Given that the strongest argument against AID 
(whether for individuals or couples) seems to relate 
to the resulting child, it is worth at this stage 
considering whether any unfavourable impact on the 
child could be minimised. In particular, 
considerable concern centres on the question as to 
whether or not a child has a right to have access to 
certain information about the donor. If the distress 
which forms the basis of this argument against AID is 
real, there seem to be two options.
On the one hand, the child could simply be 
deceived - a practice which is relatively common, but 
can be frwoned upon for several reasons.248 On the 
other hand, the child could be told of the 
circumstances of his or her conception.
247. See Zepeda v. Zepeda 41 111 App 2d 240; Williams 
v. States of New York 18 NY 2d 481 (196 6T7 McKay 
v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 2 All E. R.
771.
248. See infra, pp. 112-116.
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Ihere appear to be a number of reasons why AID 
children are not told the truth. Some fear that the 
truth will adversely affect the relationship already 
established between the child and the family. Some 
couples consider that there is no reason to tell 
because they regard the AID child as 'their' child.
Others fear that AID status will stigmatise the
. 249
child. In one study, it was concluded that the
main reason for secrecy was in fact an attempt to
protect the feelings of husbands, and to avoid
publication of the fact of male infertility.
Because of the secrecy which has surrounded 
AID, thorough follow-up studies of the impact on AID 
children when they are told of the circumstances of 
their conception have not been possible. But from 
limited data, Snowden & Mitchell250 found that the 
fear that telling an AID child the circumstances of 
his or her conception would damage the 'father'-chiId 
relationship might not be entirely justified. Those 
children who had been told apppeared to be glad that 
their AID conceptions were not kept secret, and none 
found it a particularly traumatic experience. Some
249. See Snowden, R., & Mitchell, G. D., Arti ficial 
Reproduction: a Social Investigation, Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1983, p. 106.
250. Snowden, R., & Mitchell, G. D., Artificial 
Reproduction: a Social Investigation, op. cit., 
pp. 97-123.
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were surprised that their parents had found it necessary 
to keep AID secret. In some cases, the relationship 
between parents and child was enhanced rather than 
spoiled. Hence, it appears to be possible to tell a 
child about these circumstances without harming 
'father 1-child relationship.251
Moreover, secrecy may be harmful to family 
relationships and to the child. The positive and/or 
negative deception necessary to conceal the 
circumstances of a child's conception may blemish or 
destroy the relationship of trust which ideally exists 
within the family. If a child suspects his or her 
origin, secrecy may also be harmful to his or her mental 
health.
Here, an analogy may be made with adoption. It
is generally accepted in adoption practice that an
adopted person, in order to develop a proper sense of
identity should know that he or she was adopted, and
should be given this information in a way which takes
252account of his or her age and understanding.
251. ibid.
252. Clinical research suggests that in early 
adolescence, a genealogically bewildered child 
(that is, a child who either has no knowledge or 
only uncertain knowledge of one or both of his 
natural parents) will often begin searching for 
clues about his or her unknown parents from every 
direct or indirect shred of evidence. This 
sometimes amounts to an obssession. Genealogical 
deprivation may affect a child's sense of 
self-image, identity, belonging and
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In recognition ol this principle, a provision
was made for England and Wales in the Children Act
1975 which gave an adopted person a right to ascertain
his or her biological parentage at the age of 
253
18- In Scotland, an adopted person, on reaching
17, can go to Register House in Edinburgh and ask to
254see the original birth entry.
In England and Wales, a person adopted before 
the statutory provision was enacted is required to be 
counselled before information is given which will lead 
them to their original birth record. The purpose of 
counselling is to assist the adopted person to 
understand some of the possible effects of his or her 
enquires. It was also thought that there should be 
some protection for the mother who gave the child up 
for adoption.
One may therefore argue that, by analogy with 
adoption, AID children should not be deceived about 
the circumstances of their conception, and that they
security. The need to know one's biological 
origin is confirmed by a number of studies.
See, for example, Sants, H.J., "Genealogical 
Bewilderment in Children with Substitute 
Parents", in Child Adoption, the Association of 
British Adoption and Fostering Agencies, London, 
p. 69. See McWhinnie, A.M., "Who Am I?", in 
Child Adoption, op. cit., p.104.
253. See Sections 26 & 27 of the Children Act 1975.
See Generally, Cretney, S.M., Principles of 
Family Law, (4th Ed.), Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, pp. 
473-5.
254. This provision was first made in Section 11 of 
the Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930, now 
Section 45 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978.
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should have the right to know the identities of 
donors. If so, provisions similiar to those in 
adoption could be made enabling them to find out if 
they so wish.
Nonetheless, opinions are relatively divided as 
to whether an AID child should be allowed only limited
information regarding the donor's ethic origin and 
255genetic health, or whether an AID child should
have the right of access to the donor's identity, as
does an adopted person. Here again there may be
additional consequences following from full disclosure
to an AID child, which may affect the desire of the
community to encourage full and complete disclosure.
One major concern appears to be that disclosure
of donors' identities may discourage semen donation.
Available evidence on this is rather tentative at the 
256moment. Consequently, an AID child's right to
know may be far from certain. But it is clear from 
the above discussion that openness with an AID child 
regarding the circumstances of his or her conception
255. See the Warnock Report, para. 4.21.
256. The experience in Sweden suggests that fears of 
reduce in the frequency of semen donation proves 
to be groundless, see Surrogate Motherhood, 
Report of the Board of Science and Education, 
London, BMA, 1987, p. 19. The unpublished 
survey of Robyn Rowland in Victoria, Australia 
also supports this conclusion, see Singer, P., & 
Wells, D., op. cit., pp. 74-5.
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is generally regarded to be desirable, and may avert
the potential for harm associated with deception and
accidential disclosure.
Consistent with this valuing of openness, is
the conclusion that people who resort to AID should be
counselled regarding the issues which they will have
to confront later regarding a child's understanding of
257his or her circumstances of conception. As will
258be seen later, proper birth registration and
recording of AID births will also permit access by AID
to children certain information about donors.
259As mentioned before, the arguments
concerning AID apply equally to situations where 
donated gametes are used for the founding of a family 
(whether through reproduction or not). Thus although 
the situation of a child born as a result of gamete 
donation is of great importance, the problems which 
can be identified are scarcely insurmountable. Their 
resolution depends on pragmatics, and, therefore, it 
is possible to conclude that even concern about 
possible harm to children is not a sufficient argument 
against the infertile having the ability to exercise 
their rights to found a family (whether through 
reproduction or not).
257. See the Consultation paper, para. 25.
258. See infra, pp. 149-151.
259. See supra, pp. 103-104.
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(5) CONCLUSION
In this chapter, some fundamental objections to 
the use of AI & IVF to reproduce and found a family 
have been examined. The arguments that these 
techniques are 'unnatural', and that natural 
procreation should be the only mode of procreation are 
essentially personal beliefs which do not have 
sufficient weight to defeat the claim of the infertile 
to exercise their rights to reproduce and to found a 
family.
Concerns relating to the practice of IVF, and
the many scientific possibilities it opens up, are not
insuperable. A voluntary licensing authority has
been set up to monitor scientific developments in the
260area of research on embryos and IVF treatments,
and a statutory licensing authority will be considered
261by Parliament m  the near future.
The use of donated gametes for the founding of 
a family (whether through reproduction or not) may be 
rejected by some as an unacceptable intervention into 
a marriage by a third party. Neither this personal 
belief, nor the potential harm to a child, is 
sufficiently weighty, however, to defeat the claim of
260. Voluntary Licensing Authority for Human In Vitro 
Fertilisation and Embryology, First Report,
London, Medical Research Council/Royal College of 
Obstetrician and Gynaecologists, 1986.
261. A government Bill implementing the 
recommendations of the V^arnock Report is just a 
matter of time, see II. L., Vol, 475, Col. 365 .
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those who are prepared to use donated gametes. The 
possibility of harm to a marriage may point to the 
need to counsel of potential users. The needs of 
children may indicate that the practice of AID should 
be more open, and that, for example, there should be 
proper recording of AID births, and counselling before 
access to AID birth records.
Current practice is consonant with these 
conclusions. AI, IVF and the use of donated gametes 
are all available either in the public or private 
sector. The intention of Parliament is’to act on the 
recommendations of the Warnock Report concerning 
licensing and regulation of artificial techniques.
One can infer here that an individual's right to 
reproduce, or to found a family, or both, are 
therefore being tacitly recognised and respected.
Although moral and social arguments against 
these artificial techniques do not seem to be 
sufficiently weighty to merit a denial of the rights 
of the infertile, there remain potential legal 
difficulties, which may affect this position. If the 
outcome of legal analysis is that the balance swings 
away from the rights of the infertile, then this will 
provide considerable support for the opponents of 
artificial reproductive techniques. It is to these 
matters, therefore, that attention must now be paid.
CHAPTER 5 
LEGAL ISSUES IN FOUNDING FAMILY
BY ARTIFICIAL TECHNIQUES
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(1 ) INTRODUCTION
It has been argued in the previous chapter that 
individuals should be free to resort to artificial 
techniques which will enable them to found a family 
(whether through reproduction or not), given that the 
problems identified merely indicate that the use of
artificial techniques should be regulated and
, - , - , - , 2 6 2 .  
controlled. Measures to that effect will be
conducive to putting the use, and practice, of
artificial techniques on a sound and proper footing.
Nonetheless, certain potential difficulties are
derivative from the lav/ and can be resolved primarily
by reference to legal change. The law, therefore,
can have an important role to play in this context.
There are a number of legal issues relating to
founding of a family by artificial reproductive
techniques. For instance, what is the effect of
artificial techniques on a marriage? Is the use of
donated gametes adultery in law? As will be seen,
these issues are relatively unambiguous today.
Issues concerning the legal status of children
born as a result of artificial techniques are less
263 •exigent today. The reason for this is that the
262. See supra., chapter 4.
263. No British court has considered the legal status 
of an AID child. For the American cases which 
considered the question of legitimacy of AID 
children, see Cusine, D.J., "Artificial 
Insemination", in McLean, S.A.M. (ed.), Legal 
Issues in Medicine, Aldershot, Gower, 1981, p.
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policy of the law has recently been to remove, as far
as possible, the legal disadvantages pertaining to
children born out of wedlock. In England & Wales,
this has been effected by the Family Law Reform Act 
264
1987, and m  Scotland, by the Law Reform (Parent
and Child) Act (Scotland) 1986 (LRPCA 1986). Since
the Family Law Reform Act 1987 is still unpublished,
references can only be made to the Family Law Reform
Bill 1987 (FLRB 1987).265
Some may disagree with the approach of the FLRB
1987 and the LRPCA 1986 on the ground that they do not
266abolish the status of illegitimacy altogether.
If there was only one status for all children, then 
the question of parenthood in artificial techniques 
might be resolved by establishing a mechanism whereby 
parenthood might be acknowledged and registered.
This could be accompanied by a separate register which 
could record a child's true parentage, enabling him or
264. The Family Law Reform Act 1987 was very much 
influenced by the LRPCA 1986. The 1987 Act 
received its royal assent on the 16 May 1987. 
Neither of these Act are in force.
265. Family Law Reform Bill [H.L.], Session 1986-7, 
H.C. Bill, 70.
266. See the Law Commission's working paper on 
Illegitimacy, No. 74, London, HMSO, 1982, para. 
3.16 (hereinafter cited as Law Commission's 
working paper, No. 74); Levin Jennifer, 
"Reforming the Legitimacy Laws", (1978) 8 Fam. 
Law, 35-9; Samuels Alec, "Illegitimacy: The Law 
Commission's Report", (1983) 13 Fam. Law, 87-90; 
Eekelaar, John, "Second Thoughts on Illegitimacy 
Reform", (1985) 15 Fam. Law, 261-3.
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her to trace his or her origin.267
Regardless of the merits of one status for all 
children as opposed to the current policy of the law, 
the question of parenthood is still pertinent in the 
context of founding a family through the use of 
artificial techniques. First, as will be seen
i , 268 ,. ,
later, the current concept of parenthood cannot 
satisfactorily be applied to artificial reproductive 
methods. Furthermore, since individuals resorting to 
artificial reproductive methods for the founding of a 
family are deliberately bringing children into the 
world for parenting, it is pertinent to ask who ought, 
at least, to have parental duties regarding such 
children.
The issue of parenthood and registration of 
birth engendered by the use of artificial techniques 
will be explored, and proposed solutions will be 
examined, in this chapter. Since these questions
267. See Cusine, Douglas, "Legal Issues Relating to 
AID", in Brudenell, M . , et al. (eds. ), Arti ficial 
Insemination, Proceedings of the Fourth Study 
Group of the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists, RCOG, 1976, where the concept of 
"accepted children" was suggested, p. 163-70.
268. See infra, chapters 5 & 7, pp. 133-146, 231-238.
269. In natural reproduction, both English and 
Scottish lav; accord automatic parental rights and 
duties to married parents and unmarried 
mothers. Unmarried fathers have parental duties 
once paternity is established, and parental 
rights can be obtained through a court order.
See Clause 4 of the FLRB 1987 and Sections 2 & 3 
of the LRPCA 1986.
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have been considered by the Warnock Report,270 and
its recommendations were intended to be applicable
2 71
throughout the UK, their recommendations will be 
referred to frequently.
270. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology, London, HMSO, Cmnd. 
9314, 1984, (hereinafter cited as the Warnock
Report).
271. See para. 1.10.
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(2) LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO FOUNDING OF A FAMILY BY 
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES272
Artificial Reproductive Techniques and Their 
Effect on Marriage
The legal effects of artificial reproduction
(whether involving the use of donated gametes or not)
on a marriage are relatively non-controversial 
273today. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to mention
them briefly, since they clearly concern founding a 
family and marriage. For instance, does AI amount to 
consummation of a marriage? Does it bar a decree of
nullity? Is AID adultery? Although these issues
are usually considered in relation to A I , and AID, and 
the following discussion will be conducted mainly in 
those terms, they have equal applications to IVF, and 
the use of donated gametes in general.
(a ) Consummation of Marriage
One legal issue raised in connection to AI is 
the question whether or not it constitutes 
consummation of a marriage. In both English and
272. Artificial reproductive techniques can raise many 
other legal issues, eg. the legal status of 
embryos in vitro, see Wright, Gerald, "The Legal 
Implications of IVF", in Test-Tube Babies, a 
Christian View, London, Unity Press, Becket 
Publications, 1984, pp. 39-44.
273. The Warnock Report did not discuss this legal 
aspect of artificial reproduction at all, except 
to mention that AID is not adultery in law, para. 
4.10.
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Scottish law, what is required to establish
consummation of a marriage is intercourse which is
"ordinary and complete" and not "imperfect and 
2 74
unnatural". It follows from this definition
that there is a clear distinction between consummation
and conception. The former is achieved by sexual 
275intercourse. A I , therefore, cannot amount to
consummation of a marriage. A number of English
cases have considered this now settled legal issue.
2 76In R.E.L. (otherwise R. ) v. ELL. , the wife
was granted a decree of nullity on the ground of the
husband's sexual incapacity, even though a child was
born as a result of AIH. There was no consummation
277of the marriage. Again, in Slater v.
278 1Slater, AID was not considered to constitute
consummation of a marriage. This was assumed in Q.
279v. Q . . In the Scottish case of A . B . v.
280C .B ., there was no question that AIH constituted
consummation of a marriage. Equally, therefore, IVF 
cannot in itself constitute consummation of a marriage.
274. D. v. A. (1845) 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, at p. 299, per 
Dr. Lushington; Corbett v. Corbett [1971] P. 83; 
J. v. J. 1978 SLT 128.
275. A decree of nullity may be obtained on the ground 
of inability to consummate a marriage even if a 
child has been conceived by fecunatio ab extra, 
Clarke v. Clarke [1943] P. 1.
276. [1949] P. 211“.
277. The wife's conduct in submitting to AIH was not 
held to have approbated the marriage, see infra., 
pp. 125-128, on a discussion of the doctrine of 
approbation of marriage.
278. [1953] P. 252, see infra, p. 126.
27 9. The Times, 12 May, I960, see infra, p. 127.
280. 1961 SC 347, see infra, p. 128.
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(b) Approbation of Marriage
Since AI or IVF cannot amount to consummation
of a marriage, can they amount to approbation of a
marriage, barring a decree of nullity?
The essence of the doctrine of approbation of
marriage in both England and Scottish law has been
explained in the following terms:
"...that in a suit for the nullity of 
marriage, there may be facts and 
circumstances proved which so plainly 
imply, on the part of the complaining 
spouse, a recognition of the existence 
and validity of the marriage, as to 
render it most inequitable and contrary 
to public policy that he or she should be 
permitted to go on and challenge it with 
effect."281
In England and Wales, the doctrine is now
contained in S13,(l) of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
1973, which provides that,
"The court shall not...grant a decree of 
nullity on the ground that the marriage 
is voidable if the respondent satisfies 
the court:
(a) that the petitioner, with knowledge 
that it was open to him to have the 
marriage avoided, so conducted himself in 
relation to the respondent as to lead the 
respondent reasonably to believe that he 
would not seek to do so; and
(b) that it would be unjust to the 
respondent to grant the decree."2^2
281. See C.E. v. A.B. (1885) 12 R. (H.L.) 38, per Lord
Watson at p. 45. Approved in A .B . v C .B . 1961 
SC 347.
282. See Cretney S.M., Principles of Family Law, (4th 
Ed.), London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, p.84.
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First, S13(l) puts the burden of proof on the 
respondent to satisfy the court that the conditions in 
the section are fulfilled. Second, the petitioner's 
conduct can only be a bar to nullity if he or she knew 
at the time that it was open to him or her to obtain
9 0 3
the relief. In W. v. W. , the marriage was not
consummated owing to the incapacity of the wife. The
couple adopted a child. Later, the husband
petitioned for a decree of nullity. The Court of
Appeal set aside the decree, holding that the marriage
had been approbated. The Court held that although
there was no issue that the husband knew of his
remedies in nullity at the date of the adoption, he
must be taken to have known of his remedy having
regard to all the circumstances and the facts of the 
284case.
W. v. W. was distinguished in Slater v.
285Slater. In that case, the Court of Appeal held
that neither during the time of AID, nor at the date 
of the adoption of the child did the wife have 
knowledge
283. [1952] P. 152.
284. Evershed, M.R. said, "A proceeding to adopt a 
child under the Adoption of Children Act, 1926, 
which was then in force, involved certain 
proposition and consequences. It involved that 
when two persons jointly adopted a child, they 
must proceed on the footing that they were 
spouses...The application was made on the footing 
that the applicants were parties to a valid 
marriage." ibid., p.158.
285. [1953] P. 252.
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of her remedy in nullity. Therefore, neither of 
these events amounted to approbation of the marriage 
by the wife. A decree of nullity was granted to
9 o C\
her. Again, in Q. v. Q., it was held that the
fact that the wife had given birth to a child as a
result of AID did not amount to approbation of the
marriage by her, since at the time of receiving AID,
she had no knowledge of the legal remedy open to her
as a result of the husband's incapacity; a decree of
nullity was thus granted.
The third requirement of S13 is that it would
be unjust to the respondent to grant the nullity
287decree. For instance, in D. v. D., the parties 
adopted two children at a time when the husband knew 
that he could have the marriage annulled on the ground 
of the wife's wilful refusal to consummate the 
marriage. Dunn, J. held that the instant case was 
even stronger than that of W. v. W. because the 
husband knew of his remedies. However, a decree of 
nullity was granted because, in this case, there was 
no injustice to the wife in doing so.
In Scotland, as in England, an action for 
nullity on the ground of impotence may be barred if it 
is shown that the pursuer has, with full knowledge of 
the fact and the law, approbated the contract, or has
286. The Times, 12 May, 1960.
287. [1979] 3 All E.R. 337.
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taken advantages and derived benefits from the 
matrimonial relationship which it would be inequitable
to permit him or her to treat as if it had never
• ^ 288 existed.
Thus, in the case of A .B . v. C.B.,289 a 
husband's action for nullity on the ground of the 
wife's impotence was dismissed. It was held that the 
husband had, with full knowledge of the facts and the 
law, approbated the marriage by co-operating in the 
wife's AIH, and agreeing to adopt a child.
In sum, although the doctrine of approbation in 
Scottish and English law is slightly different, a 
British court may refuse to grant a decree of nullity 
on the ground that the conduct of a spouse, in 
submitting to AI or IVF, has been such as to approbate 
the marriage. Each case, thus, depends very much on 
its own facts.
288. ChB. v. A^B. (1885) 12 R. (H.L.) 36, per Lord 
Selbourne, approved in A .B . v. C.B. 1961 SC 347.
289. supra, cit.
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(c ) Adultery
One well-discussed legal issue in relation to
AI is whether AID amounts to adultery.290 In
English law, the elements of adultery are clear.
There must be voluntary or consensual sexual
intercourse between a married person and a person
(whether married or unmarried) of the opposite sex,
291not being the other's spouse. In this context,
292some penetration, however slight, suffices. 
Consequently, in English law, AID should, and would, 
almost certainly not be considered as adultery, 
although this point has never been directly examined 
by an English court.
290. Tallin, G.P.R., "Artificial Insemination", (1956) 
34, Canadian Bar Review, 1-27, 166-86, 628-31; 
Hubbard, H.A., "Artificial Insemination: A Reply 
to Dean Tallin", (1956) 34 Canadian Bar Review, 
425-51; Bartholomew, G.W., "Legal Implications of 
Artificial Insemination", (1958) 21 M.L.R. p.236.
291. Accepted by Dennis v. Dennis [1955] P. 153.
292. See Dennis v. Dennis [1955] P. 153. "I do not 
think that it can be said that adultery is proved 
unless there be some penetration." ibid, at p. 
160, per Singleton L.J. "...I can found no 
other sure ground upon which to base my 
decision... than that which was adopted by ...my 
Lord, namely, the test of penetration; 
penetration not necessarily complete, but some 
penetration in order that the physical fact of 
adultery may be proved either directly of 
indirectly by inference." ibid., at p. 163, per 
Hodson L.J.
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In Scots law, AID is not adultery. This was 
decided in the case of MacLennan v. MacLennan,293 
where a husband petitioned for divorce on the ground 
that his wife had committed adultery. The wife 
denied adultery and explained that her child was born 
as a result of AID. The husband contended that this 
defence was irrelevant because AID without the consent 
of the husband amounted to adultery in law. It was 
held that, AID did not constitute adultery whether it 
was undertaken with or without the husband's consent.
Lord Wheatley came to this conclusion after 
holding that, for there to be adultery in a legal 
sense, there must be two parties of the opposite sex 
engaging in sexual act involving some degree of 
penetration. Consequently, AID cannot amount to 
adultery.
The decision in MacLennan is consistent with
English law on the legal requirements necessary to
establish adultery. From the point of view of common
sense, as has been argued, it is sensible to
distinguish between adultery on the one hand, and the
use of donated semen in AI (AID) for the founding of a
2 94family, on the other hand. These are acts of
entirely different nature, and they have different 
intentions and intended consequences. Moreover, it
293. [1958] SLT 12.
294. See supra, chapter 4. pp. 104-5.
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would be implausible to argue that where a married
couple resort to IVF which involves the use of donated
semen, the wife is committing adultery. An
interesting point in this context is that there has
been no suggestion that ovum donation is adultery,
even though some regard the surrendering of one's
reproductive powers as sufficient to amount to 
295adultery.
Currently, the question as to whether donation
and use of donated gametes amounts to adultery is
largely academic. Section 1 of the Divorce Law
Reform Act 1969 (applicable to England and Wales) and
Section 1 of the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 have made
irretriveable breakdown of a marriage the sole ground
for divorce. Arguably, the conduct of a wife who
undertakes AI without the consent of the husband, or
that of a husband who donates semen without the
consent of his wife, may be treated as intolerable
conduct evidencing breakdown of the marriage, and
296thus, allowing a spouse to obtain a divorce.
However, the fact that divorce may be available is 
insufficient to challenge the techniques themselves.
295. See supra, chapter 4, p. 104, on the view of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on AID.
296. "It is almost trite to say that a married woman 
who, without the consent of her husband, has the 
seed of a male donor injected into her person by 
mechanical means in order to procreate a child 
who would not be a child of the marriage has 
committed a grave and heinous breach of the 
contract of marriage." per Lord Wheatley, in 
MacLennan, [1958] SLT 12, at p . 14.
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If divorce is available in these circumstances, this 
is because of the manner in which the techniques were 
used and not due to the nature of the techniques 
themselves.
In the preceding section, the legal effects of 
AI, IVF and the use of donated gametes on a marriage 
have been considered. Consideration has been brief 
since they are relatively settled and
non-controversial issues. One may conclude that AI 
or IVF cannot amount to consummation of marriage. 
Further, whether AI or IVF may or may not amount to 
approbation of a marriage is a question of fact in 
each case. Finally, donation and use of donated 
semen for the founding of a family cannot amount to 
adultery on the part of either a recipient or a donor 
in Scots law. This is certainly also the case in 
English law. However, the issue is largely otiose 
today since a divorce can be obtained by proving 
certain facts other than adultery. Consideration of 
these problems, therefore, may not any longer be the 
crucial focus of legal debate. However, a much more 
complex and potentially far-reaching area requires to 
be elaborated, that is, the question of parenthood.
In the following section, the issue of parenthood in 
artificial techniques will be explored.
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Parenthood and Artificial Reproductive 
Techniques: AI & IVF
The complexities of inter-personal 
relationships and legal standing following on the use 
of artificial reproductive techniques are such that 
some explanation is required of the way in which 
certain terms will be used. In the following 
discussion, 'parent', 'mother' and 'father' are terms 
used to denote a legal relationship between an adult 
and a child. The undernoted terms, however, are 
purely descriptive. 'Biological mother/father' 
refers to a woman/man who contributes an ovum/semen to 
the creation of a child. 'Ovum/semen donor' refers 
to a biological mother/father who donates her or his 
genetic gametes. 'Social mother/father' refers to a 
woman/man who intends to rear a child, regardless of 
her or his genetic link with the child.
In natural reproduction, the biological mother 
and father of a child, almost invariably also the 
social mother and father, are regarded by the law as 
parents. Both English and Scottish law attribute to 
them parental duties (as opposed to parental 
rights respecting the child. Thus, it has been
said that the existing English (and Scottish)
^  4 -  • 2 9 8definition of parenthood is based on genetics.
297. See supra, p. 121.
298. Except in adoption, see Legislation on Human
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This mode of attributing parental duties, using
genetic factors will hereinafter be called the
'genetic mode'. Although the use of the 'genetic
mode' in natural reproduction for the attribution of
fatherhood is not disputed, whether this is also the
real basis for motherhood can be questioned. This,
nonetheless, does not affect the argument in this 
299chapter.
There is no doubt that the 'genetic mode1 
applies in cases where people resort to artificial 
reproduction (AI a IVF) to reproduce and found a 
family, (that is, where neither donated gametes
nor surrogacy is employed). This is so because the 
only difference between artificial and natural 
reproduction here is the way in which a child is
Infertility Cervices and Embryo Research - A 
Consultation Paper, London, HMSO, Cm. 46, 1986,
para. 33 (hereinafter cited as the Consultation 
paper). This appears also to be underlying 
assumption of the Warnock Report when it 
recommended that "where a woman donates an egg 
for transfer to another the donation should be 
treated as absolute and that, like a male donor 
she should have no rights or duties with regard 
to any resulting child." para. 6.8.
299. See infra., chapter 7, pp.236-8^ on motherhood.
300. Neither the Law Commission Report on 
Illegitimacy, No. 118, London, HMCO, 1982, 
(hereinafter cited as the Law Commission Report, 
No. 118), nor the Warnock Report mentioned this, 
probably because it is not perceived to be an 
issue at all. See Appendix 1 for Lord Denning's 
move to amend Clause 1 of the Family Law Reform 
Bill LH.L.j, Session 1986-7, L.C. Bill, 70.
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conceived. The marital status of a person using AI
or IVF is irrelevant; just as in natural reproduction,
an unmarried couple who procreate will be the parents
of the child. Therefore, if a male partner uses his
semen to inseminate artificially his female partner,
they are, and should be, regarded as parents of the
resulting child, and consequently, they should have
parental duties regarding the child. However, since
the child may be born out of wedlock, the father's
rights regarding the child differ from that of a 
301married father.
Where donated gametes (semen and/or ovum) are 
used in artificial reproduction, whether in AI or IVF, 
the obvious question is, who is the mother and/or 
father of a resulting child. Can the 'genetic mode' 
be applied here satisfactorily?
Since fatherhood is often discussed in the 
context of semen donation and its use in AI (AID), 
this will be examined first. The principle which 
applies there will be equally applicable to IVF where 
donated semen is used. The question of motherhood in 
the case of a donated ovum will subsequently be 
analysed.
301. See Clause 4 of the FLRB 1987 and Sections 2 & 3 
of the LRPCA 1986.
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(a) Semen Donation and Fatherhood 
Where a husband, for example, is sterile and 
the wife receives AID, the unsatisfactory nature of 
using the 'genetic mode' to attribute fatherhood is 
apparent. Current English (and Scottish) law, for 
example, regard a semen donor as the father of the 
resulting AID child. Such a child is in the same 
position as that of a child conceived outside 
marriage.
As a matter of legal theory, as the English Law 
302Commission points out, the donor may be liable as 
the child's father to maintain the child, and may 
indeed apply for access or custody. As a
corollary, the husband would have no parental rights 
or duties regarding the child. The social reality, 
however, is different. Because of the practice of 
keeping a donor's identity anonymous, neither the 
child nor the mother will be able to trace the 
donor. Hence, they will not be able to enforce any 
liability to maintain. The donor will know nothing 
about the child, and, he will therefore not be in a 
position to seek access or custody. For the same 
reason, it is unlikely that any intestate succession
302. The Law Commission Report, No. 118, paras. 
12.4-12.7.
303. See eg. A. v. C. (1987) 8 Fam. Law 170, High 
Court.
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rights existing between the donor and the child will
have effect. Even if the marriage between the
husband'and wife broke up, the husband would have
treated the child as a child of the family and would
thus effectively be under the same financial
obligations to the child as if he or she were the
husband's legitimate child.
This division between the lav; and social
reality is caused by the inadequacies of present
British law in dealing with the social reality of
AID. In other words, there is no legal provision
which recognises the legal rights and duties of a
social father (the husband, as in the above case), and
excludes a semen donor from having legal rights and
duties regarding an AID child.
If an AID child is to be given protection and
standing, as nearly as possible equivalent to those
who are conceived by natural means, then the division
304between the law and reality must be resolved.
304. The resolution of this issues has been considered 
in more than one occasions. See the amendment 
(which was withdrawn) put down by Lord Kilbrandon 
to the Bill leading to the Children Act 1975: 
Hansard (H.L.) 20 Feburary 1975, Vol. 357, Cols. 
511-522; and the AID Children (Legal Status) Bill 
which was given a First Leading in the House of 
Commons on 28 June 1977: Hansard (II.C.) Vol. 934, 
Cols. 276-279; the Law Commission Report, No.
118, para. 12.8.
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Legal reform has been proposed by Clause 27(1)
of the FLBR 1987, which accepted the Law Commission
305Report's recommendation, and says:
"(1).Uhere after the coming into force of 
this section a child is born in England &
Wales as the result of the artificial 
insemination of a woman who-
(a) was at the time of the insemination a 
party to a marriage (being a marriage 
which had not at that time been dissolved 
or annulled); and
(b) was artificially inseminated with the 
semen of some person other than the other 
party to that marriage,
then, unless it is proved to the satisfaction of 
any court by which the matter has to be 
determined that the other party to that marriage 
did not consent to the insemination, the child 
shall be treated in law as the child of the 
parties to that marriage and shall not be 
treated as the child of any person other than 
the parties to that m a r r i a g e . " 306
This provision (which will hereinafter be
307called the 'AID provision') clearly reflects the 
wishes and intentions of both the semen donor and the 
married couple who resort to AID in order to found a 
family. A semen donor's intention is to help another 
to have children, and he intends that his part in 
procreation ends with the donation, and does not
305. The Law Commission, No. 118, para. 12.8.
306. Similar provisions exist in some American states, 
Holland, Portugal and Switzerland. See Cusine, 
D.J., "Artificial Insemination", in heLean,
S.A.M. (ed.), Legal Issues in Medicine,
Aldershot, Gower, 1981, p. 163.
307. The LRPCA 1986 does not have a similar 
provision. Equally, the Act's forerunner, the 
Scottish Law Commission Report on Illegitimacy, 
No. 82, Edinburgh, HMSO, 1984, did not consider 
the issue relating to children born as a result 
of artifical techniques at all, see para. 1.2.
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extend to parenting, nor to the responsibilities and 
legal duties which are associated with it.
Conversely, the intention of the married couple is 
that the husband will undertake parental rights and 
duties regarding the resulting child. The rationale 
(which will hereinafter be called the 'donation 
rationale') underlying the 'AID provision', therefore, 
is to recognise and acknowledge the reality of semen 
donation and its use (at least within marriage)^^ 
by presuming a husband to be the father of an AID 
child where his wife undertakes AID and by attributing 
to him parental duties (and rights). The corollary 
to the 'donation rationale' is that a semen donor 
should have no rights or liabilities regarding an AID
child (this will hereinafter be called the 'corollary
, , 309 provision ).
The 'AID provision' essentially represents an
exception to the 'genetic mode', which is the general
basis for attributing fatherhood, so as to reflect the
reality of semen donation and its use. If the
'donation rationale' it is to achieve its real
objectives, then a clear definition as to what amounts
310to gamete donation is necessary. Otherwise, the
308. On the question of fatherhood where AID is 
undertaken by the unmarried, see infra, pp.140144.
309. See the Warnock Report, para. 4.22.
310. See the discussion of the position of a 
commissioning father, infra., chapter 7, pp.232-5.
- 140
wishes of the parties will be thwarthed rather than 
promoted.
(b) The Unmarried
The above discussion has concentrated on 
married couples, that is:- the attribution of 
fatherhood to a husband whose wife undertakes AID. 
What, however, about those unmarried people who may 
resort to AID, given that the right to reproduce and 
the right to found a family are rights of an
individual (irrespective of one's marital
4. \o311status)?
The Law Commission did not consider this issue
in full. It merely said,
"Where the woman undergoing AID is living 
in a stable union with a man who is not 
her husband (whether she is herself 
married or not), the question whether 
that man should le permitted to become 
father of the AID child by consenting to 
the treatment raises complex issues 
relating to the rights of unmarried 
cohabiting couples, which are outside the 
scope of this Report."312
Since the aim of the Law Commission was to remove the
legal disadvantages associated with children born out
of wedlock, it may be argued that the question of
fatherhood of AID children was indeed outside the
scope of the Law Commission's terms of reference.
311. See supra, chapter 3.
312. Law Commission No. 118, paras. 12.9-12.10.
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Nonetheless, since neither the Law Commission, nor the 
Warnock Report has considered this, the issue is an 
open one.
If one considers the situation as exemplified 
by the Law Commission, that is, where an unmarried 
couple resort to AID, one may argue that if the law 
and society may legitimately disapprove of the 
unmarried using AID, the conclusion in the preceding 
section that the law should reflect the reality of AID 
may not apply with equal force.
If, as the Law Commission suggested, it was 
unclear whether a male cohabiting partner could be 
permitted to become the father of an AID child, 
presumably the semen donor would be treated as the 
father. Yet/ it will evidently be unfair to hold a 
semen donor liable to an AID child solely because a 
recipient woman is unmarried. Nor would it be fair 
to hold him liable to an AID child because some 
medical blunders have resulted in his semen being used 
for the artificial insemination of an unmarried woman.
According to an intuitive understanding of what 
is entailed in semen donation, as expressed by the 
'donation rationale', the unmarried male partner 
should be regarded as father of an AID child if he 
consents to his partner undertaking AID, just as in 
the case where a husband consents to his wife s AID.
- 142 -
313As was said above, according fatherhood to such a 
person does not mean that he will have the same rights 
regarding the child as a married father. He will, 
however, at least, have parental duties regarding the 
child, and a semen donor will be excluded from having 
rights or duties in respect of the child. This will 
be in line with our sense of responsibility which an 
individual should, and ought to, have as relating to 
the use of artificial techniques for the founding of a 
family.
Indeed, the Warnock Report clearly envisaged
the availability of AID to the unmarried and not
314simply to married couples. If an AID child is
not to be left in a legal vacuum, where his or her 
legal father is not his or her social father, then the 
existence or not of a legal marriage should not be 
permitted to effect the child's rights and 
expectation. In other words, extending the 'AID 
provision' to the unmarried will be in the best 
interests of children in that it will put an AID child 
born to the unmarried in the same position as one who 
is born to the married, at least in respect of who has 
parental duties.
313. See supra, p. 135.
314. See para. 4.16. The term 'couple is used in 
the Warnock Report to include all stable 
relationship, apart from questions of legitimacy, 
see para. 2.6.
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The argument so far, therefore, is that a man 
should be regarded as the father of an AID child if he 
consents to his partner's AID. Thus, the 'AID 
provision' should be extended to unmarried couples as 
well as to married couples.
Extending the 'AID provision' to unmarried men 
does not necessarily have to be interpreted as an
encouragement to the use of AID by the unmarried.
315(After all, as will be seen, the Warnock Report's 
recommendations in respect of motherhood where a 
donated ovum is used made no distinction on the basis 
of the marital status of a woman.) It merely tackles 
certain possible undesirabilities of legislative 
inaction, which the law and society recognise and 
acknowledge.
As past experience has demonstrated, the use of 
AID was not curbed or restrained despite the division 
between legal theory of fatherhood and social 
reality. Legislative inaction has proved to be 
contributory to the undesirable state of affairs in 
which people were tempted to falsify birth registers 
and the secrecy surrounding the practice. Extending 
the 'AID provision' to unmarried men, therefore, will 
do away with the need to falsify the birth register 
and it may encourage openness.
315. See infra, p. 144.
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The implication of the 'AID provision', and its
proposed extension to the unmarried, is that before an
AID child could be rendered 'fatherless', proof would
be needed to establish that a husband or male partner
did not consent to a woman's AID. In other words,
this presumption of consent would render a child
fatherless in some situations, for example, where AID
is undertaken by a woman without the consent of her
male partner. This, however, as the Warnock Report
31Gnoted was ‘inescapable1, and the law would be
"recognising what in many cases is already the de
317
facto situation."
(c ) Cvum Donation and Motherhood
The Warnock Report recommended that when a
child is born to a woman following donation of
another's egg, the woman giving birth should, for all
purposes, be regarded in law as the mother of the
child, and the egg donor should have no rights or
318
obligations in respect of the child. This would
be the case regardless of a woman's marital status.
This recommendation is widely accepted, and is
apparently an application of the 'donation rationale',
although as will be seen later, the real basis for
319
motherhood may not be the 'genetic mode'.
316. para . 4. 24.
317. para . 4. 24.
318. para . 6. 8 .
319 . See inf ra , pp . 23 6-8.
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(d ) Embryo Donation
Once the question of parenthood regarding 
donated gametes is resolved according to the 'donation 
rationale' and the 'corollary principle', parenthood 
in respect of a donated embryo is not complicated. 
Thus, the Warnock Report recommended that where a 
child is born to a married couple following embryo
donation, the husband and the wife will be the
 ^ 320parents.
In a case where a woman is unmarried, she will 
321be the mother. However, the Warnock Report did
322'not consider who would be the father.
Arguably, the man (if there is one) who consents to
the mother having the embryo inserted in her womb
should be regarded as the father, as this is similar
to a man who consents to a woman undertaking 
3 2 3AID. In other words, the marital status of the
parties should, as argued before, be regarded as
324
unimportant for the purpose of parenthood.
320. See para. 7.6.
321. ibid.
322. ibid.
32 3. supra, pp. 136-144. 
324-. ibid.
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(c ) Summary
One can summarise this section by saying that 
the use of donated gametes in founding a family raises 
the question of fatherhood and motherhood. The 
effective resolution of this question is desirable 
since it will place children born as a result in the 
same legal position as children born through natural 
reproduction. This would also codify our intuitive 
understanding of the nature of gamete donation and its 
use, and reflect an individual's responsibility in 
founding a family through artificial techniques.
As discussed in the preceding section, where 
donated semen is used, the 'donation rationale' and 
the 'corollary principle' should apply irrespective of 
a man's marital status. To that extent, the 'AID 
provision' has only tackled the unsatisfactory 
application of the 'genetic mode' in attributing 
fatherhood in cases where a man is married. In cases 
where a man is unmarried, presumably, the semen donor 
remains legally the father of the resulting child.
This same defect is evident in the Warnock Report's 
recommendation on fatherhood when donated embryo is 
used. The proposal in the preceding section is,
however, that the 'AID provision' should be 
extended. Consequently, a man (married or not) who
325. See supra, p. 145.
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consents to a woman's undergoing AI, IVF or receiving 
a donated embryo should be regarded as the father of 
the resulting child.
Legislative implementation of this proposal has 
several advantages, and it does not necessarily have 
to be regarded as an encouragement to the use of 
artificial techniques for the founding of a family by 
the unmarried. Indeed, the Warnock Report's 
recommendations on motherhood where donated ovum or 
embryos are used - which are widely accepted - do not
take the marital status of a woman as an important
326factor. In other words, legislation tackling
comprehensively the question of parenthood, as 
proposed in this chapter, merely confronts some of the 
obvious problems which the law and society recognise 
and acknowledge consequential to the use of donated 
gametes.
For the purpose of this discussion, adequate 
resolution of the question of parenthood in artificial 
reproductive techniques, to remove the potential legal 
handicaps a child born as a result may face, may be 
significant for reasons other than mere pragmatism.
For instance, it might be argued that the deliberate 
creation of a child whose position is subjected to 
legal and social disprecancies, and whose position is 
inferior to that of a child conceived naturally, may
326. See supra, pp. 144-145.
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render the use of artificial reproductive techniques 
socially and morally unacceptable. The argument 
being that the rights of the infertile have less 
significance than the rights or interests of 
children.
However, what is contended here is that a 
comprehensive resolution of the question of parenthood 
in artificial techniques, thus removing the 
discrepancies between the law and social reality 
regarding parenthood for a resulting child, is 
ideologically consistent with the assertion of the 
rights of the infertile. Thus, although concerns 
about the legal position of a child born as a result 
of artificial techniques may have weight, their 
resolution can be effected without interfering with 
the rights of the infertile.
How the Warnock Report's recommendations on 
motherhood, and the proposals in this chapter on 
fatherhood, can be drafted in a legislative form will 
be considered later. Registration of birth as
an ancillary legal issues where donated gametes are 
used for the founding of a family will be examined 
below.
327. See infra, chapter 7, P- 240,
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Registration of Firth
This issue again is often regarded as 
problematic in relation to AID. Consequently, the 
following discussion will be conducted in that 
context, but it can have equal application to ovum and 
embryo donation.
Given that a semen donor should not, as argued 
above, be regarded in law as the father of a resulting 
child, should the social father be allowed to register 
as such?
The current situation in AID is that both the 
mother and her husband will want the name of the 
latter to appear in the register as father of the 
child. But since the child's father is most likely 
to be unknown, in declaring that the husband is the
child's father, one may contravene the Perjury Act
3281911 which applies to England and Wales.
Section 4 of the A.ct provides that if any person
wilfully makes a false answer to any question put to
him or her by a registrar relating to particulars
required to be registered concerning a birth with
intent to have it inserted in a register of birth,
329
such person shall be quilty of a misdemeanour.
328. Professor J.M. Thomson mistakenly thought that 
the Act applies also to Scotland, see Family Law 
in Scotland, London, Butterworths, 1981~, pi 
136.
329. No recorded cases have been decided under Section 
4. Section 7 also provides that the offence
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In Scotland, Section 53(1) of the Registration 
of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 
provides for a similar offence.
The 'AID provision', when it comes into force, 
will allow a husband to be registered as father of the 
child who is born in England and Wales as a result of 
his wife undertaking AID without contravening Section 
4 of the 1911 Act.
One major drawback to this 'AID provision' is 
that it involves a statutory authorisation to falsify
birth registration, since in reality the donor is most
330probably the father of the child. Nonetheless,
the consensus of opinion is that the husband should be
allowed to be registered as the father, and that an
AID child should have a birth certificate which
conceals the circumstances of his or her 
331conception.
extends to person who aids and abets another 
person to commit the offence. This means that 
where doctors or counsellors advising one to 
enter the name of the husband as the father of 
the child may be liable to contravene the 1911 
A c t .
330. Lord Denning moved to amendment Clause 29 of the 
FLRB. H.C. Debates, No. 1352, Col. 544.
331. See the Consultation paper, para. 30. Two 
alternatives have been suggested which will avoid 
falsification of the birth register. Annotation 
of the birth register canvasses the idea that a 
husband's consent to his wife receiving AID in a 
prescribed form should have to be produced to the 
registrar who would then make a special note in 
the register to indicate that the entry of the 
husband's name as that of the father is by virtue
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Currently, the Department of Social Security 
has canvassed the view that the husband should be 
allowed to enter his name on the birth register only 
if the entry could be linked by the Registrar General 
with a central record of AID births. This was 
thought to be essential to maintain the reliability of 
the birth register as a record of biological fact, and 
to ensure access, by a person born as a result of AID, 
to certain information about the donor. This option 
is presently in the consultation stage, but it appears 
to be the most satisfactory solution. If accepted, 
all that remains to be done is the working out of 
practicalities, and the establishing of mechanisms 
whereby these objectives could be achieved.
If the proposals in the previous section 
regarding parenthood where donated gametes are used 
for the founding of a family are accepted, social 
mothers and fathers (irrespective of marital status), 
rather than ovum and semen donors would be allowed to 
register as parents. If so, records of a child's 
true biological parentage should be maintained, as in 
AID, so as to facilitate access by children born as a 
result of gamete donation to certain information about 
their origins.
of the 'AID provision'. Another alternative is 
to utilise some kind of adoption procedure.
Neither of these alternatives appeared to be 
popular. See Law Commission, No. 118, para.
12.20 and Law Commission Working paper, No. 74, 
paras. 10.18-10.20.
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(3) CONCLUSION
In this chapter, a number of legal issues
relating to the use of artificial techniques for the
founding of a family have been discussed. It has
been said that as regards the use of artificial
techniques, and their effects on a marriage, the legal
issues are relatively settled.
On the question of parenthood and the use of
donated gametes, the Warnock Report's recommendations
on motherhood are acceptable. It's recommendations
on fatherhood, however, are not completely
satisfactory, since they fail to consider the issues
which arise when donated semen is used by the
unmarried. Here, the application of the 'genetic
mode' would mean that a semen donor would legally be
the father of the resulting child, and the division
between the law and social reality persists.
As argued before, the right to reproduce and
the right to found a family apply equally to the
married and the unmarried. They are negative in
nature. Consequently, they do not oblige a state to
legislate to facilitate the founding of a family in a
particular manner. For instance, it has been decided
that the right to found a family did not mean that one
has a right to have legal recognition of a foreign 
332adoption. By the same token, a state is not
332. see supra, chapter 3, p. 83.
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obliged to review, modify or resolve any 
unsatisfactory application of the current definition 
of parenthood to artificial techniques - for example 
by enacting the 'AID provision' - in order to 
accommodate the founding of a family by the married or 
unmarried. In other words, the failure of a state to 
deal with the issue of parenthood generated by the use 
of artificial techniques does not infringe the rights 
of adults wishing to use these techniques for the 
founding of a family.
Nonetheless, given that these techniques are
currently used by both the married and the unmarried,
333and m  some cases, funded by the state, and that 
the present definition of parenthood is unsatisfactory 
when it is applied to artificial techniques for the 
founding of a family, there are strong arguments that 
the law should be brought in line with reality in a 
comprehensive manner, as proposed in this chapter.
Such an approach would codify society's 
intuitive understanding of what is involved in the 
donation, and use, of genetic gametes, and would 
clarify the rights and duties of the parties 
involved. A proper allocation of parental duties 
will also be consonant with the idea of an 
individual's responsibilities arising from the 
exercise of a right to found a family through 
artificial techniques.
333. See infra, chapter 8, p. 254.
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More importantly, legislative steps to remove 
the unsatisfactory application of the current 
definition of parenthood to artificial techniques will 
be consistent with the obligation of the state to act 
in the best interests of children born as a result of 
gamete donation. It would put children born as a 
result of artificial techniques in the same position 
as those born through natural reproduction, and would 
thus reduce the weight of the objection against the 
exercise of an individual's right to found a family 
(whether through reproduction or not) on the ground 
that it is inconsistent with interests of children.
In a later chapter, the question as to how
parenthood in artificial reproduction may be
satisfactorily and comprehensively resolved will be
outlined, taking into account the Warnock Report's
recommendations and their criticisms which have been
334outlined in this chapter. Once the question of
parenthood is comprehensively resolved, registration 
as parents will not be a problem. Nonetheless, once 
again, the best interests of children will require 
measures for the proper recording of births 
consequential to the use of donated gametes, and 
provisions for access to certain information.
334. See infra, chapter 7, pp. 231-238.
CHAPTER 6
\
MORAL AND SOCIAL 
ACCEPTABILITY OF SURROGACY
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(1) INTRODUCTION
In a previous chapter, the rights of an
individual to reproduce and to found a family were 
335established. These rights, it has been argued,
can be exercised through the use of artificial
techniques which can, however, legitimately be subject 
336to regulation. It has also noted that these
rights do not oblige the state to introduce
legislative measures to remove the unsatisfactory
nature of the present concept of parenthood as it
applies to situations where donated gametes are used
for the founding of a family. Nonetheless, there are
valid reasons supporting legislative reform which will
337also be m  the best interests of children.
However, the methods by which rights are
exercised, and the extent to which these methods
should be accommodated by legal change, may remain
uncertain. Perhaps the most contentious artificial
reproductive method is that which involves the use of 
338surrogacy.
Since surrogacy may effectively be the only hope 
for some people who seek to exercise their right to 
the founding of a family (whether through reproduction
335. See supra, chapter 3.
336. See supra, chapter 4.
337. See supra, chapter 5.
338. For a discussion on why surrogacy may be useful
to some infertile people, see supra, chapter 2, 
p p . 35-8.
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or not), its significance to these people cannot be
denied. Thus, an examination of surrogacy is
necessary, before a conclusion can be reached as to
whether or not an individual 1s rights to reproduce
and/or to found a family are sufficiently broad as to
include freedom of access to surrogacy.
In Britain, surrogacy is not illegal or 
339unlawful. Since the publication of the Warnock
340 341Report, and the Baby Cotton case, surrogacy
has been consistently, and often passionately,
342debated. The Warnock Report, by a majority,
343rejected all forms of surrogacy, asserting that
"the weight of public opinion is against the 
,.344practice.
339. See infra, chapter 7, pp. 215-216. Sections 2 &
3 of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 have 
criminalised the activities of commercial 
surrogacies and the advertising of or for 
surrogacy.
340. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology, London, HKSO, Cmnd. 
9314, 1984 (hereinafter cited as the Warnock 
Report).
341. Re A Baby, The Times, 15 Jan., 1985, p. 8.
342. See eg. Surrogate Motherhood, Report of the Board 
of Science and Education (hereinafter cited as 
Surrogate Motherhood, BMA, 1987); for the debates 
in other jurisdictions, see Report of the 
Disposition of Embryos produced by IVF, the 
Committee to consider the social, ethical, an 
legal issues arising from IVF, chaired by 
Professor Louis Waller, Victoria, Australia,
1984, (hereinafter cited as the V.aller Report); 
and Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and 
Related Matters, 2 Vol., Ministry of the Attorney 
General, Toronto, 1985 (hereinafter cited as the 
Ontario Report).
343. para. 8.17.
344. para. 8.10.
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nonetheless/ majority public sentiment is in
itself inadequate as a ground justifying interference
345with an individual's liberty. As has been said/
individuals have the right to privacy, encompassing
the right to reproduce and the right to found a
family. These rights on the surface support the
choice to use surrogacy to found a family (whether
through reproduction or not), and a woman's choice to
use her reproductive and/or gestational function,
346without unwarranted government interference.
Although sentiment is insufficient to justify
interference with rights, it is necessary to analyse
the apparent public hostility to surrogacy in more
depth, in order to assess whether or not fundamentally
important reasons underlie it, and make interference
into personal choice justifiable.
In discussing the acceptability of surrogacy,
the form of surrogacy (partial or full) is largely 
347irrelevant. There are certain reasons to
support this contention.
345. see supra, chapter 3.
346. see supra, chapter 3.
347. for the distinction of full and partial 
surrogacy, see supra, chapter 2, pp.36—38.
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First, the fact that in partial surrogacy, a
surrogate is the biological mother of the child, and,
in full surrogacy, she is not, is irrelevant to the
thrust of the issue, which is:- is the idea that a
woman should agree to carry a child to term, with the
intention that she will surrender the child who will
be brought up by a person or persons other than
herself, objectionable?
A counter-argument to this, however, may be
that whether the practice of surrogacy is
objectionable depends xj:cecisely on the form of
surrogacy in question. Accordingly, it may be
suggested that partial and full surrogacy are
different in that, a woman in partial surrogacy is
carrying her own child, whereas in full surrogacy, she
, . , 348is carrying someone else s child.
The essence of this counter-argument appears to
be that in partial surrogacy, the surrogate is
349regarded (unquestionably and rightly] as the
mother of the child, and thus, surrogacy here may be
350questioned on moral, social and legal grounds; 
whereas in full surrogacy, the situation is totally 
different because the surrogate is not the biological
348. See Page, Edgar's "Book Reviews", (1986) 12
Journal of Medical Ethics, pp. 45-52.
349. See infra, chapter 7, pp. 236-238.
350. See infra, chapter 7, pp. 159-221.
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mother of the child. A number of underlying
assumptions can be detected in this counter-argument,
all of which can be challenged.
In the first place, although it may be less
arguable that the surrogate is the mother in partial
surrogacy, it does not necessarily follow that the
351surrogate in full surrogacy is not. Given that
the question of motherhood is still not definitively
352
settled in surrogacy, an assumption of this kind 
should not be made too hastily. Indeed, as will be
argued later, a biological link with a child is not
. . 353crucial in determining motherhood. Thus,
partial and full surrogacy cannot, or need not, be
distinguished on the ground of the biological link
between the surrogate and the child.
In any event, if the alleged difference between
the two cases on genetic ground is insisted upon, it
can be blurred or removed if, for example, the
surrogate in partial surrogacy agrees, before A I , to
make a donation of her ovum so as to divest her of the
rights and liabilities which she otherwise would have
354as a result of her genetic link with the child.
351. See Page Edgar, loc. cit., where he argues that 
in full surrogacy the commissioning parties are 
the child's parents.
352. See infra, chapter 7, pp. 236-238.
353. See infra, chapter 7 ,|.PP- 236-238.
354. See supra, chapter 5, pp. 136-140, on the
'donation rationale', and Page, Edgar's 
suggestion of jLn utero donation, loc. cit.
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In the second place, the alleged distinction 
between the two cases may not be apparent, or vital,
at all when one examines the arguments against
355
surrogacy. In other words, the arguments most
commonly and most powerfully used against surrogacy 
centre rather on the agreement itself than on the 
genetic contribution made.
For the above reasons, the following appraisal 
of some of the most common objections against 
surrogacy will be regarded relevant irrespective of 
the form of surrogacy in question.
Given the possible demarcations, suggested
above, regarding the different financial, dimensions of
356 .surrogacy, it is logical to discuss the
acceptability of surrogacy in principle first, 
followed by surrogacy with reasonable compensation, 
and then surrogacy for a fee.
Obviously, objections applicable to surrogacy 
in principle apply also to surrogacy with reasonable 
compensation, and surrogacy for a fee, both of which 
differ from surrogacy in principle insofar as money 
payment is made. The converse, however, is not true 
because objections to money payment will not have any 
relevance to surrogacy in principle.
355. See infra, pp. 161-198.
356. See supra, chapter 2, pp. 38-41.
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(2) SURROGACY IN PRINCIPLE
Surrogacy in principle is usually undertaken
between sisters and friends. Exceptionally/ it may be
357between strangers. Although some may regard
surrogacy as merely a logical extension of
technological development, and its practice as being
simply a logical corollary of the rights to reproduce
and/or to found a family, for others, it is entirely
unacceptable. Existing literature, however,
sometimes presents a somewhat confused picture of what
it is about surrogacy that is objectionable.
For example, in the Warnock Report, the objection
358to surrogacy in principle seems to be that it is
359wrong to treat others as a means to an end. In
A Question of Life, surrogacy is said to be wrong
because of the possible harmful consequences to the 
360child. But in an article, by Mary Warnock, it
was said that,
'...[many] feel very differently if what 
they think of is surrogacy undertaken 
between sisters or friends. And this is 
because in such a case the mother who 
gives birth to the child, though she will
357. See Keane, Noel, The Surrogate Mother, New York, 
Everest House, 1981.
358. The Warnock Report did not make a distinction 
between surrogacy in principle, surrogacy with 
reasonable compensation, surrogacy for a fee and 
commercial surrogacies.
359. Para. 8.17.
360. See Warnock Mary, A Question of Life: the Warnock
Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985, p. xii. 
(hereinafter cited as A Question of Life, 1985).
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not bring it up or count it as hers, will 
nevertheless be permitted to love it...
The child himself, if...told that his 
aunt is his mother, will in some sense 
have gained, not lost. He will have two 
mothers instead of one. No one has 
rejected him. He was born out of love 
and charity, not out of greed. And so 
it is clear that what is really felt to 
be wrong is surrogacy not for love but 
for money."^61
This quotation seems to suggest that surrogacy in
principle (and perhaps even surrogacy with reasonable
compensation) are not felt to be wrong at all. These
confusions are in part due to the fact that, in
discussing the acceptability of surrogacy, the often
vital distinctions between the various financial
dimensions of surrogacy are not clearly drawn.
In the following section, some of the arguments
against surrogacy in principle will be identified and
examined. Notably there are two main types of
arguments. First, that surrogacy is unnatural
practice, and second, that surrogacy is harmful to
both surrogates and surrogate-born children.
361. "Legal Surrogacy - Not For Love or Money?", The 
Listener, 24 Jan 1985, p.2. (emphasis mine)
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Surrogacy as an Unnatural Practice
This argument, to a large extent, mirrors that
362which is used against AI & IVF. However, its
application here has been slightly modified. The 
roots of conceptual thinking here relate to 
preconceived ideas of what a woman's role in 
procreation ought to be, rather than being based on a 
claim that artificial techniques for conception are 
unnatural. In other words, the meaning of unnatural, 
as used in arguments about surrogacy, has been 
extended beyond that employed as an objection against 
artificial techniques.
Thus it may be said that surrogacy is unnatural, 
because it is contrary to a woman's natural 
post-maternal 'instinct' to part with a child after 
parturition.
However, it must first be pointed cut that social
scientists have indicated a number of reasons which
cast doubts on this so-called 'instinct' as either
363natural or universal female behaviour. Indeed,
it has been argued that maternal behaviour is in fact ■
362. See supra, chapter 4.
363. First, the widespread practice of infanticide for 
flimy reasons, such as, vanity, equalising the 
sexes and discipline, in some societies, makes it 
hard for one to maintain that post-maternal 
behaviour is a natural human female 'instinct' as 
such. See Casler, Lawrence, Is Marriage
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a kind of socially conditioned 'sentiment 1 , the 
expression of which thus may vary from individual to 
individual/ time to time and society to society.364
Consequently, it may be an overstatement to
suggest that surrogacy is 'unnatural' in the sense
described above. In fact, surrogacy is an ancient 
365
practice. One could, therefore, contend that
the fact that it has long been practised makes it one 
of the most 'natural' (in the sense of common) and 
obvious ways of dealing with certain types of 
infertility.
Admittedly, both English and Scottish lav/ render 
unenforceable agreements by parents to divest 
themselves of parental rights and duties, ~’66 except 
when transfer of parental rights and duties is 
achieved through judicial process, such as in the case 
of adoption or a court order. However, these
Necessary? hew York, Human Science Press, 1974, 
chapter 3. Anthropologists have also found that, 
in some societies, mothers were willing to part 
with their babies without a pang, easier, 
Lawrence, op. cit. Moreover, the practice of 
aristocratic families in England and France 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of 
placing children out to wet nurses from the date 
of their births for a lengthy period, such as 4-5 
years, throws profound doubt on whether maternal 
behaviour is 'instinctive'. See Eadinter, 
Elizabeth, Myth of Motherhood: An Plistorical View 
of the Maternal Instinct, London, Souvenir Press,
1981.
364. See Eadinter, Elizabeth, op. cit.
36 5. See supra, chapter 2, p. 36.
366. See infra, chapiter 7, pp. 215-22j..
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provisions clearly are unconnected with the notion of
367maternal 'instinct' as such , and if surrogacy is 
objected to on the ground that it is a private 
agreement attempting to transfer parental rights and 
duties, legally regulated surrogacy would be the 
straightforward answer.
A variation of the argument that surrogacy is 
'unnatural* may be based on the argument that it is a 
distortion of, and a threat to, the conventional
q r  q
pattern of child-bearing and child rearing.
o  6 o
However, it has been argued above0 ° that a 
woman's right to privacy is wide enough to exclude 
interference with her choice as to how to use her 
reproductive and/or gestational capacity simply on the 
ground that it deviates from an allegedly standard 
approach to pregnancy.^ ^
Harm to Surrogates and Surrogate-born Children
One factor which may have important bearing on 
the moral and social acceptability of surrogacy in 
principle is the possible harm surrogacy may have on 
both a surrogate and a surrogate-born child. Thus, it
367. Otherwise, there would have to be provisions to 
ensure that pregnant women care for their 
children.
36b. See the barnock Report, para. 8.11.
369. See supra, chapter 3, pp. 51-70.
370. However, a surrogate's right to privacy may be 
regulated, see infra, pp. 209, 219.
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has been claimed that surrogacy is unacceptable 
because bonds exist betvveen a surrogate and the foetus 
in utero and their separation will be harmful to both 
part ies.
However, little is known about the effect of
this alleged bonding on a child. Hence, it is
prudent to avoid a conclusion one way or another as to
whether, consequential to the separation of the
surrogate and the child, either or both will be
harmed. The Warnock Report, in fact, did not place
great emphasis on this bonding theory in its
371conclusion against surrogacy. (This theory,
however, may be very important in a custody
N 372 dispute.)
Still, it may be unrealistic to suggest that a
surrogate-born child will definitely not experience
confusions of personal identity similar to those that
373are known to experience by adopted children. A
surrogate-born child may be just as anxious to know 
about the circumstances of his or her birth and/or his 
or her bearing and/or biological mother.
371. Paras. 8.17-9.20. Cf. Mary Warnock1s article in 
which it was said: "[tjhere is a deep and widely 
held belief that the relation of a child and the 
woman who carries it and gives birth to it is 
different from the relation of that to its 
father. That is the centre of the moral 
objection to surrogacy." "Legal Surrogacy - Not 
For Love or Money?", The Listener, 24 Jan. 1985,
p . 3.
372. See the Surrogacy Twin Babies case, The Daily 
Telegraph, 13, March 1987, p. 2. See infra.
3 73. See supra, chapter 4, pp. 113-114.
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374In a previous chapter, the weight of this
consideration as a factor against the use of 
artificial techniques for the founding of a family 
(whether through reproduction or not) was assessed.
The conclusion was that the needs of children to know 
about the circumstances of their conception (and 
birth) can, and should, be facilitated by a policy of 
openness, proper record-keeping of births 
consequential to the donation of gametes, and 
counselling before access to birth records. The 
issue in surrogacy is very similar. Although it is
not much debated, there is no apparent reason why a
. . 375similar approach could not be adopted.
Again, from the perspective of a surrogate-born
child, it is hardly feasible to contend that he or she
has been so badly harmed by the circumstances of
conception and birth that he or she should not have
, . 376been born.
In many ways, therefore, the argument which
relates to potential harm to a surrogate-born child
can be defeated by reference to similar criteria as
377were used in respect of AI and IVF, since it does
374. See supra, chapter 4, pp. 108-116.
37 5. See Surrogate Motherhood, BMA, 1987, p. 17-22.
376. See supra, chapter 4, pp. 110-111.
377. See supra, chapter 4, pp. 108-116.
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not seem to differ significantly from that which may 
arise from the employment of artificial techniques in 
general. Thus, a solution similar to that proposed 
in such cases may be employed in relation to 
surrogacy.
The issues which arise from the woman's 
perspective are twofold:- first, is she likely to be 
harmed by becoming a surrogate, and second, even if 
she is, ought there be interference with a woman's 
liberty to choose to become a surrogate, on 
paternalistic ground?
There is no direct evidence which establishes
that psychological and emotional harm are the
inevitable consequences for a surrogate who parts with
the child. However, there is evidence to the effect
that a woman may experience a deep sense of loss after
378giving her child up for adoption.
But even if one concedes that a particular 
surrogate will be harmed by parting with the child, an 
individual's right to privacy and liberty would allow 
for voluntary assumption of that risk. Interference- 
on paternalistic ground, therefore, is legitimate only 
when confined to cases of serious or irreversible
378. See Surrogate Motherhood, BMA, 1987, p..11.
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harm. Thus, harm to a surrogate may, in very
limited cases, for example, where destruction of 
mental or physical health is anticipated, justify 
interference with a woman's choice to become a 
surrogate. In other words, where an individual 
voluntarily accepts a lesser risk, interference on 
paternalistic ground cannot be compatible with the 
right of a woman to use her reproductive and/or 
gestational function.
Consideration of the two groups of arguments
against surrogacy does not, of course, exhaust the
possible range of objections. It may be said, for
example, that it is totally unacceptable for a woman
to be treated as a machine for breeding purposes.
Some may even go so far as condemning surrogacy on the
ground that it resembles slavery. Since these two
arguments are most commonly directed at surrogacy
where money payment is involved, they will be
380considered in greater depth later.
The contentions considered so far, however, 
have not shown that surrogacy in principle is morally 
or socially unacceptable, whereby justifying its
379. See Dworkin, Gerald, "Paternalism", in Feinburg, 
Joel and Cross, Hyman (eds. ), Philosophy and L a w , 
California, Wadsworth Publishing Co., (2nd. Ed.), 
1980, p. 230; see also Hill, John Stuart, "On 
Liberty", in Philosophy and Lav/, op. cit., p. 180.
380. See infra, pp. 171-198.
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prohibition. Surrogacy in principle can be regarded
as a noble undertaking, the essence of which is to
help another to have a child. If this beneficent
view is taken, then there need be no argument
concerning the rights of an individual either to found
a family (whether through reproduction or not) though
surrogacy, or to use one's reproductive and/or
gestational function. Where a willing surrogate is
available, this method of generating life, and
bringing it to fruition, cannot, therefore, be struck
at. Moreover, although it is clear that a
surrogate-born child may experience some
disadvantages, and accepting the importance of this,
the contention has been that the resolution of the
problem - as with AI and IVF - lies not in banning
surrogacy, but rather in regulating its use in a 
381sensitive way.
381. See infra., pp. 188-202, for other reasons for 
regulating surrogacy.
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(3) SURROGACY WITH MONEY PAYMENT
It has been noted that the two main arguments
already outlined do not exhaustively cover the range 
of the debate about surrogacy. Although surrogacy 
need not entail money payment, in some cases, if 
may. The addition of this aspect of money payment
serves to add contentious fuel to the fire.
The question to be posed is whether the 
involvement of money payment in a surrogacy 
arrangement changes the essential character of the 
agreement sufficiently to demand its condemnation. 
Even accepting that surrogacy in principle is not 
objectionable, might the introduction of monetary 
considerations render a surrogacy arrangement 
sufficiently morally reprehensible as to justify 
interference with an individual's freedom to found a 
family (whether through reproduction or not) by 
employing surrogacy, and a woman's use of her 
reproductive and/or gestational function?
When considering whether, and if so why, money
payment is objectionable, it is important to
distinguish two kinds of payments: surrogacy with
reasonable compensation and surrogacy for a fee. As
has been said, whether a particular case falls into a
particular category depends on the nature of the
382
payment and the facts of the individual case.
382. See supra, chapter 2, pp. 3 9-4 0.
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Since the amount paid in a surrogacy arrangement may 
affect one's view as to its acceptability, in the 
following discussion, this distinction between the two 
categories of payment will be maintained. However, 
where such a distinction is not apparent or necessary, 
the term 'money payment' will be used.
Surrogacy With Reasonable Compensation
Surrogacy with reasonable compensation differs
from surrogacy in principle only insofar as reasonable
compensation is paid to a surrogate. Although some
may argue that surrogacy with reasonable compensation
is a less altruistic act than surrogacy in principle,
this may not inevitably be so. The mere fact of
financial compensation does not necessarily indicate
that a surrogate acts less altruistically than some
one who is willing to bear a child for no financial 
3 83reimbursement. It may be that the former cannot
afford to become a surrogate without being 
compensated. Thus, a surrogate may only bear a child 
at her own expenses for the commissioning parties if ■ 
she has the resources, for example, to pay for the 
costs of pregnancy, and to maintain herself during 
that period. In any event, since it is the
38 3. See Adoption Application: Surrogacy case, The 
Times, 12 March, 1987, p.27. See infra, pp.
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commissioning parties who want to have a child, it
seems only fair and reasonable that they should bear
384the costs of the pregnancy. To that extent,
reasonable compensation may indeed facilitate the 
expression of altruism which may otherwise not be 
possible.
Consequently, it may be argued that surrogacy 
with reasonable compensation, like surrogacy in 
principle, is neither morally nor socially 
unacceptable. It's prohibition, therefore, which 
would deny the right to reproduce to some infertile 
people, limit the right to found a family of the 
infertile, and invade the right to privacy of 
potential surrogates, is not easily justified.
It is admitted, however, that the concept of 
'reasonable compensation' may not be entirely lacking 
in complexity, but two points can be made here.
First, the fact that out-of-pocket expenses are met by 
the commissioning parties has been argued not to 
affect the inherently altruistic nature of the 
arrangement. Thus, if surrogacy in principle is an 
acceptable method enabling the vindication of the 
rights of the infertile, then surrogacy with
384. See infra, chapter 8 for the argument that people 
should bear the cost of having children and that 
generally a state has no obligation to fund 
people in doing so.
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reasonable compensation must be too. Second, the 
problem as to what compensation is 'reasonable' need 
pose no fundamental difficulties for this assertion, 
since it is a matter which can be worked out to the
satisfaction of the parties concerned, by the parties
, 385 concerned.
Surrogacy For a Fee
Although surrogacy with reasonable compensation
may, therefore, be an acceptable method for founding a
family, surrogacy for a fee often attracts strong
moral condemnation.
The arguments against surrogacy for a fee,
however, have not been well analysed. They tend to
be no more than simple assertions of belief. For
instance, in the Parliamentary Debates on the
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, it was said that
"...a financial transaction to secure the lease of a
386woman's womb is repugnant." Mr. Harry Greenaway
said, "[i]t is a very acubtful moral proposition for a
woman to be asked to carry a baby for financial 
3 S 7gain." bo detailed reasoning was offered to
385. See infra, p. 208 for the suggestion that a third 
party may participate in deciding reasonable 
compensation.
386. Peter Bruinvels, Official Report, H.C., Vol. 77, 
Col. 50.
387. Harry Greenaway, Official Report, H.C., Vol. 77, 
Col. 45.
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support these contentions.
nonetheless, one can identify two general 
arguments against surrogacy for a fee. First, it may 
be thought to be contrary to a woman's dignity, and 
second, it may be seen as resembling baby-selling or 
baby-buying. These arguments will be discussed below.
(a ) Inconsistent With Human Dignity
It has been suggested that it is inconsistent 
with human dignity for a woman to lease her womb for a
fee, and consequently to be treated as a machine for
. ,. 388breeding.
The first point which has to be made about this 
contention is that one must be cautious about the use 
of value-laden expressions which may preclude rational 
discussion as to what is inherently objectionable 
about surrogacy for a fee. 'Womb-leasing' and 
'treating oneself or one's gestation function as a 
breeding machine1 are expressions which are not purely 
descriptive of what surrogacy for a fee entails.
Even if they were, no moral implications should, or 
could, be drawn at this stage about the rights and 
wrongs of the practice. Equally, no moral 
implication can be drawn if one chooses to describe, 
albeit highly unusually, decision-makers as primarily
388. See The Warnock Report, para. 8.10
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leasing their brain power, or typists as essentially
leasing their fingers.
The use of these expressions in respect of
surrogacy for a fee is certainly value-laden, and
indicates the underlying perception that it is worthy
of moral condemnation. Yet, even although the
decription may seem to pre-empt an alternative
conclusion, the arguments as to why it is inconsistent
witli human dignity merit consideration.
One argument which is not uncommon is that
surrogacy for a fee is wrong because it is analogous 
389
to slavery. Others argue that surrogacy for a
fee is completely at odds with traditional female
behaviour in relation to pregnancy and procreation, in
that it is a situation where a woman allows the use of
390her gestational function in return for a fee.
Alternatively, surrogacy for a fee may be said to be
degrading to a woman because it is thought to be a
practice where she is being treated as a means to an
end, that is, she is treated as a machine for the
391production of a child. Finally, surrogacy for a
fee may be considered wrong because it is potentially
389. See Shelley Roberts, "Warnock & Surrogate 
Motherhood: Sentiment or Argument?", in Bryne,
Peter (ed.), Rights & Wrongs in Medicine, King's 
Fund Publishing Office, London, 1986, p. 80.
390. See the Warnock Report, para. 8.11.
391. See the Warnock Report, para. 8.10.
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harmful to the surrogate. The emphasis here will be
on the first three arguments, as the last has already
392been discussed.
(i ) Slavery
Some may argue that surrogacy for a fee is 
unacceptable because it is analogous to slavery, in 
that a surrogacy arrangement will seek to exert an
extensive control over the personal daily activities
393of a surrogate. However, this analogy can
394 .easily be defeated. As will be seen later, it
is very unlikely that either the English, or the
Scottish Courts, would enforce any of the essential
parts of such an agreement. In effect, the surrogate
can repudicate the agreement at any time. Yet, the
argument may still be that the surrogate may not
395lawfully terminate the pregnancy. However, the
laws on abortion govern a surrogate in the same way as 
any other pregnant women. Consequently, if the 
inability of a woman to terminate a pregnancy lawfully 
is objected to, the complaint is directed at the 
abortion laws, not directly at surrogacy for a fee.
The argument iron: slavery may, however, take a 
more subtle form. Although it does not imply that a 
master-slave relationship exist in surrogacy for a
392. See supra, pp. 165-170.
393. See Shelley Roberts, loc. cit.
394. See infra, chapter 7, pp. 215-230.
3 95. Shelley Roberts, loc. cit.
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fee, in the sense that the master has the power of
life and death over the slave, the substance of the
slavery contention in surrogacy for a fee may be that
since poor women are more likely to undertake paid
surrogacy as a means of improving their finanical
situations, decisions taken under such circumstances
396could hardly be regarded as voluntary.
397As will be seen later, this argument is 
hardly consistent with the general acceptance by 
British society that people earn money, sometimes by 
undertaking jobs or tasks which they would not have 
chosen had there been other options. Furthermore, 
according to the libertarian principle espoused in 
this thesis, voluntary trade-offs between freedom of 
bodily function and the freedom which money may 
facilitate should not be prohibited unless there is 
something fundamentally and inherently objectionable 
about this particular type of trade-off. In other 
words, unless one distinquishs surrogacy for a fee 
with other trade-offs, or concedes that other paid 
jobs are also slavery, then the analogy of surrogacy • 
for a fee with slavery may be difficult to sustain.
396. Shelley Roberts, loc. cit. at pp. 88-90.
397. See infra, p. 185.
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(ii) Gestation for a fee
To say that particular behaviour or conduct is 
degrading to a person denotes that the behaviour is, 
or should be, a source of shame to that person. That 
is, since one's self-esteem is vested in the competent 
exercise of certain capacities, behaviour which fails 
to live up to that is seen to be degrading and 
undignified and to result in a lower of status for the 
person. Surrogacy for a fee is said to be degrading 
to a woman because it is an activity which deviates 
from traditional and valued female behaviour in 
relation to pregnancy and reproduction.
Obviously, those who hold such a view need not 
participate in such transactions. The relevance of 
the debate, however, as to what extent the law should, 
and ought to, reflect and shape morality is limited in
4 - W  4- 4- 3 9 8this context.
Like prostitution and homosexuality, which some 
or most people may regard as a deviation from the 
traditional form of sexual behaviour, and as immoral, 
such views need not entail consequent illegality.
Thus, under both English and Scottish law
398. For debates on the law's involvement in
enforceing morality, see Devlin, P.D.B., The 
Enforcement of Morals, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1965; Hart, H.L.A., Law, Liberty and 
Morality, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
198 2. See also, Report of the Committee of 
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, London, 
HMSO, Cmnd. 247, (1957).
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TQQ
prostitution per se is not illegal, and
homosexuality is not unlawful per se in English 
400
law. Ihus, there are strong precedents to
support a cautious legislative approach in areas of 
reproduction and founding a family which essentailly 
are aspects of an individual's privacy and liberty.
In other words, whilst the morality or 
otherwise of surrogacy for a fee offers an interesting 
perspective and approach to the issue, consistent with 
the formulation of the right to reproduce, the right 
to found a family, and a woman's right to use her 
reproductive and/or gestational function, a compelling 
interest (other than that some people regard it as a
399. Although prostitution is not criminal per se, the 
criminal law steps in where other compelling 
interests are regarded as overriding. For 
instance, it is criminal to encourage others to 
become prostitutes, to allow premises to be used 
for prostitution, to live on the earnings of 
prostitution and to loiter or solicit for the 
purposes of prostitution. See the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956, Street Offences Act 1959, the 
Sexual Offences Act 1985 and the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act 1976. For a detailed discussion 
of offences relating to prostitution, see Gordon, 
G.H., The Criminal Law of Scotland, (2nd Ed.), 
Edinburgh, W. Green & Son, 1978, pp. 914-919; 
Smith J.C. & Hogan, B., Criminal Law, London,
Butterworths, 1978, pp. 425-435.
400. Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 
proviaes that homosexual acts between consenting 
adults in private is not a criminal offence. 
Compare, section 7 of the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act 1976 which provides that conduct 
of gross indecency between males in private is a 
criminal offence, see Gordon, G.H., cp. cit., pp. 
905-6.
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practice that is immoral) must be demonstrated to
justify it's prohibition. However, as will be seen 
401
later, there may indeed be compelling reasons for 
the prohibition of surrogacy for a fee on other 
grounds.
(iii) Treating Another As a Means to an End and
Exploitation
Some perceive surrogacy for a fee as an example
of commissioning parties treating a surrogate as a
402means to an end. As noted earlier, this
argument is sometimes used even where no money payment
is involved. For example, the Warnock Report, by a
majority of 16:14, concluded against surrogacy as a
means to circumvent certain causes of infertility,
making the following comment:
"That people should treat others as a 
means for their own ends, however 
desirable the consequences, must always 
be liable to moral objection."^93
The philosophical position of the Warnock
Report appears to reflect the Kantian principle that
people ought to be treated as ends in themselves,
rather than solely as a means to an end. The
argument against surrogacy, therefore, is that, since
401. See infra, pp. 188-202, for a discussion of the 
baby-selling argument.
402. See supra, p. 169.
403. Para. 8.17.
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surrogacy, by its very nature, involves the use of a 
person (presumably the surrogate) as a means to
achieve the ends of another, it is morally
V. ■ 4-' K1 404objectionable .
Nonetheless, the principle that one should not
treat another as means to an end is not an absolute
one, otherwise, many accepted daily activities and
transactions, such as using blood donors, will be
^ ^ • -.405regarded as immoral.
The Warnock Report further concluded that where 
406'financial interests' were involved, presumably
in a case of surrogacy for a fee, the transaction
became 'positively exploitative'.
"Such treatment of one person by another 
becomes positively exploitative when 
financial interests are involved. It is 
therefore with the commercial 
exploitation of surrogacy that we have 
been primarily, but by no means 
exclusively, concerned."407
404. The Warnock Report is unclear as to who it 
regards as being treated by whom as a means to an 
end. It may be that the commissioning parties 
are treating the surrogate or the potential child 
as a means to an end. Or, alternatively, it may 
be that the surrogate is treating the 
commissioning parties or the potential child as a 
means to an end.
405. See Marietta Don E., "On Using People", (1971-2), 
82 Ethics, 232.
406. The Warnock Report did not distinguish the 
different financial dimensions of surrogacy, it 
is possible that 'financial interests' referred 
also to surrogacy with reasonable compensation. 
This however does not affect the argument made 
here.
407. See para. 8.17.
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Is the quotation suggesting that activities 
which involve paying others to be a means to one's 
ends immoral? If so, it is two sweeping a 
statement.
Most activities which involve paying others to 
be a means to one's own ends are perfectly innocuous 
and acceptable. For instance, a passenger who pays a 
taxi driver for a ride can hardly be said to be acting
immorally. Nor is the taxi driver likely to be
considered as being exploited by the passenger.
In other words, not every situation in which
payment is made by X to Y, for the purpose of X
achieving something, and which involves Y in providling 
in return time, physical presence, skill and so on, 
need be regarded purely and simply as exploitative of 
either party. However, it may be that., there is 
something about the nature of what is either offered 
or provided in surrogacy for a fee which renders this 
argument valid rather than specious. Moreover, if 
there is a real possibility of exploitation in this 
situation, then the question must be askec, who is 
being exploited? Further, if exploitation of any, or 
all, of the parties is identified, aces tnis rencer 
the practice immoral? And if she practice is aeemec 
immoral, does this demand legal conc.eration? this 
last question has been brxe f ~y consicerec amove,
4 0 8 .  s e e  s u p r a ,  pp.  1 / 9 - 1 8 1 .
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and so concentration here will be on the first two 
questions.
On the one hand, in a free market system, it is 
possible that the commissioning parties, desperate for 
children, may be subjected to demands for 
unconscionably high fees from surrogates. A 
corollary to this may be that those who wish to be 
assisted by a surrogate may find that surrogacy is not 
an option because they cannot afford to pay a fee.
In these circumstances, it may be argued that, if 
exploitation is occurring, then it is the 
commissioning parties who are its victims.
On the other hand, the attraction of payment
may mean that low-income women may be lured in to
become surrogates for those who can pay. In one
research study, it was found that 40% of volunteer
surrogates in America were unemployed, or in receipt 
409of welfare. Here, money inducement may be so
inviting to low-income women - who may have few, or 
no, equally attractive alternatives - that they will 
enter into surrogacy arrangements. Thus, the spectre 
of poor women carrying babies for the rich may then 
arise.
409. See Winslade, W.J., "Surrogate Mothers - Right or 
Wrong?" (1983) 9 Journal of Medical Ethics, 153.
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However, unless there is something inherently 
different about the use of gestational function from 
the use of other body parts, it may be argued that to 
offer a fee for services rendered is not only entirely 
consistent with capitalist economies, but that not to 
make such a payment is exploitative. Nor does the 
likelihood that women of limited financial means would 
most commonly volunteer to become participants in 
surrogacy for a fee transactions necessarily affect 
the morality of the transaction. Many men and women 
currently undertake dangerous and unpleasant tasks - 
which they would not have undertaken had other options 
existed - in return for (sometimes rather meagre) 
financial payment. Yet, it has not been suggested 
that society should ban, for example, coal mining, 
because people do it in order to earn an income.
From the perspective of the commissioning 
parties, it is perfectly possible that they are 
willing to enter into a surrogate agreement even 
though the payment to a surrogate is of what others 
may regard as an unconscionable amount.
Thus, making payments which to others may be 
regarded as excessive, in order to satisfy a 
strongly-felt desire and to vindicate a right, is a 
matter the status of which is to be assessed by the 
person choosing to do so. This view is by no means 
radical or unusual, since much of what is paid by
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individuals in order to satisfy desires (for example, 
by purchasing a Picasso) is not susceptible to 
rational objective evaluation.
Two conclusions may be drawn at this stage. 
First, the Warnock Report has failed to establish why, 
and how, surrogacy for a fee is a 'positively 
exploitative' and unacceptable transaction. 
Condemnation of surrogacy for a fee, therefore, 
appears to have mere to do with an in-built rejection 
of the practice rather than a conclusion arrived at 
after well-reasoned consideration of the issues 
involved.
Second, the potential danger of exploitation in 
surrogacy for a fee does not necessarily support 
prohibition. There are two main reasons for this.
In cases where surrogacy for a fee is voluntary on 
both sides, prohibition would infringe the right of a 
surrogate to use her procreative and/or gestational 
function, and the right of the commissioning parties 
to found a family (whether through procreation or not).
In cases where surrogacy for a fee is 
potentially exploitative of either party, the right to 
procreate and/or to use one's gestational function, 
being negative in nature, does not require a state to 
ensure an environment which is non-exploitative, nor 
one which is favourable to the exercise of that 
right. The same conclusion applies as regards the 
commissioning parties' right to found a family.
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Indeed, prohibition of surrogacy for a fee on the 
ground of possible exploitation can be regarded as 
totally gratituous and as serving no particular 
legitimate interests of either potential surrogates or 
commissioning parties, whilst defeating the rights of 
some of these individuals.
To sum up the preceding discussion on the 
acceptability of surrogacy for a fee, one can say that 
the arguments that surrogacy for a fee is inconsistent 
with a woman1s dignity because it resembles slavery, 
or that it deviates from the traditional female 
activity in relation to pregnancy and jjrocreation, or 
that it is the treating of a woman as a means to an 
end, are frail reasons for its prohibition. The 
possibility of exploitation of the parties when a fee 
is involved is a potential danger in many activities 
where people have strong desire for certain ends. 
Prohibition is in any event, not ideologically 
required, since both the right to found a family, and 
the right to procreate and/or to use one's gestational 
function, are essentially negative in nature, 
demanding merely non-interference with individuals' 
freedom and liberty to choose.
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(b) Baby-selling
One major argument against surrogacy with money
payment is that it is tantamount to baby-selling.
This has been regarded as a major obstacle to its 
. . 410acceptability. The analogy often made is with
adoption. British adoption laws generally prohibit
411money payment in connection with adoption. The
distaste which would be generally felt were babies 
bought and sold is instrumental in shaping the 
prohibition of money considerations in adoption.
However, the question must be posed as to the 
extent to which this analogy can appropriately be 
used. If surrogacy is not entirely on all fours with 
adoption, then the value of the arguments against 
baby-selling could diminish. If, however, sufficient 
link is perceived between the payment of a fee in 
surrogacy, and money payment in consideration of 
adoption, then the former may be objected to on the 
ground of baby-selling and those commissioning parties 
who would wish to adopt a surrogate-born child in 
order to secure their relationship with the child 
could find that the adoption laws constitute a major 
legal impediment to this endeavour.
410. See generally, Wright, Moira, "Surrogacy and 
Adoption: Problems and Possibilities", (1986) 16 
Pam. Law, 109.
411. See infra, pp. 185-202.
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Arguments about whether or not surrogacy with
money payment equates to baby-selling have reached the
British courts. In the first reported English case, 
412A. v. C. , a woman agreed, for a sum of £500, to
be artificially inseminated using the semen of a man
who wanted a child. The surrogate changed her mind
during pregnancy, and after the birth of the child,
the natural (biological) father started wardship
413proceedings to obtain custody of the child.
Comyn, J ., in the High Court, described the contract
as a "pernicious" agreement, saying that:
"The agreement between the parties I hold 
as being against public policy. None of 
them can rely upon it in any way or 
enforce the agreement in any way. I 
need only to give one of many grounds for 
saying this, namely that this was a 
purported contract for the sale and 
purchase of a child."414
415In the Court of Appeal, Ormrod L . J .
described the case as a "sordid commercial
V. • . 416bargain .
The primary reason for these adverse comments 
on the surrogacy arrangement appeared to be the
412. (1978) 8 Fam. Law 170, High Court; (1984) 14 Fam. 
Law, 241, Court of Appeal.
413. The High Court granted access to the father, but 
not custody.
414. (1978) 8 lam. Law, 170.
415. The mother appealed to the Court of Appeal 
against the High Court judge's decision to grant 
access. The Court of Appeal denied access on 
the best interests of the child.
416 (1984) 14 Fam. Law 241.
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perception that it was equivalent to baby-selling. 
However, the strength of this argument, which 
essentially hinges on the contention that one is paid 
money for the surrendering of a child (whether in 
consideration of adoption or not), can be tempered if 
one views the £500 merely as reasonable compensation 
for the surrogate.
Nonetheless, where surrogacy is for a fee, then 
the baby-selling argument can be applied most 
effectively.
Those who oppose the baby-selling argument may 
contend that the payment of a fee to a surrogate is 
for her pregnancy services rather than for the 
surrendering of the child to the commissioning 
parties. Clearly, if the payment of a fee is seen in 
this light, one cannot simultaneously argue that it is 
for the buying and selling of a baby.
Nonetheless, the fee element in surrogacy may
be perceived to be, and may indeed be, for the
surrendering of a child, for the simple reason that,
if the surrogate does not surrender the child, she
417
will not be paid.
417. One can use this very argument to support the 
contention that surrogacy with reasonable 
compensation resembles baby-selling. For 
instance, the practice in the USA is that a 
surrogate will be paid, for example, $12,000 
(which as suggested before, may be considered as
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It may, thus, be difficult, if not impossible
to avoid the perception that surrogacy for a fee is
baby-selling.
Attempts to argue otherwise have not been
particularly successful. One writer argues that:
"...an agreement to have a baby for the 
purpose of giving up for adoption is 
functionally different from selling 
babies already conceived. What the 
couple are doing is buying the right to 
rear a child by paying the 'mother'.
The 'purchasers 1 do not buy the right to 
treat the child as a commodity since the 
child abuse and neglect laws still 
apply."418
However, it is submitted here that this 
argument is rather incomplete and, to a certain 
extent, flawed/ Although it is correct to point out 
that the commissioning parties are not buying babies 
as a commodity, and that they are outside the ambit of
reasonable compensation to the surrogate). 10% 
of the money will be paid on confirmation of 
pregnancy, and the rest will be paid when she 
hands the child over. (See Parker, Diana, 
"Surrogate Mothering, An Overview", (1984) 14 
Fam. Law, 140.) Since a surrogate may change 
her mind by refusing to hand the child over to 
the commissioning parties, the money could be 
seen as being paid in return for her consenting 
to hand the child over. In other words, one may 
argue that the surrogate is selling the baby, 
when she performs her part of the agreement in 
return for the commissioning parties performing 
their side of the agreement. This is a 
misconception of the concept of surrogacy with 
reasonable compensation. The point being that 
if the surrogate decides to keep the child, the 
whole idea of compensating her vanishes, since 
she did not bear a child for another, rather she 
has borne the child for herself.
418. Davies, Iwan, "Contracts to Bear a Child", (1985) 
11 Journal of Medical Ethics, 61, at p. 62. 
(emphasis original).
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the laws on child abuse and neglect, it seems unsound
to suggest that the commissioning parties are merely
buying "the right to rear a child by paying the
'mother'". Even if there is such a "right to rear a
child", ought it be capable of being bought and
sold? Will this be injurious to the interests of 
419children? In other words, there may be other
fundamental values which conflict with such a view of 
surrogacy for a fee. Consequently, this approach 
scarcely leads one closer to what is really regarded 
to be objectionable about surrogacy for a fee.
Surrogacy, as a means of founding a family 
(whether through reproduction or not), may indeed be 
very close to the concept of adoption, except that 
adoption is usually the surrendering of a child in 
situations where parents find themselves unable or 
unwilling to undertake parental duties for one reason 
or another; whereas surrogacy is the deliberate 
creation of a child for the purpose of parenting by 
person or persons other than the surrogate. 
Nonetheless, if one examines the legal position of 
money payment in connection with adoption, it may give 
some insight as to why surrogacy for a fee is often 
connected with the baby-selling argument.
The present UK lav/, and many US states' laws, 
have reflected societies' disapproval of any
419. See infra. pp. 188-213.
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transaction that is seen as linked to baby—selling.
Thus, Section 50 of the Adoption Act 1985,420 and
Section 51 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978,421
generally prohibit payment of money in consideration
for surrendering a child for adoption. Equally,
American legislative provisions in various states
prohibit payment of money or other reward to parents
m  consideration for adoption.
There are two main reasons why public policy is
against money payment in connection with adoption.
First, a state has a legitimate interest in protecting
mothers from being, as was said on one case:
"coerced, compelled, forced or pressured 
to feel constraint or obliged to yield up 
their infants whether by threats of 
violence, financial withdrawal, or 
derision regardless of how oblique or 
veiled the pressure might b e .  "42:3
420. For the terms of the section, see infra, 
p. 199.
421. The terms is the same as Section 50 of the 
Adoption Act 1958.
422. See Rushevsky Cynthina, "Legal Recongition of 
Surrogate Gestation", (1982) 7 Women's Rights Law 
Reporter, 10 7. In Doe v. Kelley, the Wayne 
County Circuit Court stated that: "Baby-selling 
is against public policy of this State and the 
State's interest in preventing such conduct is 
sufficiently compelling and meets the test set 
forth in Roe. Mercenary considerations used to 
create a parent-child relationship and its impact 
upon the family unit strikes at the very 
foundation of human society and is patently and 
necessary injurious to the community. It is a 
fundamental principle that children should not 
and cannot be bought and sold. The sale of 
children is illegal in all states." 6 Fam.L.Rep 
(BRA) 3011, 3013 (1980).
423. Galison v. Dist. of Columbia, 420 A 2d 1263, 1268 
(D .C . 1979).
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Similarly, in the case of surrogacy for a fee, a state
has a legitimate interest in ensuring that surrogates
are not pressured by a fee to hand the child over to
the commissioning parties.
This state interest can be reconciled with the
argument made earlier, that the right to found a
family is narrower in scope than the right to
reproduce and/or to use one's gestational function,
and that a state does have the power to interfere more
readily with founding of a family than in relation to
an individual's right to procreate and/or to use one's
424gestational function. In other words, although
the right of a surrogate not to be coerced into
pregnancy is negative in nature, and thus does not
demand the removal of social conditions which may be
425potentially exploitative, the state can
legitimately protect her right to found a family in 
the face of monetary inducement to give up the 
surrogate-born child. The converse of this is that a 
state may have a legitimate interest in preventing the 
founding of a family by the commissioning parties 
through payment of a fee.
Additionally, the use of money for the creation 
of family relationships may not always be in the best 
interests of a child. A person may pay for a child
424. See supra, chapter 3, pp. 86-88.
425. See supra, pp. 186-7.
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even though he or she is is not suitable for
parenthood. Admittedly, states do not generally
intervene in natural reproduction to impose any
conditions on fitness for parenting. Still,
intervention is considered legitimate after birth if
there is evidence, for example, of abuse. Thus, it
could be argued that if a state recognises a certain
method of founding a family (whether through
reproduction or not) then it has an obligation in its
regulation. The simple transfer of of a child from
one person to another as in a private surrogacy
transaction without regulation is scarcely
satisfactory.
The policy of the state - recognising the
undesirability of money in the creation of
parent-children relationship - is one which prohibits,
in general, money payment in people's endeavours to 
426found a family. At the same time, it regulates,
through close supervision, these endeavours; ensuring
protection of the interests of adults and children.
Hence, English law prohibits agreements to transfer
parental rights and duties, and both English and
427
Scottish law render them unenforceable. In the
case of adoption, this state policy is expressed 
through stringent regulations and close supervision.
426. See Section 50 of the Adoption Act 1958 which
applies to England and Wales, and Sections 51 &
24 of the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978.
42 7. See infra, chapter 7, pp. 215-221.
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Consistent with this policy, the law can
prohibit generally surrogacy for a fee. But since
existing practice favours regulating people's
endeavours in founding a family, rather than closing
428avenues to such endeavours altogether, surrogacy
should be regulated to ensure that (i) the children's
best interests are not jeopardised, and (ii) that
where surrogates surrender children to the
commissioning parties, they are not coerced,
especially by monetary considerations.
Indeed, judicial reactions to the recent
English surrogacy cases may be cited as lending suport 
429to this view.
In these cases, judicial reaction towards
surrogacy with money payment has been toned down. In
the Baby Cotton case, (Re A Baby) , a surrogate
agreed, for £6,500, to carry a child for an infertile
couple. The case finally led to the speedy passage
431of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. Latey
J. refrained from commenting on the morality of such
428. See supra, chapter 4 on the current practice of 
not prohibiting the use of artificial techniques 
which allow people to found a family.
429. See Re A Baby, The Times, 15 Jan., 1985, p. 8; 
Adoption Applicaton Surrogacy case, The Times, 12 
March, 1985, p. 27, and Surrogacy Twin Babies 
case, Daily Telegraph, 13 March, 1987, p. 2.
For further discussion of these cases, see infra, 
pp. 197-204.
430. The Times, 15 Jan, 1985. p.8.
431. See Sloman Susan, "Surrogacy Arrangements Act 
1985", (1985) 135/2 D.L.J., 978.
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an arrangement, considering that the best interests of
the child were of paramount importance for the court
432in exercising its wardship jurisdiction. The
court ultimately granted the commissioning husband 
(also the biological father) care and custody of the
child. In the Adoption Application: Surrogacy
433case, Latey J. (again not commenting on the 
morality of the surrogacy arrangement) made an 
adoption order in favour of the commissioning
parties. Again, in the Surrogacy Twin Babies
434case, where the surrogate changed her mind, (the 
amount paid was not disclosed), Sir John Arnold in the 
Family Division said that there was nothing 'shameful1 
about the arrangement.
These cases, however, do not connote judicial 
acceptance of surrogacy with money payment. As Latey 
J. said in both cases, the morality and acceptability 
of surrogacy is a question for Parliament (which has
432. He said that the "... moral, ethical and social 
considerations are for others and not for this 
court in its wardship jurisdiction." The Times 
15 Jan, 1985, p. 8.
433. The Times, 12 Larch, 1985, p.27. There was no 
written agreement in this case. Nor were 
lawyers consulted. The agreement was one based 
on trust. Surrogacy was achieved through 
natural intercourse between the surrogate and the 
commissioning husband.
434. The Daily Telegraph, 13 March 1987, p.2.
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4-3 5not taken any definitive stance), not the 
courts. The task of the courts is to decide in a 
particular case what is in the best interests of the 
child. Nonetheless, in all three cases, the judges 
did not castigate the arrangements as immoral or 
shameful. Hence, one may infer a possible acceptance 
by the judiciary of surrogacy with money payment as a 
viable and acceptable means of founding a family.
These cases additionally demomstrated two 
further points. First, the public policy argument 
against, and the legal difficulty of, surrogacy with 
money payment may be overcome. Second, the role of 
the courts in cases of performed surrogacy 
arrangements can be similar to that which they perform 
in adoption.
(i ) Surrogacy and Adoption
In the Adoption Application: Surrogacy 
436case, money payment of £5,000 was made to
compensate the surrogate's loss of earnings and 
437expenses. The surrogate handed the child
435. See the Consultation Paper, para. 41-3.
436. The Times, 12 March, 1987, p.27.
437. The payment originally agreed between the 
commissioning married couple and the surrogate 
(who was married with two children and had to 
give up her job to have the child) was £10,000. 
The surrogate refused to accept the balance of 
£5,000 after the birth of the child on the ground 
that she had already made some money through 
publishing her story in a book. The payment of 
£5,000 was said by the judge to be an amount that 
did not in fact cover the surrogate's loss of 
earnings and expenses.
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over to the commissioning parties as agreed, and the
couple applied for an adoption order.
S50(l) of the Adoption Act 1958 says:-
"Subject to the provisions of this 
section, it shall not be lawful to make 
or give to any person any payment or 
reward for or in consideration of - 
(a) the adoption by that person of an 
infant; (b) the grant by that person of 
any consent required in connection with 
the adoption of an infant; (c) the 
transfer by that person of the care and 
possession of an infant with a view to 
the adoption of the infant; or (d) the 
making by that person of any arrangements 
for the adoption of an infant."438
Statutory provision states clearly that the court
shall not make an adoption order unless it is
satisfied that the applicants have not contravened S50
439of the Adoption Act 1958.
Despite these provisions, the judge held that
no payment had been made under S50(l), and he allowed
an adoption order after considering that it would be
in the best interests of the child.
The judge reasoned that "it was only after the
payments had been made and the baby born that any of
the [the parties] began to think about adoption and
legalities...[N]o payment or reward had been made 
440within S50."
This reasoning appears to imply that if the
438. Contravention of S50 is a criminal offence for 
which the local authority may prosecute, see 
SS50(2) and S54(2) of the Adoption Act 1958.
439. S2 2 (5) the Children Act 1975.
440. The Times, 12 March 1987, p.27.
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parties had not contemplated or intended the adoption 
of the child at the time of the payments, no payments 
had been made under S50(l). This is not, in fact, 
what S50(l) provides. It covers any payment in 
consideration for the surrendering of a child, or for 
the granting of consent for the adoption of a child. 
Hence, it would have been a more satisfactory decision 
had the judge stated why there had been no payments 
made for either, or both, of those purposes.
Although the judge did not attempt to explain 
this, one may find evidence in the case, which, if 
examined against the underlying rationale of S50, can, 
and will support the judge's conclusion that, in this 
case, no payments had been made within S50(l).
S50(l) was intended to tackle the problem of 
child trafficking, the possible objectionable features 
of which are (i) money inducement to mothers to give 
up their babies, and (ii) the possibility that the 
interests of the adults giving up or receiving 
children will take precedence over that of 
children's. Since the evidence in this case was that 
the surrogate was acting primarily for altruistic 
reasons, and that the payments were in fact for her 
loss of earnings and expenses - and were unconnected 
with payments for the surrendering of the child, or 
for granting of consent to the adoption of the child - 
it could legitimately be interpreted as not being a 
payment struck at by S50(l).
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What is most interesting about the judgment is 
what was said obi ter. The judge said that if he was 
mistaken about S50(l), that is, if there had been 
payment within S50(l), he considered that S50(3)441 
permitted the court, in the exercise of its discretion 
in each case, to authorise payment not only 
prospectively, but also, retroactively.
This again is consistent with the spirit of
442
S50. It is not intended to be a bar to an
adoption order in a case where payment was innocently 
made, where there was no evidence of coercion of the 
mother to give up the child, or irrespective of the 
child's welfare. It would, however, have such an 
effect if S50 was construed as limiting authorisation 
solely to prospective payment.
441. S50(3) says:- "This section does not apply to any 
payment... authorised by the court to which an 
application for an adoption order in respect of 
an infant is made."
442. A strict literal interpretation of S50 may 
support prospective but not retroactive 
authorisation of payments. S50(l) and S50(3), 
taken together, state plainly that payment is 
unlawful unless that being authorised by the 
court. Thus, payment cannot be lawfully 
received before obtaining the court's 
authorisation. An accompanying section in the 
Adoption Act 1958, S7(l)(c), supported this 
contention. It stated that before making an 
adoption order, the court should satisfy itself 
that, the applicant 'has not received' and that 
no person 'has made' to the applicant, any 
payment in consideration of adoption except such 
as the court 'may' sanction.
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The decision of the Adoption Application:
44-3 .Surrogacy case is clearly satisfactory; it has
effected the best result for all the parties. This
liberal interpetation, if followed, may allow adoption
after surrogacy with money payment, whether the
payment is for reasonable compensation, or for a
fee. In other words, money payments in surrogacy may
not necessarily be contrary to public policy as
constituting baby-selling, nor need they constitute an
444inevitable obstacle to adoption.
(i i ) The Role of the Courts in Performed
Surrogacy Arrangements
The decision, and the obi ter dicta, in the
445Adoption Application: Surrogacy case indicate a
possible role for British courts in performed
446surrogacy arrangements.
Where a surrogacy arrangement involves money 
payment, a court can assess the nature of the payment, 
and decide whether it was a case of surrogacy with 
reasonable compensation. If it was, as in this case,
443. The Times, 12 March, 1987, p. 27.
444. For further discussions on other possible legal 
obstacles to adopting a surrogate-born child, and 
their possible solutions, see Wright, Moira, 
"Surrogacy and Adoption: Problems and 
Possibilities", (1986) 16 Fam. Law, 109.
445. supra, cit.
446. Although as will be seen in chapter 7, where a 
surrogacy agreement is breached, the law is not 
primarily competent in regulating the behaviour 
of the parties.
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S50(l) will not apply, and an adoption order could be 
made in favour of the commissioning parties, providing 
that this is in fact in the child's best interests.
Where money payment to a surrogate is in fact a
fee, that is, it is a payment within S50(l), the court
may still exercise its discretion under S50(3) and 
authorise the payment retroactively, if and only if,
adoption in the case is in the child's best intersts.
447In the Surrogacy Twin Babies case , custody
was granted to the surrogate on the ground that it was 
in the best interests of the children since they had 
established a strong bonding with her. These two 
cases indicate that the court can play an important 
role in deciding what is in the best interests of a 
surrogate-born child; a role that they have long 
played in making adoption orders.
447. supra, cit.
- 204- -
(4) CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the acceptability of surrogacy 
as a means of founding a family (whether through 
reproduction or not) has been examined. The Warnock 
Report which is the major British government document 
examining the issue, by a majority, condemned it. 
However, the arguments favoured by the Report, that 
is, that surrogacy is a practice where one person 
treats another as a means to an end, and that it is 
positively exploitative, are largely rhetorical. 
Furthermore, the Warnock Report failed to distinquish 
the different possible financial elements of 
surrogacy.
As has been argued in this chapter, surrogacy 
in principle and surrogacy with reasonable 
compensation are not socially and morally 
objectionable practices. Consequently, individuals 
should be allowed to found a family (whether through 
reproduction or not) by employing these forms of 
surrogacy. Conversely, a woman should be free to 
choose to become a surrogate (whether for reasonable 
compensation or not). However, as indicated during 
the course of the discussion, the best interests of 
children will necessitate regulation of these 
practices, at least, along the line suggested 
regarding the use of artificial techniques.
Regulation of the practice of surrogacy in principle
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and surrogacy with reasonable compensation is 
compatible with one's right to found a family (whether 
through reproduction or not) and the best interests of 
children.
In relation to surrogacy for a fee, the 
contentions that it resembles slavery and that it 
deviates from traditional female behaviour are in 
themselves inadequate arguments for its prohibition. 
The objections that surrogacy for a fee is a practice 
that treats a woman as a means to an end, and that it 
is positively exploitative are unconvincing arguments 
for narrowing an individual's options in procreation 
and founding of a family. According to the 
libertarian approach which has been adopted in this 
thesis, the potential of adult participants being 
exploited in surrogacy for a fee does not require the 
prohibition or regulation of such a practice, since 
the right to found a family (whether through 
reproduction or not), and the right to use one's 
reproductive and/or gestational function, are negative 
claim rights. These rights do not require a 
government to ensure an environment which is 
non-exploitative in the exercise of these rights.
State interference with the practice on that ground, 
therefore, serves no legitimate interests of the adult 
parties.
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Baby-selling, however, is the strongest 
argument against surrogacy for a fee. The policy of 
the state against baby-selling has, indeed, been 
reflected in the adoption practice in the UK, which 
prohibits money payment in consideration of 
adoption. The legitimate state interest in 
prohibiting baby-selling is twofold. First, the 
state has an interest in preventing women from being 
coerced into giving babies up for adoption. In other 
words, a state has a legitimate interest in protecting 
the founding of a family by a woman in the face of 
money inducement to give up her baby (and conversely, 
in prohibiting an individual's endeavours in founding 
a family through money payment). Second, the state 
has a legitimate in ensuring that children are not 
bought and sold regardless of their best interests.
For these same reasons, surrogacy for a fee can 
legitimately be prohibited as contrary to public 
policy against baby-selling.
Notwithstanding this, one may argue that 
regulating baby-selling may meet these two 
objections. In other words, agencies may regulate 
baby-selling transactions in order to ensure that 
payments do not significantly affect the voluntariness 
of a mother in giving up her baby for adoption, and 
stringent selection procedures for prospective 
adoptors may also be the answer in protecting the best 
interests of children.
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The possibility of regulating baby-selling, and 
its non-adoption has alluded one to another possible, 
and perhaps more fundamental, objection against money 
payment for the creation of parent-child 
relationship. This is the contention that such 
practice may be totally at odds with our intuitive 
feeling that certain activities should not be the 
subject of market forces, which may have the effect of 
commodification of certain human relationships, for 
example, the child-parent relationship. This 
argument may also be the basis of opposition to 
prostitution, and payment of blood donors over and 
above that which represents reasonable compensation.
Nonetheless, the arguments of commodification, 
and baby-selling do not apply to surrogacy in 
principle and surrogacy with reasonable 
compensation. Given that the practice in the UK is 
to permit options in founding a family (through 
adoption or the use of artificial techniques), rather 
than restricting them unless a compelling interest is 
shown, the argument in this chapter is that these 
practices should be permissible subject to regulation 
aimed at securing the best interests of children and 
surrogates.
In other words, an individual's right to found 
a family (whether through reproduction or not), and a 
woman's right to use her reproductive and/or 
gestational function, should not be restricted in
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relation to surrogacy in principle and surrogacy with 
reasonable compensation except insofar as is necessary 
in the best interests of children and surrogates.
Comments about morality in recent English
surrogacy cases have become somewhat subdued. This
may be interpreted as a possible acceptance by the
judiciary of some forms of surrogacy in the founding
of a family. Furthermore, the Adoption Application: 
448Surrogacy case has removed one major legal 
impediment to surrogacy with reasonable 
compensation. The court in effect held that 
surrogacy with reasonable compensation did not amount 
to payment in consideration of adoption of a 
surrogate-born child. In any event, the court said 
that if it was payment, the court could authorise it, 
and allow an adoption order in the best interests of 
the child. The decision indicates that money payment 
in surrogacy does not necessarily create a legal 
obstacle to the adoption of a surrogate-born child.
Yet, as the case has revealed, the courts, 
being the first and final safeguard regarding the 
propriety of surrogacy with money payment, cannot 
defeat the baby-selling argument. In other words, 
given that a court will make an adoption order if it 
is in the best interests of a child, and that the 
taint of impropriety in relation to money payment to a
448. supra. ci t .
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surrogate may have to be ignored, the baby-selling
argument continues to have some force. It is perhaps
for this reason and to protect the best interests of
children that proponents of surrogacy usually suggest
449the introduction of a regulatory scheme.
Such a scheme is compatible with the argument
in this chapter that surrogacy can be viewed as akin
to adoption. Given that steps towards the creation
of a parent-child relationship in surrogacy begin
before a child is conceived, there is a strong case
for the establishment of agencies - along the line of
the present adoption agencies - which will assess the
suitability of commissioning parties and surrogates
and counsel and advise them to ensure that they
understood the full implication of surrogacy. Such
agencies can also regulate the question of payment to
avoid the taint of baby-selling.
Again, by analogy with adoption, such agencies
must have the skills necessary to deal with the issues
involved in surrogacy, and should operate on a
non-profit making basis. Legal prohibition of
commercial surrogacies can be justified on the ground
that their involvement in creating parent-child
relationship has in the past proved to be deleterious
450
to the interests of children and adult parties.
449. See the Warnock Report, “Expression of Dissent: 
A. Surrogacy", pp. 87-9.
450. See the Report of the Departmental Committee on
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If the above regulatory proposal is accepted, 
then the state is limiting the right to found a family 
by surrogacy, and the right to use one's reproductive 
and/or gestational function, to that which is provided 
by state regulated agencies. In other words, these 
rights do not extend to using commercial 
surrogacies. Nor do they extend to the practice of 
surrogacy for a fee. This is not necessarily an 
unacceptable limitation of these rights, although 
whether an individual's freedom to do business, and 
make a profit is unreasonably restricted by this
regulation is another matter outside the scope of this
,, . 451thesis.
The suggestion that surrogacy should be 
regulated rather than banned has been made in other 
jurisdictions, for example, the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission's study of Human Artificial Reproduction 
and Related Matters proposes legislative recognition
Adoption Services and Agencies, B.P.P., 1936-7, 
Cmnd 5499. para., 30 (or the Horsburgh Report) 
which highlighted the unsatisfactory state of the 
English adoption law caused by the operation of 
unregulated intermediaries which operated on 
either a profitable or non-profitable basis. 
Today, the operation of adoption agencies in the 
England and Scotland is strigently regulated by 
the Adoption Act 1958 (as amended) and the 
Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 respectively.
451. Action, H.B., The Morals of Markets, London, 
Longman, 19 71.
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452of surrogacy. Again, in Michigan, a House of
Representative Bill No. 5148 proposed detailed
453regulation of surrogacy. The underlying
philosophy of the regulatory approach is that not only 
do people have rights in the areas of procreation and 
founding of a family, but also that some of the 
problems associated with surrogacy can best be tackled 
by a regulatory scheme. In the words of the Ontario 
Report,
"...given the relative accessibility of 
artificial insemination, prohibition 
would result in recourse to clandestine 
private arrangements that would realise 
the worst fears of those who oppose this 
practice. Dangers of exploitation of 
the weak by the powerful, pregnancies 
contracted by the irresponsible, and the 
introduction of infants into 
inappropriate, even dangerous 
circumstances would seem to be 
accentuated if the practice were driven 
underground. At the greatest risk would 
be the child whose place in society would 
be uncertain...Accordingly, we have 
rejected prohibition in favour of a form 
of regulation, in the belief that the 
latter best would protect the interests 
of all concerned. . .
A completely different approach to that 
advocated in this chapter was adopted by the state of 
Victoria, Australia. In response to the Waller
452. Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and 
Related Matters, 2 Vol., Ministry of the Attorney 
General, Toronto, July 1985, p.232.
453. See Rushevsky, Cynthina, A., "Legal Recognition 
of Surrogacy Gestation", (1982) 7 Women ' s Rights
Law Reporter, 107-142.
454. The Ontario Report, op. cit., p. 232.
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455Report, S30 of the Infertility (Medical 
Procedures) Act 1984 makes surrogacy whether for a fee 
or not an offence. This is accompanied by a penalty 
for contravention.
According to the argument in this chapter, and 
throughout the thesis, prohibition of surrogacy 
whether for a fee or not is clearly an excessive 
reaction to the problems identified in surrogacy. 
Moreover, it would be an infringement of rights of 
individuals to found a family (whether through 
reproduction or not), and right of a woman to use her 
reproductive and/or gestational function. The effect 
is to restrict people's choice in the areas of 
reproduction and founding of a family. More 
importantly, it is to abrogate the right to reproduce 
of some infertile people, and restrict severely the 
right of the infertile to found a fami ly.
Although a regulatory scheme is advocated in 
this chapter, this is not however to s a y  that 
regulation is necessarily a straightforward task. 
Questions as to the validity and enforceability of 
surrogacy arrangements must be c o n s i d e r e d  b e f o r e  one 
can assess the efficacious and s a t i s f a c t o r y  n a t u r e  of 
surrogacy as a means for t h e  f o u n d i n g  o f  a f a m i l y  
(v/hether through r e p r o d u c t i o n  o r  n o t ) .  I t  i s  t o  
these question t h a t  the n e x t  c h a p t e r  w i l l  t u r n .
4 5 5 .  The  W a l l e r  R e p o r t ,  o p .  c i u ;  see gener^.^^n ,
C u r r e n t  T o p i c ,  ( 1 9 8 4 )  s 8  The n.u s r a  ^ - o.r. La.-. 
J o u r n a l ,  p .  68  3 .
CHAPTER 7 
<LEGAL ISSUES IN SURROGACY
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(1) INTRODUCTION
It has been concluded, therefore, that the 
right to reproduce and the right to found a family can 
include the right to use surrogacy (even where money 
payment is involved) subject to the caveat that 
regulation will be needed to ensure that the interests 
of children and surrogates are adequately 
protected. However, regulation also requires
consideration of the legal difficulties which may face 
the interested parties, and their resolution may 
provide genuine access to surrogacy as a means to 
found a family.
In this chapter, two major legal issues
relating to the use of surrogacy for the founding of a
family (whether through reproduction or not) will be
explored and examined. First, and this is a very
important question, is such an arrangement lav/ful and
£ F 7
enforceable? Second, it has been seen that 
parenthood is an important issue in the founding; of a 
family by artificial techniques, ana tnere are 
arguments supporting legal reform v.hicn w i _  remove 
the unsatisfactory nature of the current oerinition of 
parenthood as applied in the use of artiric^a_ 
techniques. The same arguments app~y in respect, or 
surrogacy. Consequently, in toe sectno section or
45 6. See supra, chapter 6.
457. See supra. chapter i.
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this chapter, the issue of parenthood in surrogacy 
will be considered, and proposals as to how problems 
can be resolved, will be made.
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(2) VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF A SURROGACY 
ARRANGEMENT
The 'Transfer Te r m 1
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 which
outlawed the operation of commercial surrogacies left
the issue of the lawfulness of a surrogacy arrangement
open. Section 1(9) of the 1985 Act states,
"This Act applies to arrangements whether 
or not they are lawful and whether or not 
they are enforceable by or against any of 
the persons making them."
According to current English and Scottish law,
a surrogate arrangement (whether for money payment or
458not) is not illegal or unlawful. The Surrogacy
Arrangements (Amendment) Bill 1986, clause 1 of which
attempted to make a surrogacy arrangement unlawful,
459was lost through lack of parliamentary time.
The objective of clause 1 was to ensure that
money payment made in a surrogacy transaction was 
460irrecoverable. Thus, in the case of breach by a
surrogate, the commissioning parties could not sue to 
recover money payment which had already been made to 
her. This would not be the situation if a surrogacy, 
arrangement is merely void and unenforceable, which is 
taken by many to be the present English and Scottish
458. See H.C. Vol. 79, Col. 118-9.
45 9. Surrogacy Arrangement (Amendments) Bill [H.L.] 
1986, No. 169.
460. See the debates to the Surrogacy Arrangements 
(Amendment) Bill 1986, H.L., Vol. 473, Col. 
160-164; H.L. Vol. 475, Col. 363-366.
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461lav;.
Nonetheless, under both English and Scottish
common law, an agreement to transfer or surrender
parental rights and duties is contrary to public
4 6 2policy, and is certainly unenforceable. Whether
463such an arrangement is also void is less certain,
but the point is largely academic today because of
statutory provisions.
Currently, the English statutory provision
which restates the common law rule can be found in
S85(2) of the Children Act 1975, which says,
"Subject to section 1(2) of the 
Guardianship Act 1973...a person cannot 
surrender or transfer to another any 
parental right or duty he has as respects 
a child."464
says,
And Section 1(2) of the Guardianship Act 1973
"An agreement for a man or woman to give 
up in whole or in part, in relation to 
any child of his or hers, the rights and 
authority referred to in subsection (1) 
above shall be unenforceable, except [a 
separation agreement between husband and 
wife] ..."
461. A surrogacy arrangement is often said to be void 
and unenforceable, but this may be so insofar as 
the 'transfer term' is concerned.' Other terms 
in a surrogacy arrangement may be unenforceable, 
but not necessarily void. See infra.
pp. for further discussions on this
point.
462. See Appendix 2.
463. See Appendix 2.
464. S85(2) is to be considered with the background of 
adoption in mind. It cannot be taken literally, 
otherwise adoption could not exist.
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The Scottish common law rule, like the English 
common law rule, has been put into statutory form, and 
Section 10(2) of the Guardianship Act 1973 is the 
Scottish equivalent of Section 1(2).465 In other
words, under both English and Scottish law, an 
agreement to transfer parental rights and duties is 
unenforceable.
The obvious legal problem arising from using a 
surrogacy arrangement to found a family, therefore, 
relates to one of its fundamental terms, which states 
that a surrogate is to surrender the child to the 
commissioning parties (this will hereinafter be called 
the 'transfer term').
The applicability of the lav; prohibiting an 
agreement to transfer parental rights and duties to 
surrogacy agreements, of course, depends on who is 
considered to be the mother, and therefore, who has 
parental rights and duties regarding a surrogate-born 
child in the first place. The 'transfer term' in a 
surrogacy arrangement will not contravene any 
statutory provisions, if (in the most unlikely 
eventuality) a surrogate is considered not to be the 
mother of the child. Most probably, however,
465. Note: in Scotland, there is no statutory
equivalent of S85(2) of the Children Act 19/5.
See Cusine, b ., "'Womb-Leasing1: Some Legal
Implications", (197 8) 128/2 L.L.J. 824, at p. 625.
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a surrogate will be considered to be the mother. In
such a case, the 'transfer term' in a surrogate
arrangement will be void and unenforceable. Although
4 66no English or Scottish judicial decision or
467legislative enactment to this effect has been
made, the consensus of opinion in various
468 469parliamentary debates and academic writings
clearly sujjport this view.
Evidently, if a dispute arises between a
surrogate and the commissioning parties regarding the
custody of a surrogate-born child, a decision will be
made taking the child's best interests as the
470
paramount consideration, and the ‘transfer term' 
in a surrogacy arrangement will never prevail over
466. See the obiter in A. v. C., (1978) 8 Earn. Law,
170, where the trial judge Comyn, J. said that:
"The agreement between the parties I hold as
being against public policy. bone of them can 
rely upon it in any way or enforce the agreement 
in any way."
467. An Amendment moved during the debates to the now 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 by Michael 
Meadowcrafts to make a 'transfer term' of a 
surrogacy arrangement unenforceable was 
withdrawn. See h.C. Vol. 79, Cel. 115-9.
468. See H.L., Vol. 473, Col. 160-177; H.L., Vol. 475, 
Col. 363-6; H.C., Vol. 79, Col. 188-9.
469. See eg, Freeman's Annotation to the Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985, SI (9), in Scottish Current 
Law Statutes, 1985.
470. See A. v. C. (1978) 8 Earn. Law 170, (1984) 14
Fam. Law 241; the Surrogacy Twin Babies case, 
Daily Telegraph, 13 March, 198 7, p. 2; the Baby M 
case, Hornblower Margot, "Judge Awards 'Baby M' 
to Her Biological Father", the Washington Post, 
April 1, 1987.
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that. Otherwise, the court would be allowing a 
contractual term to pre-empt its decision on the best 
interests of a child.
Given that the 'transfer term' in a surrogacy
arrangement cannot be enforced, endeavours to found a
family (whether through reproduction or not) by using
surrogacy will be hazardous. Nonetheless, since the
right to found a family (whether through reproduction
or not) is essentially a negative claim right, there
is no obligation on the part of the state, for
instance, to ensure, either that a surrogacy
arrangement is entered into only if there is a good
471prospect of performance, or to enforce it.
472However, as has been argued, there is a
case for regulating the practice of surrogacy. If 
the state is involved, it may seem illogical that it 
should participate in the initial process of surrogacy 
for the founding of a family by ensuring, for 
instance, the eligibility of commissioning parties, 
without also assessing the likelihood of the parties 
performing the agreement, through assessing their 
genuineness. This, nonetheless, is still far from
471. Compare the approach of the Ontario Lav/ Reform 
Commission which proposes statutory enforcement 
of a surrogacy agreement. See Report on Human 
Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters, 2 
Vol., Ministry of the Attorney General, Toronto, 
July 1985, p. 252.
472. See supra, chapter 6.
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suggesting enforcement of surrogacy arrangements.
Although unenforceability can be a substantial 
obstacle to the commissioning parties' endeavours to 
found a family (in the event of a surrogate refusing 
to surrender the child), surrogacy may still be
regarded by some as realistic and meaningful way of
473founding a family.
It has, therefore, been noted that a 'transfer 
term' in a surrogacy arrangement is void and 
unenforceable. Whether this conclusion is 
necessarily true with regard to other terms in a 
surrogacy arrangement is unclear, even though it has
often been said that a surrogacy arrangement is void
474and unenforceable.
In the debates on the Surrogacy Arrangements
Act 1985, it was said that "...it is almost certain
that most aspects of a surrogacy arrangement would be
regarded as unenforceable by the courts as being
47 5
contrary to public policy."
It is submitted here that other important terms 
in a surrogacy arrangement are not necessarily
473. Since the late 1970s, some 500-600 children have 
been born through surrogacy arrangements. Out 
of these cases, there had been three reported 
incidences where surrogates changed their 
minds. See "The Lessons From Eaby M", The 
Economist, 21 March, 1987, p. 18.
474. See for example Parker, Diana, "Surrogate 
Mothering: An Overview", (1984) 14 Fam. Lav/, 143.
475. Fir. Kenneth Clarke, Hansard: H.C., Vol. 79, Col. 
118-9.
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contrary to public policy and void, although their 
enforceability is seriously doubted.
In a surrogate agreement, a surrogate will 
usually agree to carry a child to term, (this will be 
referred to as the 'carrying term'), and to seek 
proper medical attention to ensure foetal health,
(this will be referred to as the 'pre-natal care 
term'). These are clearly vital aspects of a 
surrogacy arrangement. It is, however, unclear why 
these terms should be regarded as void and contrary to 
public policy.
A promise to have a child, and to ensure a
foetus' pre-natal health, must be in accordance with
public policy emphasing pre-natal care, unless, of
course, the very existence of the foetus is objected
476 .
to. Nonetheless, as has argued before, it is 
difficult to envisage a situation where it is feasible 
to make such a contention.
Notwithstanding this, the question of whether 
or not the commissioning parties could enforce these 
terms through judicial process is certainly 
problematic.
The 'Carrying Term'
Where a surrogate wishes to abort the foetus, 
contrary to the 'carrying term', the interests which
476. See supra, pp. 110-111.
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the commissioning parties have in the surrogate's 
non-abortion appear to be insufficient to prevent the 
operat ion.
In Paton v . British Pregnancy Advisory Service 
477
Trustees, the English courts first came across a
case where the plaintiff (a husband and father) sought
an injunction to restrain his wife from having an
abortion to be carried out under the Abortion Act
1967, without his consent. Sir George Baker P. held
that, in law, the husband has no legal right to stop
his wife from having an abortion.
"The Abortion Act gives no right to a 
father to be consulted in respect of a 
termination of a pregnancy...The husband 
therefore has no legal right enforceable 
in law or equity to stop his wife having 
this abort ion . "4-78
479Paton was considered m  C. v. £>. where a 
father sought an injunction to prevent iiis 
girlfriend's termination of an eighteen to twenty-one 
weeks' pregnancy. Although, the case was not based 
on the right of a father to be consulted about an 
abortion - a point which was not a r g u e d ^ ^  - it has
477. [1979] Q.B. 276.
478. ibid., at p. 281. Note that the 1976 Act gives 
no right to a mother either. Compare, "but the 
Abortion Act 1967 has given mothers the right to 
terminate the lives of their unborn children and 
made it lawful for doctors to help to abort 
them." per Stephenson L.J. in McKay v. Essex AHA 
[1982] 2 All. E.R., 771 at p. 780e.
479. The Times, 24 Feburary, 1987, p. 25.
480. The father's argument in C. v. S. was based on 
the interpretation of the term "capable of being 
born alive" in the Infant Life (Preservation) Act
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nonetheless revived the whole debate in 
481
Britain. Consequently, whether the present
sound and unambiguous state of the law on this point 
will be changed remains to be seen.
482American cases since Roe v. Wade are also
clear on whether a husband-father has a right to 
prevent his wife's abortion. Thus, in Planned
483Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danford A-G.,
the Supreme Court held that,
"[.the state] may not constitutionally 
require the consent of the spouse...as a 
condition for abortion during the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy... Since the 
state cannot regulate or proscribe 
abortion during the first stage, when the 
physician and his patient make that 
decision, the state cannot delegate 
authority to any particular person even 
the spouse to prevent abortion during 
that same period.
15 29. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
interpretation of Justice Heilbron, in the High 
Court, that the proposed abortion was not in 
contravention of the 1929 Act in that the foetus 
was not "capable of being born alive". The 
House of Lords, at an emergency appeal committee, 
decided unanimously not to allow a challenge to 
the Court of Appeal's decision because there was 
"no arguable point of law". See Guardian, 25 
Feb., 1987, p. 1; C. v. S., The Times, 26 Feb., 
1987, p. 24.
481. See the Guardian, 25 Feb., 1987, p. 12 (Editoral 
Comments), and the introduction of the Infant 
Life (Preservation) and Paternal Rights Bill 
1987, H.C. Bill 113. Clause 2 of the Bill 
proposed to amend Section 1(1) of the Abortion 
Act 1967 by inserting after S I (1)(b) the words- 
"(c) that the father of the unborn child had been 
consulted about the mother's intention to 
terminate the pregnancy and that, where he is the 
mother's husband his consent as to the 
termination has been obtained."
482. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra, pp. 57-59.
483. 4-28 U.S. 52 (1976 ) .
484. ibid., at p. 69.
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The Supreme Court decision emphasises a woman's 
right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy and 
her right to self-determination. That is, since it
is the woman who physically bears the child, and since
she is most directly affected by the pregnancy, she
should have, within certain limits, the final
. . . 485decision.
A similar decision was arrived at in the 
Australian case of K. v. T.,486 Williams, J. of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland held that a de facto 
father has no legal right to restrain the wife from 
having an abortion. On Appeal to a full court of the
Supreme Court of Queensland, three judges upheld that
• . 487decision.
If a father-husband or a father cannot prevent 
a woman from having an abortion, it is difficult to 
envisage that the commissioning parties should be able 
to prevent a surrogate from having an abortion by 
reason of a surrogate agreement.
The Abortion Act 1967, which applies to 
England, Wales and Scotland, lays down the
485. Compare Teo, Wesley D.H., "Abortion: the 
Husband's Constitional Rights", (1974-5) 85 
Ethics, 337.
486. [1983] 1 Qd. R. 386.
487. Attorney General (ex rel Kerr) v. T., [1983] 1
Q d . R. 404. Note that judges in both cases
consider their decisions as in accordance with
legal principles rather than concerning 
themselves with the conflicting moral and 
religious views on abortion. See Paton, supra, 
cit., at p. 278; K. v. T., supra, cit., at p. 397.
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circumstances under which an abortion can be legal.
As long as an abortion is legal, that appears to be 
the end of the matter.488
In America, since a woman has a limited right 
to abortion, the question may be whether a surrogate 
can waive her (limited) right to abortion by an 
agreement, and further, whether such a waiver should 
be irrevocable.
This question should not, however, overshadow a 
more important issue: how can the commissioning 
parties enforce this waiver without unacceptably 
infringing the liberty of a surrogate to decide 
whether or not to continue with the pregnancy?488 
Furthermore, should the commissioning parties have the 
right to enforce a surrogate's waiver? Given the 
importance of a woman's freedom to choose in relation 
to procreation and/or the use of her gestational 
function, it appears extremely unlikely that a court 
would hold that a surrogate has legally bound herself 
to continue her pregnancy.
Consequently, where a surrogate wishes to have 
an abortion within the ambit set by the law, no other 
party can prevent her. The 'carrying term' in a 
surrogate agreement, therefore, cannot be
488. Cn the abortion law in England and Wales and 
Scotland, see Mason, J.K. & McCall Smith, R.A., 
Law and Medical Ethics, London, Butterworths,
1983. chapter 5.
489. See supra, chapter 3 on the right to privacy and 
the right to reproduce.
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contractually enforceable.
The 'Pre-natal Care Term1
The enforceability of a 'pre-natal care term' 
through the judicial process, again, is questionable.
The principles governing contractual equitable
remedies in the British courts are that specific
performance of a personal service contract will not be
ordered, not only because it may amount to an
unacceptable infringement of one's liberty, but also
because such an order may also be futile (in that
involuntary performance may result in something that
is far from satisfactory). Nor will the courts issue
a decree of injunction if the result is directly or
indirectly to order the specific performance of a
450personal service contract. Thus, it appears
extremely unlikely that a court will use its equitable 
remedies to order a surrogate to adhere to the 
'pre-natal care term'.
However, since the 'transfer term' is 
unenforceable, the question really is, will a court 
uses its equitable remedies to enforce a contractual 
term to undertake pre-natal care?
490. See generally, Treitel, G.R., "Specific
Performance and Injunction", in Chi tty on 
Contract, General Principles, Vol. 1, (24th Ed.),
London, Sweet and Maxwell, 197 7, p. 1631; Walker,
D .to., The Law of Contract and Related Obligations
in Scotland, (2nd E d .), London, Butterworths,
1985, pp. 540-544.
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There are no British precedents suggesting that
the court would be willing, or ought, to take on such
a task irrespective of contract.491 In the recent
4 go
English case of Re D (a Minor) , the House of
Lords upheld the care order of Berkshire Social
Services respecting a heroin addict's baby who was
born with drug withdrawal symptons. The decision was
based on the interpretation of "is being" in Sl(2) of
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, which says:-
"If the court before which a child...is 
brought...is of opinion that any of the 
following conditions is satisfied...(a) 
his proper development is being 
unavoidably prevented or neglected or his 
health is being unavoidably impaired or 
neglected or he is being il1-treated:- 
and and that he is in need of care and 
control... then... the court may if it 
thinks fit make such an order..."
It was held that, in deciding whether any of the
conditions in Section 1(2) was satisfied, the justices
were entitled to have regard to the fact that the
mother had taken drugs during her pregnancy.
Furthermore, in this context, the court could take
into account the hypothetical future of the 
493situation.
491. Some American cases do suggest that the court may 
intervene in some extreme circumstances in the 
interests of the child, but not continuing 
supervision of the progress of a pregnancy to 
ensure foetal health, see Weinberg, S.R., "A 
Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health?" (1983) 58 
Indiania Law Journal, 531.
492. The Times, 5 December, 1986, p. 15.
493. That is, would the condition that had existed 
have been likely to continue had the move of 
protecting the child not been commenced.
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To that extent, the case is primarily concerned
with what are the relevent factors in determining
494one's suitability for parenting. It may have an
indirect impact on the behaviour of pregnant women, 
but it is far from suggesting that the courts 
supervise, or will supervise, the conduct of a 
pregnant woman. Consequently, the 'pre-natal care 
term' in a surrogacy arrangement is unlikely to be 
enforceable in courts.
494. It has been a controversial decision in this
respect. See Guardian, 9 December, 1986, p. 12.
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The preceding discussion obviously is of very 
little practical significant if the 'transfer term' in 
a surrogacy arrangement is unenforceable.
Nonetheless, it has demonstrated that it may be too 
sweeping a statement to say that a surrogacy 
arrangement is void and unenforceable, since clearly, 
there are terms in a surrogacy arrangement that may 
not necessarily be void as contrary to public policy, 
albeit that their enforceability is highly 
questionable. Enforcement of the 'pre-natal care 
term' is too invasive to an individual's liberty, and 
the British Abortion Act 19 67 lays down the 
circumstances under which abortion is lawful. 
Consideration such as contract, therefore, is 
irrelevant.
45 5As noted above, the fact the 'transfer 
term' and other essential terms in a surrogacy 
arrangement are unenforceable, does not defeat the 
right to found a family (whether through reproduction 
or not). If this is so, the more important issue may 
relate to the position of a surrogate-born child.
Who are the parents of a surrogate-born child? 
Clarification of this issue will clearly be in the 
best interests of a surrogate-born child.
495. see supra. PP- 215-231.
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The Warnock Report considered the question of
496motherhood (but not fatherhood), notwithstanding
its recommendation which, if accepted, would render
criminal, "actions of professionals and others who
knowingly assist in the establishment of a surrogacy 
497pregnancy."
In the following section, the question of 
parenthood in surrogacy will be considered. The 
following terms will be used very often, and 
therefore, the adopted definition is important. 
'Parent', 'mother' and 'father' are used to denote a 
legal relationship between an adult and a child. The 
undernoted terms, however, are purely descriptive, 
'Biological mother/father' refers to a woman/man who 
contributes an ovum/semen to the creation of a 
child. 'Ovum/semen donor' refers to a biological 
mother/father who has donated her or his genetic 
gametes. 'Social/commissioning mother/father (or 
parties) refers to a woman/man who intends to rear a 
child regardless of her or his genetic link with the 
child. 'Surrogate/bearing mother' refers to a woman
who bears a child regardless of her genetic link with
• , ^ 498the child. As will be seen, a commissioning
father who is also a biological father will not be
regarded as a semen donor.
496. para. 8.20.
497. para. 8.18
498. see infra, p. 234.
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(3) PARENTHOOD AND SURROGACY
499As has been noted, the question of 
parenthood in natural procreation, is based on 
genetics:- a biological mother and father are parents 
of a child, and are accorded at least parental duties 
regarding the child.
Surrogacy, as implemented by artificial 
reproductive techniques, is a completely novel 
concept, and one major legal problem it engenders is:- 
who are the parents of a surrogate-born child (and 
thus have parental duties, at least, regarding the 
child)?
Who is the father? Is he the commissioning 
father (who may or may not be the biological father), 
or is he the semen donor? Is the mother the 
commissioning mother (who may or may not be the 
biological mother), the surrogate (who may or may not 
be the biological mother), or the ovum donor? Since 
all these permutations are technically possible, it 
should be clear that an attempt to rationalise the 
situation is needed.
499. See supra, chapter 5, p. 13 3.
- 232 -
Fatherhood
A surrogate-born child has two possible 
candidates as his or her father; the semen donor 
(where, for example, the commissioning father is 
sterile), or the commissioning father (who may be the 
biological father, as in the case of partial 
surrogacy).
As has argued b e f o r e , a c c o r d i n g  to the 
'donation rationale' a donor should have no rights or 
liabilities regarding a resulting child. The 
'donation rationale', as exemplified by the 'AID 
provision', which suggests that where a wife receives 
AID the husband should be considered the father of the 
child unless non-consent is proven, and that a semen 
donor will have no rights or liabilities regarding the 
child born as a result, can however cause at least two 
problems in partial surrogacy.
For instance, in California, the AID law deems
a husband irrefutably to be the father of an AID
301 . . .child. This can have application to partial
surrogacy, where a surrogate has a husband, and she
undertakes to be artificially inseminated using the
semen of the commissioning father. The result will
be that a surrogate-born child will be regarded,
irrefutably, as the child of the surrogate and
500. See supra, chapter 5.
501. See Parker, Diana, "Surrogate Mothering: An 
Overview," (1984) 14 Fam. Law, 140, 141.
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her husband, even if the husband had nothing to do
with the surrogate arrangement, and the purpose of the
surrogacy is to enable the commissioning parties to
have a child. This result is undesirable for a
number of reasons.
First, the husband becomes the father for no
logical reason. Fatherhood is attributed to him on a
purely fortuitous basis; that is, he happens to be the
husband of the surrogate. Second, this is totally
contrary to the intention of the parties.
Even if an AID law is framed in a less rigid
form, (for example, if it allows a husband to prove
his non-consent to his wife's AID, and consequently,
he is not regarded, by the AID law, as the father of
502the resulting child), may the commissioning
father, who is the biological father, be excluded by
503the 'corollary princple1 as a semen donor? If
so, who is the father?
502. See Syrkowski v. Appleyard 420 Mich. 367
(1985 j". In this case, a married surrogate was 
artificially inseminated using semen from the 
commissioning father. The AID statute in 
Michigan was similar to the 'AID provision', (see 
supra, chapter 5). The surrogate's husband had 
signed an affidavit of non-consent to his wife's 
AID. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that 
the circuit court had jurisdiction under the 
Paternity Act to identify the father of a 
surrogate-born child despite the statutory 
presumption of the AID statute.
503. In fact, the 'corollary principle' cannot exclude 
the commissioning father because by the very 
definition of the term used here, he is not a 
semen donor, see supra, p. 230.
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This discussion shows that if an 'AID 
provision' is not to have unintended consequences in 
partial surrogacy, it has to be very carefully framed.
Where the commissioning father is the 
biological father, for instance, in partial s u r r o g a c y ,  
he should be distinguished from a semen donor, since - 
unlike the standard case of semen donation - he never 
intends to divest himself of his responsibilities and! 
liabilities regarding a surrogate-born child born as a 
result of a surrogate's artificial insemination using 
his semen. Consequently, he should not be excluded 
from being the father of a surrogate-born child by use 
of the 'corollary principle1.
In the case where the commissioning father is 
not the biological father of a surrogate-born child, 
the 'donation rationale1 should apply since an
anonymous semen donor should not be regarded, as the
5 O' 4 -father. As argued before," ' * the ccnacico 
rationale1 which is an exception to me. 'generic 
mode', when applied will regard a can woo is non m e  
biological father, as the latner or a c m  m  , m e r e  ne 
consents to a woman's pregnancy m r c c g n  A~ or
The same principle could eg m m  a g y m  . e
surrogacy, although the nam.re or t r. e c m  s e n  
respect of the two men invcn/ec nee sc .m 
distinguished. In the case os m e  c n n . - ^ n  .n .n.
504. tee supra, one peer s, pp. - s ^ - .
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father, his consent is to a surrogate's carrying a 
child using semen from a donor so that he can found a 
family. Where a surrogate has a husband, his consent 
will relate to the wife's participation in 
surrogacy. This distinction is necessary to avoid 
the situation of attributing fatherhood to the 
surrogate's husband, and depriving the commissioning 
father of fatherhood; a result which would be totally 
contrary to the intention of all parties.
In sum, in surrogacy, where a commissioning 
father is the biological father, he should be regarded 
as father of a surrogate-born child. In other words, 
he is not a semen donor. Where he is not the 
biological father, he should be regarded as father on 
the ground that he has consented to the surrogate's 
pregnancy, whether through AI or IVF, for the founding 
of a family by him. Here, his consent should be 
distinguished from that of a surrogate's husband (if 
she has one). A surrogate's husband should not be 
regarded as father of a surrogate-born child, because 
if he had consented to his wife's pregnancy, the 
nature of his consent would relate only to his wife's 
surrogacy. This caveat should apply equally to a 
surrogate's male partner who consents to her surrogacy 
if what has been argued previously about extending the
application of the 'AID provision' to unmarried
. . 505 couples is accepted.
505. See supra, chapter 5, pp. 140-143.
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Motherhood
The Warnock Report, as has been noted,
recommended that when a child is born to a woman
following donation of another's egg, the woman giving
birth should, for all purposes, be regarded in law the
mother of the child, and that the egg donor should
have no rights or duties in respect of the 
507 . .child. Similarly, it recommended that a woman
carrying a donated embryo should be regarded as the
508mother of the child. These recommendations are
apparently the results of a consistent application of
509the 'donation rationale'.
In relation to surrogacy, the Viarnock Report 
recommended that whether in a case of partial or full 
surrogacy, (that is, irrespective of whether the
surrogate is the biological mother), the surrogate
510should be regarded as the mother of the child.
This will hereinafter be called the 'surrogacy
recommendation'. The Report considered that the two
types of surrogacy could be covered by its
recommendations regarding egg and embryo donation,
even though it acknowledged that "the egg or embryo
511has not been donated".
506. See sux^r a . chapter 5, p. 144.
507. See para. 6.8.
508. See para. 7.6.
509. See sux^ra. chapter 5, pp.
510. See para. 8.20
511. para . 0.20.
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This 'surrogacy recommendation', although
■ - . 512widely accepted, is rather curiously expressed.
If there is no donation of ovum or embryo to a
surrogate, why then should a surrogate become the
mother in a situation where she is not the biological
mother, given that the 'genetic mode', presumably, is
the basis for motherhood?
Analysis of the issue of motherhood in 
surrogacy reveals that the real basis for attributing 
motherhood is that a woman has borne a child - which 
will hereinafter be called the 'bearing factor' - 
rather than the use of the 'genetic mode'.
The 'bearing factor 1 as a basis for defining
motherhood is, in fact, consonant with the attribution
of motherhood in both natural and artificial
procreation. For instance, although motherhood in
cases of natural procreation, AI and IVF (whether
donated ovum is used or not) may be explained, as it 
513has been, in terms of the 'genetic mode' and the
'donation rationale', there is no one case where the 
application of these principles does not invariably
512. The 'surrogacy recommendation' is widely 
accepted. See eg. Lord Denning's attempt to 
amend the Surrogacy Arrangements Bill 1985 to 
make a surrogate mother of the child whom she has 
borne. Hansard, H.L. Vol. 465, Col.927. See 
also the Surrogacy Arrangements (Amendment) Bill 
1986, sponsored by the Earl of Halsbury. Clause 
2 seeks to make a surrogate the mother of the 
child.
513. See supra, chapter 5, pp. 133-145.
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accord motherhood to a bearer of a child.514
The 'bearing factor' as a basis for motherhood 
is entirely different from the 'genetic mode' for 
fatherhood. Nonetheless, they can both be logically 
justified according to the different role men and 
woman play in natural and artificial procreation.
The 'bearing factor' suggests that bearing a 
child is both a necessary and a sufficient condition 
of the attribution of motherhood. The role played by 
the woman who carried and gave birth to a child is so 
significantly different from the role played by the 
male partner that the 'genetic mode' has less 
significance in determining motherhood.
Summary: Parenthood in Surrogacy
According to what has been said above, a 
carrying woman should always be regarded as the mother 
of the child. This conclusion is the same as that of 
the 'surrogacy recommendation'. Equally, a 
commissioning father should always be regarded as the 
father of a surrogate-born child, either because he is 
the biological father (not a semen donor), or because • 
he has acquired the liabilities of a father through 
consenting to the surrogate's pregnancy, with the 
ultimate aim of his founding a family.
514. See supra, chapter 5. pp. 133-145.
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(4 ) CONCLUSION
In this chapter, two major legal issues 
concerning the founding of a family through surrogacy 
have been examined. According to the present UK law, 
a surrogate arrangement is not illegal or unlawful. 
Nonetheless, a 'transfer term' in a surrogacy 
arrangement is void and unenforceable. In a dispute 
about the custody of a surrogate-born child, the best 
interests of the child will dictate the outcome.
Other terms in a surrogacy arrangement, such as the 
'carrying term' and the 'pre-natal care term' are 
unenforceable, rather than void, on the ground that 
they are contrary to public policy.
Since an individual's right to found a family
(whether through' reproduction or not) is negative in
nature, there is no obligation on the part of the
legislature or the courts to enforce the 'transfer
term' in a surrogate arrangement, (nor would such a
step be compatible with the argument in the previous
chapter that a state's interest is to ensure that
mothers are not coerced into surrendering their 
515children). Consequently, those who choose
surrogacy as a means to found a family do so at their 
own peril.
The argument that an individual's right to 
found a family (whether through reproduction or not)
515. See supra, chapter 6, pp. 193-194.
- 240 -
does not oblige a state to review and modify the 
unsatisfactory applications of current definitions of 
parenthood in respect of artificial reproductive 
techniques applies equally to surrogacy. Thus, 
legislative reform would codify our understanding of 
what is entailed in gamete donation, and would equate 
to our sense of responsibility in the use of donated 
gametes for the founding of a family. More 
importantly, it is compatible with the best interests 
of children.
If the unsatisfactory nature of the current 
concept of parenthood as applied to artificial 
reproductive techniques and surrogacy, and the 
proposed solutions are accepted, the inherent problems 
can be removed by several legislative provisions 
modifying the concept of parenthood respecting 
artificial reproductive methods.
Such changes may take the following form:- 
first, that a woman who bears a child is deemed to be 
the mother of that child. Second, fatherhood: refers 
to either (i) a biological father who uses his semen 
for the AI of the mother, or the creation of an embryo 
which is inserted into the womb of the mother; or (ii) 
where donated semen is used for the above purpjoses, a 
man who consents to such a use. This last 
possibility excludes a male partner of a surrogate who 
may have consented to her surrogate pregnancy.
This recommendation in respect of fatherhood is
- 241 -
realistic. It reflects the intention of semen 
donors, and men who wish to found a family through the 
use of donated semen. As suggested earlier, if the 
'donation rationale' operates to negate the parental 
rights and duties of a man who donates semen, cases of 
donation must be distinguished from cases where there 
is no donation of semen. The importance of this can 
clearly be seen by reference to the position of a 
commissioning father in partial surrogacy. In the 
case of a woman, the 'bearing factor' determines 
motherhood. Consequently, the question of ouvm 
donation has no real importance.
516In the foregoing chapters, the 
acceptability of artificial reproductive methods for 
the founding of a family (whether through reproduction 
or not), and some of the major legal difficulties 
associated with them, have been examined and 
considered. The conclusion so far is that they 
should be acceptable means for the founding of a 
family, because an individual's right to found a 
family (whether through reproduction or not) has not 
been defeated by any compelling reasons. The 
problems identified in the foregoing chapters merely 
justify regulation which may restrict the scope of an 
individual's right. In the penultimate chapter of 
this thesis, the question of funding of artificial 
reproductive techniques will be considered.
516. chapters 4-7.
CHAPTER 8
STATE FUNDING OF ARTIFICIAL TECHNIQUES
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(1) INTRODUCTION
It has been argued here that the two negative 
claim rights (to reproduce and to found a family) 
support the claim of the infertile to use artificial 
reproductive methods to found a family (whether 
through reproduction or not). Nevertheless,
these rights do not address the issue of state funding 
of artificial techniques. Yet the question of 
funding may have important implications for the 
practicalities of access to these techniques, and 
thereby will play a role in the extent to which at 
least some of the infertile may vindicate their 
rights.
If a case for public funding is to be made, two 
possible forms of argument could be adopted. First, 
it could be asserted that both the right to reproduce 
and the right to found a family are in fact positive 
claim rights, despite what has been said 
earlier.51^ Alternatively, one could employ 
utilitarian arguments for funding.
517. See supra, chapter 3.
518. See supra, chapter 3.
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(2) ARGUMENT FROM RIGHTS
Here the argument is that the right to 
reproduce and the right to found a family are positive 
claim rights, thus justifying state funding to assist 
the infertile to found a family (whether through 
reproduction or not). Clearly, the argument that the 
right to reproduce is a positive claim right 
specifically relates to the provision of positive 
assistance to enable reproduction. The right to 
found a family, as a positive claim right, would 
involve a more general contention. Thus, to 
accommodate such a right, a state might have an 
obligation to, for example, encourage
non-abortion in order to increase the number of babies
available for adoption and/or providing funding for
519artificial reproductive techniques.
Since the suggestion that the right to 
reproduce and the right to found a family are positive 
claim rights is relatively novel, arguments on this 
proposition, to a large extent, are relatively 
unexplored, and have to be constructed.
Right to Reproduce As a Positive Claim Right
When considering the argument that there is a
519. See Herbenick, Raymond M., "Remarks on Abortion, 
Abandonment and Adoption Opportunities", in 
O'Neil, Onora & Rucdick, William (eds.), Having 
Children, Philosophical and Legal Reflections on
Parenthood, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1977, p. 52.
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positive claim right to reproduce, it may be useful to
have some rough idea as to the extent of public
assistance which may be demanded if the right is
established. Although, AI is a relatively cheap
technique, when compared to IVF, it may become more
expensive because of the necessity of screening semen
for, for example, the AIDS virus. The birth of a
recent 'test-tube' baby was said to have cost 
520£5,000. This, however, is not the average cost
for a successful IVF baby. IVF treatment has a
relatively low success rate, and some couples may need
to go through a number of treatments without
successfully becoming pregnant. Thus, the cost of
artificial reproductive techniques to assist people to
reproduce could present a substantial demand on public
resources, even if confined to assisting those who
have physical impediments which prevent reproduction.
When sterile people are considered, a positive
right to reproduce can represent an even heavier
demand on public resources. For instance, the
sterile could claim state funding to render them
fertile, or state funding of research to that end. A
positive claim right could also mean that the state
has a duty to provide a partner for those who are
521single, for procreatlonal purposes.
520. See the Times, 24 April 1987, p. 3.
521. Thus, flying in the face of current legal 
understanding of the concept of the right to 
reproduce, see supra, chapter 3, pp. 51—70.
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To that extent, the claim that the right to 
reproduce is a positive claim right is weak and its 
implications likely to be unacceptable. Indeed, it 
is not often presented in this way. A positive claim 
right to found a family may, however, seen to be a 
more feasible proposition, perhaps, because some may 
consider that family units are more important both to 
society and to individual development, than is 
procreation per s e . In the following section, some 
arguments for and against the assertion of a positive 
claim right to found a family will be considered.
Right to Found a Family as a Positive Claim
Right
One obstacle to the suggestion that there is a
positive claim right to found a family is the
contention that British society currently does not
assist people to found a family either through
reproduction or adoption (except for infertility
treatments, such as, hormone injections, tubal
522surgery, AI and IVF). State funding in relation
to pregnancy and childbirth can be explained and
defended on grounds other than that the state - in
recognition of the existence of a positive claim right
to found a family - is obliged to assist people to
523
found a family through reproduction.
5 22. See infra. pp. 252-254.
523. See Uniacke Suzanne, "IVF and the Right to 
Reproduce", (1987) No. 3, Bioethics,.
(forthcoming).
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For instance, unpaid maternity leave may be 
defended on the ground that it is consistent with the 
belief that a mother should not be penalised for her 
family commitments, in the sense, for example, that 
without protection she would have to find another job 
after childbirth. Although paid maternity leave may 
be partly defended on the ground that having children 
is regarded unquestionably as fundamentally good to 
the individuals concerned and to society, it may also 
be defended on the ground that it will be in the 
interests of the mother (and indirectly in the 
interest of the child), in that the mother does not 
have to worry about finances during and after 
pregnancy. Family allowances also may be defended, 
on the grounds that the prevalent social attitude is 
that having children should not be confined to the 
wealthy, and that families should be assisted to 
attain a certain standard of living.
In other words, public assistance to people who
make commitments to founding a family through
reproduction can be explained in terms other than that
the state has a positive duty to fund a right to found
a family. It has, therefore, been argued that the
state has no obligation to fund people for having 
524children.
524. See Richards, J.R., The Sceptical Feminist: A
Philosophical Enquiry, Harmondsworth, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1983, Chapter 9.
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Similarly, public spending in relation to
adoption and ancillary services can be explained on
the ground of the state's obligation to 
525children. That is, it is recognised that
children's best interests can be served by being 
adopted by competent adults. Additionally, the state 
will benefit financially if obligations regarding 
children in its care are transfered to adults wishing 
to be parents. In other words, there does not appear 
to be any strong argument that the right to found a 
family is a positive claim right.
Notwithstanding this, one typical claim for 
state funding of artificial reproductive techniques is 
that, since the infertile suffer a great deal of 
distress, state funding should follow. The strength 
of this contention is, however, minimal. In a 
similar vein, it would be difficult to argue that one 
has a positive claim right to state funding for an 
activity, for example, being a successful dancer, 
merely because one's inability to pursue that 
privately will generate deep distress.
Sometimes, the claim for state funding to found 
a family is framed in terms of the fundamental human 
desire and need to have a family. This claim is
525. See Article 12 which does not guarantee the right 
to adopt, see supra, chapter 3, pp. 78-84.
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sometimes supported by citing the European Convention
526on Human Rights.
Clearly, to suggest that Article 12 alone 
sustains the case that founding of a family is a 
fundamental human desire and need is no more than an 
appeal to the authority of the Convention.
Nonetheless, Article 12 does endorse the generally 
unchallenged perception that the founding of a family 
is considered good, not only for the individuals 
concerned, but also for the continuing existence of 
society. As a matter of fact, the majority of adults 
do found families. Thus founding of a family may 
inevitably be regarded as a fundamental aspect of 
human existence.
527Yet, as said before, this conclusion only 
justifies no unwarranted interference with people's 
activity in founding a family. The claim that the 
pursuit of founding a family should be satisfied and 
fulfilled by collective sacrifices, not only in a 
minimal manner, but also in a rather substantial way, 
is a proposition that has not yet been satisfactorily 
demonstrated. Consequently, it is difficult to argue 
that there is a positive claim right to found a 
family.
526. See, for example, Edwards, R.G., "Fertilisation 
of Human Eggs In Vitro: Morals, Ethics, and the 
Law", (IS 74) 49 The Quarterly Review of Biology,
3 , at p . 10.
527. See supra, chapter 3, pp. 7 8-84.
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(3) UTILITARIAN ARGUMENTS
528As has been said, people can have a
passionate and fervent desire to have children. The
inability to do so, which affects a sizeable
proportion of the population, can cause an enormous
529amount of human suffering. Given this, there
may be a prima facie utilitarian-based argument that 
artificial reproductive techniques should be part of a 
state funded medical service. Further, infertility 
may cause serious psychological and mental 
illnesses. It may, therefore, be irrational to treat 
the symptoms rather than dealing with the causes at an 
earlier stage, for example, by the use of artificial 
techniques to alleviate infertility. Essentially, 
the case for state funded treatment of the infertile 
can thus be anchored to utilitarian considerations.
Nevertheless, utilitarian considerations for 
state funding of artificial reproductive techniques 
may not be simple. There are two aspects to this.
In the first place, assuming that state funding of 
artificial reproductive techniques is the best option 
to alleviate the distress caused by infertility, 
artificial reproductive techniques may not also be the 
best long term solution to the problem. A more
528. See supra, chapter 2.
529. See supra, chapter 1.
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cost effective strategy in spending public resources 
to tackle distress caused by infertility may be to
reduce the prevalance of infertility, for example, by
530prevention and education. If so, utilitarian
arguments may merely support temporary, rather than 
permanent, state funding of artificial 
reproduction.
In the second place, there may also be 
utilitarian arguments against state funding on a 
temporary basis. For instance, state funding of 
artificial reproductive techniques may be 
anti-utilitarian, if the expectations of infertile 
couples are raised and consequently dashed because of 
the low success rate of IVF. The degree of 
disappointment, of course, may be less intense if, for 
example, infertile people are warned about this. 
Nevertheless, one may argue that since infertility 
treatments can be highly taxing emotionally, money 
spent on these treatments may be more cost effectively 
employed in assisting people to cope with the fact of 
infertility, and assisting them to develop and pursue 
other interests. Futher, utilitarian arguments may 
rather support spending what limited public resources 
there are in areas which cause more accute distress
530. Given that a substantial number of people become 
infertile as a result of avoidable damage. See 
Uniacke Suzanne, "IVF and the Right to 
Reproduce", (1987) No. 3, Bioethics,
(forthcoming).
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and suffering than that caused by infertility, for
exapmle, in improving provisions for the handicapped
and those suffering from kidney failure.
Additionally, the possible harmful consequences to
future children, and the legal uncertainties which
artificial reproductive methods may create, may also
531form part of the utilitarian equation. In other
words, utilitarian arguments for state funding of 
artificial reproductive techniques may be less 
conclusive than it sometimes seems.
Obviously, utilitarian arguments may also be 
used against state regulation of the use of artificial 
reproductive methods, since time and resources will be 
needed. However, the resources required are for the 
satisfaction of rights of people to found a family 
(whether through reproduction or not) which can only 
be overriden by compelling consideration.
531. See supra, chapters 5 & 7.
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(4) CONSISTENT HUMANITARIANISM
In the preceding section, it has been suggested
that there may be no arguments to support the
assertion of positive claim rights to reproduce and to
found a family. However, the claim of the infertile
to state funding of artificial reproductive techniques
to found a family (whether through reproduction or
not) may be advanced by using another type of
argument. The strength of this consistent
humanitarian argument, as will be explained below, may
be augmented by utilitarian considerations in favour
of state funding.
The consistent humanitarianism argument has two
aspects. First, it may be contended that an affluent
society, like Britain, does not, and should not,
ignore the plight of the infertile. This argument
appeals to the humanitarian attitude which prevails in
affluent societies.
Indeed, when the claim to state funding of
artificial techniques is compared with (i) current
spending on treatments that alleviate other causes of 
5 5 2distress, and (ii) current spending on
non-artificial infertility treatments, some
expenditure on artificial techniques does not seem
533
entirely out of place.
532. Such as provisions of psychiatric treatment, 
plastic surgery, and dental services.
533. See Singer, P. & Wells, D., The Reproduction 
Revolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1984, pp. 64-66.
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For instance, the NHS currently spends a 
certain amount of its budget on various kinds of 
infertility treatments, from relatively inexpensive 
hormone injections, to expensive surgery aimed at 
re-opening blocked fallopian tubes. These 
non-artificial treatments clearly facilitate founding 
of a family (through reproduction) by restoring 
reproductive capacity or removing impediments that 
prevent reproduction.
One may, therefore, argue that existing 
expenditure on non-artificial treatments support 
funding of artificial techniques which will assist 
couples and individuals to found a family through 
reproduction. The outcome could therefore be 
equated. This support would include techniques such 
as, All!, AID, IVF & ER, IVF & ET and surrogacy (full 
and partial).
However, this argument from current spending on 
non-artificial infertility treatments will not support 
funding for the use of donated embryos, or donated 
embryo surrogacy:- that is, they do not equate where 
artificial reproductive techniques are used to create 
a child with no genetic connection with an individual, 
or a partner of a couple, for the founding of a 
family. This is reconcilable with the fact that the 
state does not fund individuals, or couples, in their 
endeavours to have a family through adoption.
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The consistent humanitarianism argument, thus,
does support some funding for a wide variety of
artificial techniques, including some forms of
surrogacy. Indeed, limited funding is currently
5 34
available for AI & IVF. Since the acceptability
to society of surrogacy is so uncertain at the moment, 
it is unlikely that funding will be made available in 
the near future. The argument, however, is that 
since surrogacy is not necessarily unacceptable, and 
that it can achieve the the same end as some of the 
artificial techniques, it should not be discriminated 
against where funding is available.
534. However, the extent of funding is a question of 
the allocation of medical resources which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For further 
discussion, see Brand, Ian, "Allocation of Health 
Care Resources", in Brumby, M.N. (e d . ) , 
Proceedings of the Conference In Vitro 
Fertilisation: Problems and Possibilities, 
Victoria, Australia, Monash Centre for Human 
Bioethics, 1982; "Don't Strain the NHS, Test-Tube 
Baby Team Told", The Guardian, 13 June, 1987, p. 
5.
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(5) CONCLUSION
It has been argued that the rights to reproduce
and to found a family are not positive claim rights
obliging a state to fund artificial reproductive
techniques for the founding of family (whether through
reproduction or not). The claim for funding on
utilitarian grounds may be indecisive. But
utilitarian reasons in favour of funding can augment
the argument of consistent humanitarianism for state
funding of some artificial techniques, enabling an
individual to reproduce and to found a family. But
the consistent humanitarian argument does not apply to
the founding of a family by an individual.
The question as to who is entitled to funding
is complex, and must be linked with the issue of
eligibility and availability of resources. But
according to the arguments in this chapter, certain
people will definitely be excluded.
For instance, a woman may wish to use IVF & ET
surrogacy in order to reproduce and found a family,
because she does not want pregnancy to interrupt her • 
535career. A homosexual may wish to use partial
surrogacy in order procreate and found a family by 
avoiding the necessity of compromising his or her 
sexual preference.
535. This is sometimes called surrogacy for
convenience. It may be argued that it is a 
value-laden term.
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Their claim for state funding is extremely 
weak. First, there is great doubt as to whether 
humanitarianism applies to these cases where 
individuals have deliberately chosen not to reproduce 
and found a family for personal reasons.
In the case of a career woman, her case for 
funding of IVF & ET is that an alternative to 
surrogacy may be that she herself will have to become 
pregnant which will be detrimental to her career.
The essence of her argument, therefore, amounts to 
suggesting that the rest of the community should pay 
to achieve a situation which is regarded as necessary 
for career success, namely, a career life 
uninterrupted by pregnancy.
In a similar vein, the argument of the 
homosexual amounts to saying that since compromising 
one's sexual preference is personally so undesirable, 
the rest of the community should provide for an 
alternative means of procreation and founding of a 
family. In other words, the rest of the community 
should pay for the consequences of one's sexual 
preference. Both of these claims appear less than 
exigent.
Secondly, these claims are inconsistent with 
the conclusion that the right to reproduce and the 
right to found a family are essentially negative claim 
rights. That is, having children essentially is, and 
should be, a chosen way of life, and that individuals
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do not generally have a claim against the state in 
respect of their endeavours to have children.
For those who are entitled to state funded 
artificial techniques, preference may be given to some 
for certain reasons. For instance, first preference 
may be given to couples, both of whom have the right 
to reproduce and the right to found a family. This 
will be so in the case of a couple who are infertile 
because there are physical impediments to reproduction 
and founding of a family. This preference may be 
justified on the ground that such a treatment is most 
cost effective in that it can satisfy four rights (the 
rights of the couple to reproduce and to found a 
family).
In the case of a couple where one partner is 
sterile, (eg. where the husband is sterile), three 
rights can be satisfied through administering AID to 
the wife. This example may be given priority over a 
case of a single woman with blocked fallopian tubes, 
because in the latter situation, the IVF technique 
will only satisfy the single woman's right to 
reproduce and to found a family.
Nonetheless, one may question preferences in 
state funded treatment on the basis of maximising 
rights. For example, in the above two cases, both 
women have the right to reproduce and the right to 
found a family. Any preference given to the wife on
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the basis of the fortuitous fact that treating her 
will also satisfy the right to found a family of her 
husband may be somewhat dubious. However, a more 
plausible reason for distinguishing the two cases may 
be based on the best interests of children; the 
general belief of society is still that two-parent 
family is better for children.
It must be concluded, therefore, that the 
nature of rights to reproduce and to found a family - 
as negative claim rights - require a policy of 
non-interference rather than compelling active legal 
or financial support from the state. This 
conclusion, of course, has implications for the 
practical value of the rights. On the one hand, 
unless otherwise open to well-reasoned and convincing 
charges of immorality, artificial reproductive methods 
capable of vindicating these rights should not be 
banned by the state. To do so would be an 
unwarranted intrusion into the rights of 
individuals. However, the same approach will justify 
non-funding of artificial techniques, since the state 
equally is not obliged by the nature of the rights 
actively to support or facilitate the use of 
artificial reproductive methods. Taken simply, 
therefore, the conclusion could be that artificial 
methods should be available, but that they will be
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pragmatically available only to those who can afford
.. 536them.
However, the implications of this last 
conclusion need not be so stark. Once a state does 
make funding available, then - although it may be 
doing more than that to which it has an obligation - 
the focus changes from the question as to whether 
funding should be made available to become how much 
and to whom. The final decisions here will, 
however, require complex assessments, which are 
outwith the scope of this thesis.
536. See Richards, Tessa, " IVF Update", (1986) 292
British Medical Journal, 1156. Today, there are 
25 medical centres in Britain offering IVF 
treatment. Of these, only one is operated on 
the JS1HS.
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION
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Infertility is a significant human problem 
which can cause distress and suffering. Artificial 
reproductive methods, A I , IVF and surrogacy, have been 
developed which can assist the infertile to found a 
family (whether through reproduction or not), and thus 
alleviate some of the unpleasant and distressing 
consequences of infertility. The use of artificial 
reproductive methods, however, raises a number of 
complex moral, social and legal issues. Yet, debates 
on the subject have often been conducted in a vacuum 
in which no specific conceptual position is referred 
to. In attempting to fill this gap, the rights-based 
approach has been tested for its values and efficacy 
in this discussion.
Viewing infertility and its circumvention from 
such a perspective has several merits. First, such 
discourse is often used to validate claims which 
individuals feel to be particularly significant, and 
the circumvention of infertility is indeed perceived 
as a legitimate and strongly felt human interest. 
Furthermore, rights-talk is popular in issues 
fundamentally affecting one's private life such as 
reproduction and founding of a family. Rights-talk, 
thus, is the benchmark against which derogation is 
tested. To that extent, rights-talk is a useful tool 
whereby competing interests (between that of 
individuals, children and society) can be assessed and 
weighed. The question, therefore, as to whether the
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claim of the infertile to use artificial reproductive 
methods to found a family (whether through 
reproduction or not) can be justified, and the setting 
of limits on the kinds of intervention into an 
individual's liberty which are justifiable, can be 
discussed by reference to rights, and the 
identification and exposition of any rights can have 
important implications for society, medicine and the 
law.
In this thesis, it has been claimed that what 
permeates Western judicial thinking in the areas of 
reproduction and founding of a family is libertarian 
philosophy which supports the rights to reproduce and 
to found a family, both of which are negative claim 
rights. In other words, it is perceived that 
individuals (fertile or otherwise) should be given the 
widest possible freedom of choice in those areas. 
Consequently, any interference must be justified if 
rights are to be taken seriously. This applies to a 
fertile person's choice to use artificial reproductive 
methods, and a woman's choice to become a surrogate.
An individual, therefore, does not only have a right 
to choose whether and when to reproduce and to found a 
family, but also, in certain circumstance, h o w .
In the context of the infertile, a distinction 
between the rights of reproduction and founding a 
family is vital to the understanding of what it is 
about the rights of the infertile that is truly
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significant. Thus, some infertile people can only be 
said to have a right to found a family, and are not in 
the position to claim the right to reproduce in a 
meaningful way.
The implication of this thesis for the right to 
reproduce and to found a family is that any 
unwarranted interference with their vindication 
through the use of artificial reproductive methods is 
an infringement of rights. The effect of this 
varies. Where an individual's reproductive capacity 
is unimpaired, infringement of an individual's right 
to reproduce and to found a family has the effect of 
limiting freedom of choice. In the context of the 
infertile, since their means of founding a family 
(whether through reproduction or not) are very 
limited, unjustifiable interference with the use of 
artificial reproductive methods can have the serious 
effect of abrogating the right to reproduce, and 
severely limiting the right to found a family.
As has been argued in this thesis, there are no 
compelling moral and social reasons against the use of 
artificial reproductive techniques and surrogacy 
(whether in principle or with reasonable compensation) 
for the founding of a family.
The problems relating to A I , IVF, and the use 
of donated gametes, indicate that they should be 
regulated in order to put these iDractices on a 
socially acceptable basis, but do not justify banning
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them. Thus, there should be counselling serivces for 
those contemplating using artificial techniques. In 
the best interests of children born as a result of the 
donation of gametes, society should encourage openness 
with these children regarding the circumstances of 
their conception. Regulation should also extend to 
proper record keeping of births consequential to the 
donation of gametes, and counselling of children 
before providing access to birth records.
Current social practice is one which recognises 
the right to found a family (whether through 
reproduction or not) by interfering as little as 
possible in the use of artificial techniques. In 
other words, the rights of the infertile to reproduce 
and to found a family have been tacitly accepted and 
recognised.
Surrogacy, in comparison with artificial 
techniques, is a more controversial issue. A 
thorough analysis of the arguments against surrogacy 
(whether for money payment or not) reveals that some 
of the vehement opposition to the practice does not 
stand up to close scrutiny, and that others are of 
insufficient weight to defeat the rights to reproduce 
and to found a family. Notwithstanding this, there 
is indeed a major obstacle to the complete validation 
of surrogacy with money payment - this is the analogy 
with baby-selling. In other words, it is recognised
that the state does have a legitimate interest in
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regulating the means used to found a family, and that 
the involvement of money payment in that respect is 
not always acceptable.
However, it has been argued that not all cases 
of surrogacy with money payment should be equated with 
baby-selling. It is only in the case of surrogacy 
for a fee that this analogy can be most vigorously 
drawn. Thus, although surrogacy for a fee can be 
prohibited by the law, surrogacy in principle and 
surrogacy with reasonable compensation cannot. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that certain problems 
which are associated with these two types of surrogacy 
can be overcome, minimised or averted by regulation, 
just as adoption is currently regulated.
In other words, complete prohibition of 
surrogacy would be an excessive reaction by the law to 
the problems identified in surrogacy. Moreover, it 
would be an infringement of the right to privacy, 
incorporating the rights of individuals to reproduce 
and to found a family. A proper regulatory scheme 
for surrogacy is not, however, inconsistent with the 
vindication of individuals' rights. Such a scheme 
would improve the current British position in which, 
although courts can act in the best interests of 
surrogate-born children, they are powerless to 
regulate the propriety of money payment so as to avert 
the taint of baby-selling.
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The conclusion of this thesis, therefore, is 
that regulating the use of artificial reproductive 
techniques and surrogacy (whether in principle or with 
reasonable compensation) is reconcilable with the 
rights of individuals to found a family (whether 
through reproduction or not), given that their use can 
generate a number of legitimate concerns. Regulation 
is also consonant with the view that artificial 
reproductive methods are essentially means for the 
founding of a family, and a state has legitimate 
interests in ensuring the best interests of children 
who are the end products of these endeavours. 
Consequently, some kind of eligibility test is 
acceptable.
Given that artificial reproductive methods 
should be acceptable means for the founding of a 
family, certain legal issues become patently 
important.
The effects of artificial techniques and the 
use of donated gametes on marriage are non-issues 
today. However, the attribution of parenthood in 
artificial reproductive methods is not only an issue 
of general importance, but it is also vital in the 
founding of a family. As has been a r g u e d ,  a state is 
not obliged to review and  m o d i f y  the c u r r e n t  
definition of parenthood with the a i m o f  reflecting 
the reality o f  a r t i f i c i a l  r e p r o d u c t i v e  m e t h o d s  f o r  t h e
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founding of a family. Nonetheless, considerations 
from the perspective of pragmatism, individual 
responsibility, and most importantly, the best 
interests of children indicate the desirability of 
legislative reform on this issue.
Attempts, thus, have been made to demonstrate 
why the 'AID provision', and the Warnock Report's 
recommendations in respect of parenthood, are 
inadequate in comprehensively tackling the issue of 
parenthood in artificial reproductive methods. 
Proposals have been suggested for an alternative 
legislative approach.
Once the question of parenthood in artificial 
reproductive methods is clarified and settled, 
registration of parents will not be problematic, and 
the argument from the needs and interests of children 
would require that there should be proper record 
keeping of children born as a result of gamete 
donation, and possibly surrogacy, so as to facilitate 
future access to information by the person concerned.
The acceptance of some forms of surrogacy 
raises the further question of the enforceability of a 
surrogate arrangement. As argued, the 'transfer 
term' in a surrogacy arrangement is unenforceable, as 
are other essential terms in such an arrangement. 
Nevertheless, surrogacy may still be practically 
feasible for some individuals as a means of founding a 
family (whether through reproduction or not). Since
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the right to found a family is negative in nature, 
there is no obligation on a state to enforce a 
surrogate arrangement. However, given that 
regulation of surrogacy is desirable, then some kind 
of assessment regarding the likelihood of performance 
would be appropriate.
Notwithstanding that the right to reproduce and 
the right to found a family are essentially negative 
claim rights, which primarily demand no unwarranted 
interference with an individual's use of artificial 
reproductive methods for the founding of a family 
(whether through reproduction or not), a case can be 
made for state funding of some artificial techniques 
on the basis of consistent humantarianism. That is,
society should not, and does not, ignore the plight of 
the infertile.
This argument supports funding of artificial 
techniques which will enable an individual to 
reproduce and to found a family, but not the founding 
of a family without reproduction by an individual. 
Thus, embryo donation or embryo donation surrogacy for 
a sterile couple or individual need not be state 
funded. Nor would state funding be available to 
cases of a less exigent nature where an individual 
deliberately chooses not to reproduce and found a 
family for personal or social reasons. Nonetheless, 
all these people would have the option of resorting to 
artificial reproductive methods through private 
means.
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Since the acceptability of surrogacy to society 
at large is still uncertain, it is not envisaged that 
state funding will be available to implement some 
forms of surrogacy (which will assist an individual to 
reproduce and to found a family). Nonetheless, 
according to what has been argued in the thesis - that 
surrogacy is not necessarily unacceptable, and that 
society already spends a certain amount on artificial 
techniques for certain purposes - some forms of 
surrogacy should also be part of the state funded 
infertility treatments.
To put it very simply, an individual should be 
allowed to resort to artificial reproductive methods 
for the founding of a family subject to certain 
provisions regulating their use. However, the 
exercise of the right to found a family (whether 
through reproduction or not) may effectively depend 
upon one's ability to pay for the use of artificial 
techniques.
It is clear, therefore, that artificial 
reproductive methods can raise many moral, social and 
legal issues. It is, therefore, hoped that the 
approach adopted in this thesis has made a valuable 
contribution to the subject, and will generate further 
theoretically consistent debates on issues in the 
field of artificial reproduction.
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Appendix 1
Lord Denning moved an amendment to clause 1 of
the Family Law Reform Bill 1986 (see Weekly Hansard,
Vol. 484, No. 13 52, Col. 522). The amendment says:
"In this Act, unless the contrary 
intention appears -
"father" means the biological father, 
that is to say, the man by the use of 
whose semen insemination took place 
either naturally or artificially, or 
conception took place by the embryo 
insertion that resulted in the birth of 
the child."
"mother" means the carry mother, that is 
to say, the woman who begins to carry the 
child at the time of the insemination, 
or, as the case may be, embryo insertion 
that results in her carrying the child."
This amendment was withdrawn. On the question 
of motherhood, this amendment is acceptable.
On the question of fatherhood, this amendment 
is consonant with the 'genetic mode'. It merely 
re-states what is not generally doubted. For 
instance, where an artificial technique (AI or IVF) is 
used for reproduction and founding of a family by a 
couple (that is, where no donated gametes or surrogacy 
is employed) the couple are clearly the parents.
This amendment would not, however, 
comprehensively deal with the unsatisfactory 
application of the 'genetic mode' to other variants of 
artificial reproductive methods.
Similar comments can be made regarding Lord 
Kilbracken's amendement to clause 1 of the Family Law 
Reform Bill 1986 (see Weekly Ilandard, Vol. 484, No.
1352, Col. 526). It states,
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"In this Act:-
(a) references to the mother of a child 
shall be taken as being reference to the 
woman who gave birth to that child; and
(b) references to the father of a child 
shall be taken as being references to -
(i) the husband of that child's mother in 
the case of a man who was a party to a 
marriage that subsisted during all or
part of that child's gestation and was
not ended by dissolution or divorce 
before the child's birth; and
(ii) the genetic father in all other 
cases."
On the question of motherhood, this amendment 
has the same effect as Lord Denning's amendment.
On the question of fatherhood, however, it is 
unsatisfactory even in the context of the Act. It 
would mean that a child born to an adulterous 
relationship would be regarded as the child of the 
mother's husband. In relation to AID, Clause 27, 
merely creates a presumption that a husband will be 
the father of a child born as a result of the wife's
AID. The provision in (i) above has the effect of
making him the father regardless of the rebuttable 
presumption of consent. Further, the husband of a 
surrogate would be deemed to be the father of a 
surrogate-born child. In cases where AID is used by 
the unmarried, the donor is the father.
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Appendix 2
The English common law rule on agreements to transfer
parental rights and duties
It has been said that an agreement to transfer
parental rights and duties in English common law is
contrary to public policy and hence void and 
537
unenforceable. Although the unenforceability of
such an agreement is not disputed, there may be some
538doubt that such an agreement is void.
The English common law rule can be traced back
to some seventeenth centuries cases. In Walrond v. 
539Walrond, a husband agreed that the child of the
marriage should remain with the wife. This was held
to be "void as being contrary to the public policy of 
540the law." The court referred to two cases to
support this. They were Vansittart v.'
541 54-2Vansittart and Hope v. Hope. In both of
these cases, the courts, however, merely said that the
agreements were contrary to public policy as
537. See eg., Bromley, P. M . , Family Law, (5th Ed.), 
London, Butterworths, 1976, at p. 310, where it
was said that "any agreement which a parent 
purports to assign the custody of his minor child 
to another is contrary to public policy at common 
law and therefore void." See also Cusine, D.J., 
"'Womb-Leasing': Some Legal Implications", (1978) 
128/2 N.L.J. 824.
538. In the sense that it is an agreement that 
produces no legal effects whatsoever, and that 
neither party is able to sue the other on the 
contract.
539. (1858) Johns 18.
540. ibid., at p. 27.
541. (1858) 2 De G. & J. 249.
542. 8 De G.M. & G. 731.
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they interfered with the due discharge of the fathers 1 
duties with respect to their children.
In more recent cases, for example, in Re 
544
Andrews, a guardian appointed under the father's
will was held to be able to demand the custody of the
father's child regardless of an ante-nuptial agreement
between him and his wife. Archibald, J. held in
favour of the guardian and said that,
"The courts of common law, however, have 
always declined to give effect to any 
mere arrangement or consent on the part 
of the father disposing of the custody of 
his infant child..."545
546In R v. Smith, an agreement, by a father of a 
child that she should live with her uncle was held to 
be a mere consent. The father could revoke it.
In relation to an illegitimate child, the 
mother at common law is the sole guardian. Thus, an 
agreement by her to transfer parental rights is
547certainly unenforceable. In Humphrey v. Polak,
543. Lord Justice Turner said, "By article 1 of the 
agreement one of the children is to remain under 
the care of the plaintiff the mother...[A]s I 
apprehend, [it] is in contravention...of the 
settled law and policy of the country. The law 
of this country gives to the father the custody 
of the children and the control over them, and it 
gives him that custody and control not for his 
own gratification, but on account of his duties 
with reference to the public welfare." Hope v. 
Hope, 8 De G.M. Sc G. 731, at p. 744.
544. (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 153.
545. ibid., at p. 157 (emphasis mine).
546. (1853) 22 L.J. (Q.B.) 116.
547. [1901] 2 K.B. 385.
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the plaintiff, mother of an illegitimate child, sued
the defendants for damages (expenses in maintaining
her child) for breach of contract. It was alleged
that the defendents agreed to keep the child as their
own. In the Court of Appeal, it was held that the
contract could not be enforced.548
Thus, except in Walr ond548, agreements to
transfer parental rights and duties at common law are
merely unenforceable. Indeed, it has been suggested
that such agreements are not necessarily void. If
they are made for good consideration, they may not be
unenforceable.
"I do not say that there might not be an 
agreement by which a parent who was going 
abroad, or for some other reason was 
unable to take care of a child, might 
contract with other persons that they 
should take care of it, and that, if such 
a contract was made for good 
consideration, it might not be enforced 
in the event of a breach of it. "550
In other words, an agreement transfer parental rights
and duties may not be void, although all the cases do
suggest that in English common law rule such an
551agreement is unenforceable. Scottish cases on
54S. Vangham Williams L.J. said, "...as the promise 
the breach of which is complained o f ... I am 
clearly of opinion that such a promise as that 
cannot be enforced in a court of law." ibid. at 
p~! 388 ( empahs i s mine) .
549. supra, cit.
550. [1901J 2 K.B. 385, per Vangham Williams L.J., at 
p . 388.
551. See Chitty on Contracts, General Principles, Vol.
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this point offer a clearer picture as to what this 
means.
Agreements to transfer parental rights and duties in
Scottish common lav;
The Scottish common law position on an
agreement to transfer parental rights and duties is
that such an agreement is unenforceable.
552In MacPherson v. Leisham, a mother of an
illegitimate child agreed to hand over the child to
the custody of the father. It was held that the
553mother was not bound by the agreement.
554In Kerrigan v. Hall, a mother of an
1, (24th Ed.), London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1977, "A
contract by a parent to transfer parental rights 
and liabilities to another is against public 
policy. At common law a father had custody of 
his legitimate child and could not by contract 
bind himself to give up the control of...his 
children, or their custody." para. 960. (emphasis 
mine)
552. (1887) 14 R. 780.
553. "[The agreement] is not binding on the mother, 
because it is an interference with the legal 
right...even had there been an express 
stipulation that the arrangement should be 
permanent I should have entertained very great 
doubt whether the mother could be held to have 
effectively bound herself." (1887) 14 R. 780, 
at p. 782. Even in a case where the court 
rejects a petitioner's claim for the return of 
the child on the ground that it would be in the 
child's best interest to stay with the 
respondent, the court will not sanction any 
agreement between the two parties to the effect 
that the child should permanently stay with the 
respondent. See Sutherland v. Taylor (1887) 15
r. 224; Campbell v. Croall (1895) 22 R. 869, 
Kerrigan v. Ha11 (1901) 4 F. 10.
554. T1901) 4 F. 10.
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illegitimate child (the petitioner) agreed to have her
child boarded with the respondent. The rate of
aliment was being paid for by the mother. When the
mother demanded the return of the child, the
respondent alleged that there was an agreement that
the child should stay permanently with the latter.
55 5Such a defence was rejected by the court. Lord
McLaren said,
It may often be necessary for the parents 
of a child...to enter into an arrangement 
with a stranger for its board. Such a 
contract is enforceable in law, subject 
to the qualification that the law will 
not specifically enforce a contract where 
an order of specific performance would 
interfere with personal liberty...if a 
person makes a bargain to board in a 
certain home the law will not compel him 
to remain in the house in order that the 
lessor may earn the board, but will leave 
the lessor to seek relief in the form of 
damages."556
Lord Adam said,
"I can only say that I am not disposed to 
hold that the Court will enforce an 
agreement by which a woman is bound to 
permanently give up the custody of her 
child, though she might liable in damages 
as for breach of contract."557
In other words, the agreement may be good for
the purpose of supporting a pecuniary claim. Thus,
555. "It would...be very dangerous to allow a proof of
such an agreement as this, as it would come very
near to sanctioning the sale of a child by its 
parent. I am therefore satisfied that this 
defence cannot be sustained." ibid., at p. 13.
556. ibid., at p. 16.
557. ibid., at p. 15 (emphasis mine).
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the respondent in Kerrigan could use the agreement as
the basis for a claim for aliment had there been any
arrears (although it could not be used for claiming
the custody of the child). Conversely, the mother
could sue on the basis of the agreement for any
pecuniary loss she has incurred as a result of the
respondent's breach (for example, if she has already
paid for the boarding of the child for a specific
period, and the respondent breach the agreement before
the end of that period), though not for damages for
558maintaining the child in the future.
558. see Humphreys v. Polak supra, cit.
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